Workplace Safety Policy: Past, Present, and Future

With an annual budget of about $400 million, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is about 5 percent the size of the Environmental Protection Agency, another federal agency created by President Richard M. Nixon in 1970, the "Year of the Environment." Nearly all workers in the United States come under OSHA's juridction, with some notable exceptions, including miners, transportation workers, many public employees, and people who are self-employed. OSHA is currently responsible for ptoecting over 100 million workers at 6 million work sites with the help of only about 2,000 workplace health and safety inspectors. Nevertheless, suppoers of OSHA argue that it has significantly improved worker safety over the last 30 years and that a beefed-up enforcement effort would produce even greater improvements. We examine the available evidence and find little support to the notion that OSHA has effectively reduced accidents and diseases in the workplace or that a more vigorous enforcement campaign would be likely to do so. Other policy instruments--tort laws, state Workers' Compensation insurance programs, and research and public education on the causes and consequences of work hazards--now keep workplace deaths and injuries low and can reduce them even more. The wage premiums, estimated at$210 billion per year, that workers receive for accepting job-related health hazards give employers a stronger economic incentive to eliminate workplace health and safety hazards than the $132 million per year in fines imposed by OSHA and its state counterparts for violations of workplace safety standards. Because of the heterogeneity of workers and firms, we argue that public policy should expand the economic incentives for workplace safety while allowing firms and workers freedom to discover on their own the best ways to improve workplace safety.

Hedonic Wage Equilibrium: Theory, Evidence and Policy

We examine theoretically and empirically the properties of the equilibrium wage function and its implications for policy. Our emphasis is on how the researcher approaches economic and policy questions when there is labor market heterogeneity leading to a set of wages. We focus on the application where hedonic models have been most successful at clarifying policy relevant outcomes and policy effects, that of the wage premia for fatal injury risk. Estimates of the overall hedonic locus we discuss imply the so-called value of a statistical life (VSL) that is useful as the benefit value in a cost-effectiveness calculation of government programs to enhance personal safety. Additional econometric results described are the multiple dimensions of heterogeneity in VSL, including by age and consumption plans, the latent trait that affects wages and job safety setting choice, and family income. Simulations of hedonic market outcomes are also valuable research tools. To demonstrate the additional usefulness of giving detail to the underlying structure we not only develop the issue of welfare comparisons theoretically but also illustrate how numerical simulations of the underlying structure can also be informative. Using a reasonable set of primitives we see that job safety regulations are much more limited in their potential for improving workplace safety efficiently compared to mandatory injury insurance with experience rated premiums. The simulations reveal how regulations incent some workers to take more dangerous jobs, while workers’ compensation insurance does not (or less so).hedonic labor market equilibrium, VSL, panel data, job safety, OSHA, quantile regression, workers’ compensation insurance

Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement Efforts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, and New Health Implications

Studies of industrial safety regulations, OSHA in particular, often find little effect on worker safety. Critics of the regulatory approach argue that safety standards have little to do with industrial injuries, and defenders of the regulatory approach cite infrequent inspections and low penalties for violating safety standards. We use recently assembled data from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) concerning underground coal mine production, safety regulatory activities, and workplace injuries to shed new light on the regulatory approach to workplace safety. Because all underground coal mines are inspected at least once per quarter, MSHA regulations will not be ineffective because of infrequent inspections. We estimate over 200 different specifications of dynamic mine safety production functions, including ones using deliberately upward biased estimators, and cherry pick the most favorable mine safety effect estimates. Although most estimates are of insignificant MSHA effects, we select the single regression specification producing the most favorable MSHA impact from the agency viewpoint, which we then use in a policy evaluation. We address the question of whether it would be cost-effective to move some of MSHA's enforcement budget into alternative programs that could also improve the health of the typical miner. Even using cherry picked results most favorable to the agency, MSHA is not cost effective at its current levels. Even though MSHA is a small program when judged against others like OSHA and EPA, MSHA's targeted public health objective could be much better served (almost 700,000 life years gained on balance for typical miners) if a quarter of MSHA's enforcement budget were reallocated to other programs such as more heart disease screening or defibrillators at worksites.

Workplace Safety Policy: Past, Present, and Future

With an annual budget of about $400 million, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is about 5 percent the size of the Environmental Protection Agency, another federal agency created by President Richard M. Nixon in 1970, the Year of the Environment. Nearly all workers in the United States come under OSHA\u27s juridction, with some notable exceptions, including miners, transportation workers, many public employees, and people who are self-employed. OSHA is currently responsible for ptoecting over 100 million workers at 6 million work sites with the help of only about 2,000 workplace health and safety inspectors. Nevertheless, suppoers of OSHA argue that it has significantly improved worker safety over the last 30 years and that a beefed-up enforcement effort would produce even greater improvements. We examine the available evidence and find little support to the notion that OSHA has effectively reduced accidents and diseases in the workplace or that a more vigorous enforcement campaign would be likely to do so. Other policy instruments--tort laws, state Workers\u27 Compensation insurance programs, and research and public education on the causes and consequences of work hazards--now keep workplace deaths and injuries low and can reduce them even more. The wage premiums, estimated at$210 billion per year, that workers receive for accepting job-related health hazards give employers a stronger economic incentive to eliminate workplace health and safety hazards than the $132 million per year in fines imposed by OSHA and its state counterparts for violations of workplace safety standards. Because of the heterogeneity of workers and firms, we argue that public policy should expand the economic incentives for workplace safety while allowing firms and workers freedom to discover on their own the best ways to improve workplace safety

Hedonic Wage Equilibrium: Theory, Evidence and Policy

We examine theoretically and empirically the properties of the equilibrium wage function and its implications for policy. Our emphasis is on how the researcher approaches economic and policy questions when there is labor market heterogeneity leading to a set of wages. We focus on the application where hedonic models have been most successful at clarifying policy relevant outcomes and policy effects, that of the wage premia for fatal injury risk. Estimates of the overall hedonic locus we discuss imply the so-called value of a statistical life (VSL) that is useful as the benefit value in a cost-effectiveness calculation of government programs to enhance personal safety. Additional econometric results described are the multiple dimensions of heterogeneity in VSL, including by age and consumption plans, the latent trait that affects wages and job safety setting choice, and family income. Simulations of hedonic market outcomes are also valuable research tools. To demonstrate the additional usefulness of giving detail to the underlying structure we not only develop the issue of welfare comparisons theoretically but also illustrate how numerical simulations of the underlying structure can also be informative. Using a reasonable set of primitives we see that job safety regulations are much more limited in their potential for improving workplace safety efficiently compared to mandatory injury insurance with experience rated premiums. The simulations reveal how regulations incent some workers to take more dangerous jobs, while workersﾒ compensation insurance does not (or less so)

Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement Efforts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, and New Health Policy Implications

Studies of industrial safety regulations, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in particular, often find little effect on worker safety. Critics of the regulatory approach argue that safety standards have little to do with industrial injuries, and defenders of the regulatory approach cite infrequent inspections and low fines for violating safety standards. We use recently assembled data from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) concerning underground coal mine production, safety inspections, and workplace injuries to shed new light on the regulatory approach to workplace safety. Because all underground coal mines are inspected at least once per quarter, MSHA regulations will not be ineffective because of infrequent inspections. We estimate over 200 different specifications of dynamic mine safety production functions, including ones using deliberately upward biased estimators, and cherry pick the most favorable mine safety effect estimates. Although most estimates are of insignificant MSHA effects, we select the single regression specification producing the most favorable MSHA impact from the agency viewpoint, which we then use in a policy evaluation. We address the question of whether it would be cost-effective to move some of MSHA’s enforcement budget into alternative programs that could also improve the health of the typical miner. Even using cherry-picked results most favorable to the agency, MSHA is not cost effective at its current levels. Even though MSHA is a small program when judged against others like OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), MSHA’s targeted public health objective could be much better served (almost 700,000 life years gained on balance for miners) if a quarter of MSHA’s enforcement budget were reallocated to other programs such as more heart disease screening or defibrillators at worksites

Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement Efforts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, and New Health Policy Implications

Studies of industrial safety regulations, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in particular, often find little effect on worker safety. Critics of the regulatory approach argue that safety standards have little to do with industrial injuries and defenders of the regulatory approach cite infrequent inspections and low fines for violating safety standards. We use recently assembled data from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) concerning underground coal mine production, safety inspections, and workplace injuries to shed new light on the regulatory approach to workplace safety. Because all underground coal mines are inspected at least once per quarter, MSHA regulations will not be ineffective because of infrequent inspections. We estimate over 200 different specifications of dynamite mine safety production functions, including ones using deliberately upward biased estimators, and cherry pick the most favorable mine safety effect estimates. Although most estimates are of insignificant MSHA effects, we select the single regression specification producing the most favorable MSHA impact from the agency viewpoint, which we then use in a policy evaluation. We address the question of whether it would be cost-effective to move some of MSHA\u27s enforcement budget into alternative programs that could also improve the health of the typical miner. Even using cherry-picked results most favorable to the agency, MSHA is not cost effective at its current levels. Even though MSHA is a small program when judged against others like OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), MSHA\u27s targeted public health objective could be much better served (almost 700,000 life years gained on balance for miners) if a quarter of MSHA\u27s enforcement budget were reallocated to other programs such as more heart disease screening or defibrillators at worksites

Workplace Safety Policy: Past, Present, and Future

With an annual budget of about $400 million, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is about 5 percent the size of the Environmental Protection Agency, another federal agency created by President Richard M. Nixon in 1970, the Year of the Environment. Nearly all workers in the United States come under OSHA\u27s jurisdiction, with some notable exceptions, including miners, transportation workers, many public employees, and people who are self-employed. OSHA is currently responsible for projecting over 100 million workers at 6 million work sites with the help of only about 2,000 workplace health and safety inspectors. Nevertheless, suppers of OSHA argue that it has significantly improved worker safety over the last 30 years and that a beefed-up enforcement effort would produce even greater improvements. We examine the available evidence and find little support to the notion that OSHA has effectively reduced accidents and diseases in the workplace or that a more vigorous enforcement campaign would be likely to do so. Other policy instruments--tort laws, state Workers\u27 Compensation insurance programs, and research and public education on the causes and consequences of work hazards--now keep workplace deaths and injuries low and can reduce them even more. The wage premiums, estimated at$210 billion per year, that workers receive for accepting job-related health hazards give employers a stronger economic incentive to eliminate workplace health and safety hazards than the $132 million per year in fines imposed by OSHA and its state counterparts for violations of workplace safety standards. Because of the heterogeneity of workers and firms, we argue that public policy should expand the economic incentives for workplace safety while allowing firms and workers freedom to discover on their own the best ways to improve workplace safety

Data Mining CEO Compensation

The need to pre-specify expected interactions between variables is an issue in multiple regression. Theoretical and practical considerations make it impossible to pre-specify all possible interactions. The functional form of the dependent variable on the predictors is unknown in many cases. Two ways are described in which the data mining technique Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) can be utilized: first, to obtain possible improvements in model specification, and second, to test for the robustness of findings from a regression analysis. An empirical illustration is provided to show how MARS can be used for both purposes

Why Do Borrowers Pledge Collateral? New Empirical Evidence on the Role of Asymmetric Information

An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection, credit rationing, and other inefficiencies that arise when borrowers hold ex ante private information. There is no clear empirical evidence regarding the central implication of this literature - that a reduction in asymmetric information reduces the incidence of collateral. We exploit exogenous variation in lender information related to the adoption of an information technology that reduces ex ante private information, and compare collateral outcomes before and after adoption. Our results are consistent with this central implication of the private-information models and support the empirical importance of this theory