Memorializing Genocide I: Earlier Holocaust Documentaries

In this essay, I discuss in detail two of the earliest such documentaries: Death Mills (1945), directed by Billy Wilder; and Nazi Concentration Camps (1945), directed by George Stevens. Both film-makers were able to get direct footage of the newly-liberated concentration camps from the U.S. Army. Wilder served as a Colonel in the U.S. Army’s Psychological Warfare department in 1945 and was tasked with producing a documentary on the death camps as well as helping to restart Germany’s film industry. I next review the great French Holocaust documentary Night and Fog (1955), directed by Alain Resnais. This was a widely acclaimed film, winning the Prix Jean Vigo in 1956. Resnais employed a camp survivor (Jean Cayrol) to write the dialogue, and it is powerful, indeed, truly lyrical in places. The last film I review in the essay is a generally overlooked British Thames Television documentary, Genocide: 1941-1945 (1974), directed by Michael Darlow (and narrated by Sir Laurence Oliver). It was the first of the major Holocaust documentaries to focus on the point that the Nazi genocide targeted first and foremost the Jewish people, and to explore the development of Nazi racial theory, and the rise of the SS

Selling Genocide I: The Earlier Films

In this essay, I review two earlier anti-Semitic propaganda films of 1939, to wit, Robert and Bertram, and Linen from Ireland. I begin by rehearsing some of Abram de Swann’s analysis of genocide and then discuss in greater detail a classic sociological analysis written during WWII by Hans Speier. Speier distinguished three broad kinds of war of increasing ferocity: instrumental war, agonistic war, and absolute war. While the first two sorts of war are relatively constrained, in absolute war the in-group regards the out-group as inherently evil, and consequently the goal of such a war is to exterminate the out-group, with no limitation on methods. I suggest in the piece that the focus of these films is precisely to get the audience to view Jews as three different things: different (not Germans as “Aryans” are supposed to be); disgusting (loathsome, somehow degenerate); and dangerous (a threat to Aryan Germans by their very nature). I cover both films, pointing to the scenes that are crafted to engender in the audience exactly these feelings. To help explain how the various scenes manipulate the audience to push the regime’s Anti-Semitic narrative, I use Robert Cialdini’s theory of the use of psychological mechanisms in marketing

Selling Genocide II: The Later Films

In this essay I take up the later major anti-Semitic propaganda pieces, all of them released in 1940. They were produced under Goebbels explicit orders to each of the three Nazi-controlled studios to produce an anti-Semitic film. The three films produced were: The Rothschilds Share at Waterloo; Jud Suss; and The Eternal Jew. These films were much more powerful propaganda pieces in intensifying anti-Semitic feelings—those feelings of difference, disgust, and danger. For each film, I point to the scenes that arouse the feelings even more profoundly than did the earlier films. The Rothschilds’ Shares at Waterloo put forward the conspiracy theory (widespread to this day) that Jewish bankers form a conspiratorial cabal bent upon world domination. Jew Suss (which was presented as historically true) pushes the narrative of Jews using money to take power, and of their boundless lust for young Christian women (hence the danger of “racial pollution”). Of all the anti-Semitic propaganda films the regime produced, the top regime figures considered this to be the most powerful—about 40% of German adults of the time saw this film. It is banned in Germany to this day. Finally, The Eternal Jew—perhaps the most infamous of the group—is presented as a truthful documentary. While this sham documentary was a comparative box office flop, it was widely used as a training film

Livingston, Donald, ed. Rethinking the American Union for the Twenty-First Century. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Company, 2012

This essay is my short, critical review of Donald Livingston’s anthology, Rethinking the American Union for the Twenty-First Century. The contributors of this anthology all argue for secession as a legal and proper tool for calling the Federal government down in size and power. I critically examine the arguments of the contributors

A National Summit on Women Veteran Homelessness: A Leadership Dialogue

The National Summit on Women Veteran Homelessness brought together noted researchers, policy and practice experts, and women veterans with the lived experience of homelessness in a day and a half of facilitated dialogue sessions. Our purpose was threefold. First, we wanted to call attention to the growing national problem of homelessness among women veterans. Second, we wanted to better understand the unique challenges facing women veterans who have lost their homes or are at risk of homelessness. Finally, we sought to gather information and ideas for solutions to prevent and end homelessness among women veterans. Rich information was obtained from these sessions that will help us to understand the complex conditions that can result in women veteran homelessness, isolate the key areas where action to remediate the issues is required and create comprehensive and sustainable solutions that reduce the risk of women veteran homelessness and help those who are already homeless to achieve full reintegration into their communities. This report begins with a summary of presentations delivered by three experts who provided background on the demographics of homeless veterans, key programs at the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), a research perspective on the challenges homeless women veterans face and litigation and advocacy as tools for change. The core of the report, called the Summit Dialogue Sessions, summarizes three roundtable discussions centered on the following themes: 1) pathways to homelessness for women veterans; 2) strategies for exiting homelessness; and 3) approaches to preventing women veterans from falling into homelessness. The report then turns attention to the list of actionable tasks which grew out of the roundtables, as well as two facilitated "fishbowls" in which subgroups of Summit participants explored specific issues related to policy, practice and research. Together, these offer not only a record of the work accomplished at the Summit, but also a pathway to future research, policy and program initiatives that hold the hope and potential for preventing and ending women veteran homelessness

Stock Options: The Backdating Issue

[Excerpt] Employee stock options are contracts giving employees the right to buy the company’s common stock at a specified exercise price, at a specified time or during a specified period, and after a specified vesting period. The value of the option when granted lies in the prospect that the market price of the company’s stock will increase by the time the option is exercised (used to purchase stock). At the grant date for the options, rather than selecting an exercise price based on the current market price for the stock, officials at some companies have selected a prior date with a lower market price; that is, they backdated stock options to an earlier grant date. If this backdating occurred without public disclosure, the recipient of the stock options received increased compensation in violation of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations, generally accepted accounting rules, and tax laws. Some backdating is said to involve “sloppiness,” not fraud. The backdating of stock options has imposed costs on shareholders, employees, bondholders, and taxpayers. A corporate official who has profited from undisclosed backdating of stock options may not be responsible or even knowledgeable of the backdating. “Nonqualified” stock options, which have no special tax criteria to meet, are the focus of the backdating controversy primarily because they can be granted in unlimited amounts. The magnitude of stock option grants grew dramatically in the 1990s, subsequent to passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, a stock market boom, and revised accounting rules. Recent corporate disclosure changes have reduced the opportunities and rewards for backdating stock options. Empirical studies about backdating have been done by academics and investigative journalists. Four recent regulatory actions may have reduced the backdating of stock options, but problems persist. On December 16, 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued new rules requiring companies to subtract the expense of options from their earnings. After August 29, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act required that companies notify the SEC within two business days after granting stock options. In 2003, the SEC required increased disclosure of stock option plans. The SEC issued enhanced option grant disclosure rules effective December 15, 2006. Policy options to further reduce backdating and other timing manipulation include changes in SEC regulations and a change in the tax law. The SEC, various state prosecutorial, and Department of Justice (DOJ) probes into backdating abuses are ongoing. In addition, many firms have mounted their own internal probes into possible abuses. By November 2007, the SEC’s investigation caseload had fallen from a peak of 160 to about 80, and the SEC had brought civil enforcement actions against seven companies and 26 former executives associated with 15 firms. And according to reports from the DOJ, there were at least 10 criminal filings against defendants for backdating. As of January 2, 2008, the only CEO to be convicted of charges related to backdating was Greg Reyes, former Brocade CEO. This report will be updated as issues develop or new legislation is introduced

Does "skin in the game" reduce risk taking? Leverage, liability and the long-run consequences of new deal financial reforms

We examine how the Banking Acts of the 1933 and 1935 and related New Deal legislation influenced risk taking in the financial sector of the U.S. economy. Our analysis focuses on contingent liability of bank owners for losses incurred by their firms and how the elimination of this liability influenced leverage and lending by commercial banks. Using a new panel data set that compares balance sheets of state and national banks, we find contingent liability reduced risk taking, particularly when coupled with rules requiring banks to join the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Leverage ratios are higher in states with limited liability for bank owners. Banks in states with contingent liability converted each dollar of capital into fewer loans, and thus could sustain larger loan losses (as a fraction of their portfolio) than banks in limited liability states. The New Deal replaced a regime of contingent liability with stricter balance sheet regulation and increased capital requirements, shifting the onus of risk management from banks to state and federal regulators. By separating investment banks from commercial banks, the Glass-Steagall Act left investment banks to manage their own leverage, a feature of financial regulation that, in part, depended on their partnership structur

Noise Trading, Delegated Portfolio Management, and Economic Welfare

In 1992, turnover on the New York Stock Exchange was 48 percent. While there is no convincing theoretical prediction for assessing this number, observers may have the view that turnover is very high. The increase in turnover has been accompanied by a rise in institutional ownership. A regression of turnover on institutional ownership and real commissions per share shows that institutional ownership is still highlysignificant in explaining turnover. The available evidence is at least suggestive of a causal link between turnover and institutional control. It seems difficult to explain the level of trading activity purely on the basis of 'rational' motives for trade. The authors argue that the motive stems from a contracting problem between professional traders and their clients or employers. The contracting problem in the authors model is whether the delegated portfolio manager can convince the client/employer that inactivity was his best strategy. The difficulty is that the employer cannot distinguish "actively doing nothing" in this sense from "simply doing nothing." If the contract allows a reward for not trading, portfolio managers may simply do nothing; the contract may either attract incompetent managers or lead competent managers to shirk. If this makes it impossible to reward inactivity, and limited liability prevents punishing ex post incorrect decisions, then the optimal contract may induce trading by the portfolio manager which is simply a gamble to produce a satisfactory outcome by change. The authors call this noise trading or churning and show that the noise trade will occur in equilibrium. The paper then considers the implication of noise trading for agents welfare. Noise trading would appear to be costly for the employer since it lowers the expected rate of return on the portfolio. It will benefit hedgers; if managed portfolios earn lower rates of return, then uninformed hedgers earn higher returns. The higher return earned by the hedgers effectively reduces the cost of hedging; as a result they will trade larger amounts. In turn, this increase in volume can support a larger amount of investment by an informed fund manager. If the manager earns a smaller (percentage) return on a sufficiently increased investment, then he will be better off. The model is a general equilibrium model of portfolio management in a security market. The authors conclude that a portfolio manager will frequently find that the best investment policy is simply to hold the existing portfolio. The question is whether, in this situation, he will be able to credibly convince his client or employer that he is 'actively' doing nothing. The client may instead believe that he is simply doing nothing. He may think that the portfolio manager has not spent any effort on producing information or he has no talent. The paper describes a contractualrelationship, and its economic consequences, where actively doing nothing is indistinguishable from simply doing nothing. Ultimately it is an empirical question as to when these are indistinguishable. Designing a contractual relationship for portfolio management is to a large extent a matter of maximizing this distinction. Noise trade is a manifestation of this agency problem. Because all agents objectives are specified, the authors can examine the welfare implications of this agency problem. The example discussed shows that noise trade, by making the market more liquid, can benefit everyone. This illustrates that welfare effects can be more subtle and more complex than is allowed by standard models with exogenous noise traders.