31 research outputs found
Does Ought Imply Ought Ought?
Knows-knows principles in epistemology say that if you know some proposition, then you are in a position to know that you know it. This paper examines the viability of analogous principles in ethics, which I call ought-ought principles. Several epistemologists have recently offered new defences of KK principles and of other related principles, and there has recently been an increased interest in examining analogies between ethics and epistemology, and so it seems natural to examine whether defences of KK and related principles carry over to OO principles. In this paper, I introduce two OO principles, and I show how some arguments in favour of KK carry over to them. Then I show how these OO principles can be used to shed light on a much-discussed case in ethics, that of Professor Procrastinate
Knowledge-to-fact arguments can deliver knowledge
In a recent paper, Murali Ramachandran endorses a principle that he thinks can help us
solve the surprise test puzzle and cause problems for a Williamsonian argument against KK principles. But in this paper I argue that his principle is false and as a result it cannot do either
The Threshold Problem, the Cluster Account, and the Significance of Knowledge
The threshold problem is the task of adequately answering the question: âWhere does the threshold lie between knowledge and lack thereof?â I start this paper by articulating two conditions for solving it. The first is that the threshold be neither too high nor too low; the second is that the threshold accommodate the significance of knowledge. In addition to explaining these conditions, I also argue that it is plausible that they can be met. Next, I argue that many popular accounts of knowledge cannot meet them. In particular, I lay out a number of problems that standard accounts of knowledge face in trying to meet these conditions. Finally, near the end of this paper, I argue that there is one sort of account that seems to evade these problems. This sort of account, which is called a cluster account of knowledge, says that knowledge is to be accounted for in terms of truth, belief and a cluster of epistemic properties and also that knowledge doesnât require having all members of the cluster, but merely some subset
The Worse than Nothing Account of Harm and the Preemption Problem
Because harm is an important notion in ethics, itâs worth investigating what it amounts to. The counterfactual comparative account of harm, commonly thought to be the most promising account of harm, analyzes harm by comparing what actually happened with what would have happened in some counterfactual situation. But it faces the preemption problem, a problem so serious that it has driven some to suggest we abandon the counterfactual comparative account and maybe even abandon the notion of harm altogether. This paper defends a version of the counterfactual comparative account that solves the preemption problem, a version called the âworse than nothing account.â It says that you harm someone just in case you leave them worse off than if youâd done nothing at all
Harm, baselines, and the worse than nothing account
Harm is one of the central concepts of ethics so it would be good to offer an account of it. Many accounts appeal to a baseline: they say that you harm someone if you leave them worse off than in the baseline case. In this paper, I draw some lessons regarding what counts as an appropriate baseline and explore what these general lessons reveal about the nature of harm. In the process of so doing, I argue that a certain rarely-discussed account of harm -- the worse than nothing account of harm -- does a particularly good job at identifying a baseline. This account says you harm someone if you leave them worse off than if you had done nothing to them
Implicit complexity for coinductive data: a characterization of corecurrence
We propose a framework for reasoning about programs that manipulate
coinductive data as well as inductive data. Our approach is based on using
equational programs, which support a seamless combination of computation and
reasoning, and using productivity (fairness) as the fundamental assertion,
rather than bi-simulation. The latter is expressible in terms of the former. As
an application to this framework, we give an implicit characterization of
corecurrence: a function is definable using corecurrence iff its productivity
is provable using coinduction for formulas in which data-predicates do not
occur negatively. This is an analog, albeit in weaker form, of a
characterization of recurrence (i.e. primitive recursion) in [Leivant, Unipolar
induction, TCS 318, 2004].Comment: In Proceedings DICE 2011, arXiv:1201.034
KumÄrila and Knows-Knows
This essay defends a principle that promises to help illuminate the nature of reflective knowledge. The principle in question belongs to a broader category called knows-knows principles, or KK principles for short. Such principles say that if you know some proposition, then you're in a position to know that you know it.KK principles were prominent among various historical philosophers and can be fruitfully integrated with many views in contemporary epistemology and beyondâand yet almost every contemporary analytic epistemologist thinks that they are false.Regarding their historical pedigree: they've been endorsed by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Averroes, Aquinas, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer, among others.1Regarding..