Development Through Synergistic Reform

Several studies suggest that production of high-quality output is a precondition for firms in less developed countries to participate in the export market. Institutional deficiencies that raise the costs of entry into high-quality production therefore limit the positive impact that trade liberalization can have on income or growth. Institutional reform that reduces the costs of entry into high-quality production and trade reform therefore have synergistic effects on income and, possibly, growth. In contrast, institutional reform that reduces the costs of entry into low-quality production (e.g., reforms targeted at small businesses) interferes with the impact of trade reform. The model that yields these results is also used to analyze impacts of foreign direct investment and of subsidies to entrepreneurship in the presence of unemployment.

Bureaucracy, Infrastructure, and Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Cities During the Progressive Era

Recent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private enterprise can flourish. I hypothesize that establishment of such a bureaucracy will lengthen the period that public decision makers are willing to wait to realize the benefits of expenditures, leading to allocation of a greater proportion of government resources to long-gestation period projects such as infrastructure. This hypothesis can be tested using data generated by a `natural experiment' in the early part of this century, when a wave of municipal reform transformed the governments of many U.S. cities. Controlling for city and time effects, adoption of Civil Service is found to increase the share of total municipal expenditure allocated to road and sewer investment. Other estimates imply that this increased share raises the growth rate of city manufacturing employment by one-half percent per year.

Trade and Search: Social Capital, Sogo Shosha, and Spillovers

A network/search view of international trade in differentiated products is proposed. It is shown that this view can explain the importance of ethnic and extended family ties in trade, the success of diversified trading intermediaries such as Japan's sogo shosha, and the ubiquity of government export promotion policies such as subsidized trade missions.

Productivity Gains From Geographic Concentration of human Capital: Evidence From the Cities

Based on recent theoretical developments I argue that the average level of human capital is a local public good. Cities with higher average levels of human capital should therefore have higher wages and higher land rents. After conditioning on the characteristics of individual workers and dwellings, this prediction is supported by data for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the United States, where the SMSA average levels of formal education and work experience are used as proxies for the average level of human capital. I evaluate the alternative explanations of omitted SMSA variables and self-selection. I conclude by computing an estimate of the effect of an additional year of average education on total factor productivity.

Does History Matter Only When it Matters Little? The Case of City-Indu try Location

When will an industry subject to agglomeration economies move from an old, high-cost site to a new, low-cost site? It is argued that history, in the form of sunk costs resulting from the operation of many firms at a site, creates a first-mover disadvantage that can prevent relocation. It is demonstrated that developers of industrial parks can partly overcome this inertia through discriminatory pricing of land over time, and empirical evidence is provided that they actually engage in such behavior. It is also shown that other aspects of developer land-sale strategy can be a source of information on the nature of interfirm externalities.

Neckties in the Tropics: A Model of International Trade and Cultural Diversity

Some cultural goods, like clothes and films, are consumed socially and are thus characterized by the same consumption network externalities as languages. At the same time, producers of new cultural goods in any one country draw on the stock of ideas generated by previous cultural production in all countries. For such goods, costless trade and communication tend to lead to the dominance of one cultural style, increasing utility in the short run but reducing quality and generating cultural stagnation in the long run. Increasing trade costs while keeping communication costs low may reduce welfare by stimulating production of cultural goods that are "compatible" with the dominant style, thereby capturing consumption network externalities, but that add little to the stock of usable ideas. A reform of cultural policy suggested by our two-country analysis could be to remove import restrictions in the smaller country and replace them with subsidies to the fixed costs of production of new cultural goods in its traditional style.

Entrepreneurship in International Trade

Motivated by evidence on the importance of incomplete information and networks in international trade, we investigate the supply of 'network intermediation.' We hypothesize that the agents who become international trade intermediaries first accumulate networks of foreign contacts while working as employees in production or sales, then become entrepreneurs who sell access to and use of the networks they accumulated. We report supportive results regarding this hypothesis from a pilot survey of international trade intermediaries. We then build a simple general-equilibrium model of this type of entrepreneurship, and use it for comparative statics and welfare analysis. One welfare conclusion is that intermediaries may have inadequate incentives to maintain or expand their networks, suggesting a rationale for the policies followed by some countries to encourage large-scale trading companies that imitate the Japanese sogo shosha.

Neckties in the Tropics: a Model of International Trade and Cultural Diversity

Some cultural goods, like clothes and films, are consumed socially and are thus characterized by the same consumption network externalities as languages. At the same time, producers of new cultural goods in any one country draw on the stock of ideas generated by previous cultural production in all countries. For such goods, costless trade and communication tend to lead to the dominance of one cultural style, increasing utility in the short run but reducing quality and generating cultural stagnation in the long run. Increasing trade costs while keeping communication costs low may reduce welfare by stimulating production of cultural goods that are “compatible†with the dominant style, thereby capturing consumption network externalities, but that add little to the stock of usable ideas. Our two-country analysis suggests a reform of cultural policy whereby import restrictions in the smaller country are replaced by subsidies to the fixed costs of production of “authentic†new cultural goods, funded by contributions from the larger countryGains from trade; Cultural goods; Diversity; Network externalities

Starting Small in an Unfamiliar Environment

Motivated by a characteristic way in which firms in developed countries make their decisions regarding cooperation with potential partners from less developed countries, we design a simple model of a DC firm's search for an LDC partner/supplier and the subsequent relationship between the two parties. Matched firms can "start small" with a trial order or pilot project of variable size in order to gain information about the ability of the LDC firm to successfully carry out a large project. We derive results relating whether and how the parties start small to the characteristics of the large project and to the matching environment. Among other results, we show how risk and search cost are associated with the propensity to start small and we establish a connection between starting small and the expected longevity of successful partnerships. We also address methods of contract enforcement and demonstrate the relationship between starting small and monitoring.

Anonymous Market and Group Ties in International Trade

When trade involves differentiated products, preferential ties to a group settled abroad facilitate an exporter's entry into the foreign market by providing information and access to distribution channels. This contrasts with the difficulties experienced by an unattached producer unfamiliar with the foreign environment. Inspired by the role of coethnic ties and business groups in East Asia, we build a simple general equilibrium model of trade that formalizes this observation. Output is generated through bilateral matching o agents spanning a spectrum of types. Domestic matching is perfect--every trader knows the type of all others and can approach whomever he chooses, but international matching is random--every trader lacks the information to choose his partner's type. However, group ties allow perfect matching abroad to a minority of individuals who have access to them and can decide whether or not to exploit them. We show that in the absence of ties the existence of informational barriers reduces the volume of trade. By increasing trade, group ties are beneficial to the economy as a whole, but have significant distributional effects. On average, group members benefit, but some may lose; non-members lose almost without exception, with the largest losses concentrated among those with the poorest domestic market niches.