Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.Margin of victory, plurality, abstention, strategic voting, committee voting, elections

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.Abstention, alienation, platforms, polarization, voting

The informational value of incumbency

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates different from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.Incumbency, information, candidate quality, selection bias, ideology

The Informational Value of Incumbency

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with- out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters informa- ion about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates di?erent from incumbency status, we pro- pose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection uccess. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideo- ogical and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the iterature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.Incumbency, information, candidate quality, selection bias, ideology.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of the public agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition compete in elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience to an issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo. Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters’ concerns and those with broad agreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probability of victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters’ decision. But remarkably, the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may not be given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survive in spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on a policy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of the United States presidential election in 2004.Agenda, elections, political competition, issues, salience, agreement.

Immigration policy with partisan parties

This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoral issue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditure in immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters’ welfare through economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a la Wittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. At equilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and to the right of the median voter’s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workers among their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigration proposed by the two parties and the composition of parties’ constituencies as we vary the efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.Immigration, ideological parties, unskilled and skilled labor

A Dynamic Analysis of Human Welfare in a Warming Planet

Climate science indicates that climate stabilization requires low GHG emissions. Is this consistent with nondecreasing human welfare? Our welfare index, called quality of life (QuoL), emphasizes education, knowledge, and the environment. We construct and calibrate a multigenerational model with intertemporal links provided by education, physical capital, knowledge and the environment. We reject discounted utilitarianism and adopt, first, the Intergenerational Maximin criterion, and, second, Human Development Optimization, that maximizes the QuoL of the first generation subject to a given future rate of growth. We apply these criteria to our calibrated model via a novel algorithm inspired by the turnpike property. The computed paths yield levels of QuoL higher than the year 2000 level for all generations. They require the doubling of the fraction of labor resources devoted to the creation of knowledge relative to the reference level, whereas the fractions of labor allocated to consumption and leisure are similar to the reference ones. On the other hand, higher growth rates require substantial increases in the fraction of labor devoted to education, together with moderate increases in the fractions of labor devoted to knowledge and the investment in physical capital.Quality of life, Climate change, Education, Maximin, Growth

North-South convergence and the allocation of CO2 emissions

We postulate a two-region world, comprised of North (calibrated after the US) and South (calibrated after China). Our optimization results show the compatibility of the following three desiderata: (1) Global CO2 emissions follow a conservative path that leads to the stabilization of concentrations at 450 ppm. (2) North and South converge to a path of sustained growth at 1% per year (28.2% per generation) in 2075. (3) During the transition to the steady state, North also grows at 1% per year while South’s rates of growth are markedly higher. The transition paths require a drastic reduction of the share of emissions allocated to North, large investments in knowledge, both in North and South, as well as very large investments in education in South. Surprisingly, in order to sustain North’s utility growth rate, some output must be transferred from South to North during the transition. Although undoubtedly subject to many caveats, our results support a degree of optimism by providing prima facie evidence of the possibility of tackling climate change in a way that is fair both across generations and across regions while allowing for positive rates of human development.Convergence, CO2 emissions, North-South, climate change, sustainability, growth.

A dynamic analysis of human welfare in a warming planet

Climate science indicates that climate stabilization requires low GHG emissions. Is this consistent with nondecreasing human welfare? Our welfare or utility index emphasizes education, knowledge, and the environment. We construct and calibrate a multigenerational model with intertemporal links provided by education, physical capital, knowledge and the environment. We reject discounted utilitarianism and adopt, first, the Pure Sustainability Optimization (or Intergenerational Maximin) criterion, and, second, the Sustainable Growth Optimization criterion, that maximizes the utility of the first generation subject to a given future rate of growth. We apply these criteria to our calibrated model via a novel algorithm inspired by the turnpike property. The computed paths yield levels of utility higher than the level at reference year 2000 for all generations. They require the doubling of the fraction of labor resources devoted to the creation of knowledge relative to the reference level, whereas the fractions of labor allocated to consumption and leisure are similar to the reference ones. On the other hand, higher growth rates require substantial increases in the fraction of labor devoted to education, together with moderate increases in the fractions of labor devoted to knowledge and the investment in physical capital.Climate change, education, Maximin, growth.

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear. We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under this uncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternative von Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extension of the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy (without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation. Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendations of the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, then we prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possible disappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implications for intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.Discounted utilitarianism, Rawlsian, sustainability, maximin, uncertainty, expected utility, von Neumann-Morgenstern, dynamic welfare maximization.