Searle and Buddhism on the Non-Self

In this brief note I continue the discussion that I had with John Searle on the topic of the self and the possibility of continuity of consciousness after death of the body. The gist of Searle\u27s reply to my original paper (Hongladarom 2008) is that it is logical possible, though extremely unlikely, that consciousness survives destruction of the body. This is a rather startling claim given that Searle famously holds that consciousness is the work of the body. Nonetheless, he claims that such issue is an empirical matter which could perhaps be discovered by future science. Another point concerns identity of the self or the person. Searle claims that the self functions as a unified point of view from which episodes of mental events are presented as a coherent picture. Here the Two Truths position in Buddhism differs from Searle\u27s here. The point of view that Searle mentions exists only at the conventional level, but not the ultimate one

Global Culture, Local Cultures, and the Internet. The Thai Example

This paper addresses the questions of whether, and if so, how and to what extent the Internet brings about homogenization of the local cultures in the world. It examines a particular case, that of Thai culture, through an investigation and interpretation of a Usenet newsgroup, soc.culture.thai. Two threads of discussion in the newsgroup are selected. One deals with criticisms of the Thai government and political leaders, and the other focuses on whether Thai language should be a medium, or perhaps the only medium, of communication in the newsgroup. It is found\ud that, instead of erasing local cultural boundaries, creating a worldwide monolithic culture, the Internet reduplicates the existing cultural boundaries. What the Internet does, on the contrary, is to create an umbrella cosmopolitan culture which is necessary for communication among people from disparate cultures. That culture, however, is devoid of "thick" backgrounds, in Michael Walzer's sense

COVID-19: Thailand Report

The COVID-19 pandemic is well underway and there is no substantial news to assure us, as of now, that it is going to subside soon. Intensive worldwide efforts are now focused on finding ways to combat it, but we will have to wait and see how it turns out. Meanwhile, the world’s population must follow the routine of physical distancing, which by now has become the “new” normal

Language, Reality, Emptiness and Laughter

This paper begins by exploring the place of laughter in the characterization of the human being and how it is related to reason. It then examines the attitudes towards laughter in Buddhism; from the prohibitions on laughter concerning monks, to the laughing Buddha

LOVE IN THE AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY: HOW ARE METTA AND KARUNA STILL POSSIBLE?*

The tremendous advances in science and technology today need not deter us in promoting and sustaining love. This may seem surprising to some, at least because such advances have resulted in pessimism concerning the survival of love. On the contrary, not only is love possible, but it has become more necessary in today’s world. The paper will focus on the kind of love that Buddhism pays particular attention to, namely metta (Skrt. maitri) and karuna. The two terms are generally translated as ‘loving-kindness’ and ‘compassion’ respectively. It is the teleological character of Buddhist thought that makes metta and karuna possible in today’s world

A Buddhist Perspective on Human Enhancement and Extension of Human Lifespan

Buddhism has nothing in principle against either human enhancement or lifespan extending technologies. Everything depends on motivation. In the case of human enhancement technologies in general, the argument that enhancing humans is unethical because it commits an unnatural act is found wanting because it relies on the untenable premise that the natural and the ethical are identical. However, Somparn Promta’s argument to the effect that in Buddhism there is no unnatural act is criticized because the argument conflates two different senses of “natural”, one being natural law and the other presupposed in the premise that the ethical and the natural are identical. Then the paper moves on to discuss the central idea in Buddhism concerning the emptinessof all things. Since there can be no essence or core of identity of anything, person or non-person, any argument based on there being a subsisting person whose body is to be enhanced or whose life is to be extended is based on an untenable premise. Finally the paper discusses Steven Horrobin’s recent attempt to base the value of the extended lifespan on the ability to enjoy more pleasures. This is also found wanting because the extended life will contain not only pleasures but also pain and boredom. Moreover, the value of life, either extended or not, lies more on how well it is lived rather than how much pleasures the subject can consume

Metaphysics of Change and Continuity: Exactly What is Changing and What Gets Continued?

This is a metaphysical and conceptual analysis of the concepts ‘change’ and ‘continuity’. The Buddhists are in agreement with Heraclitus that all are flowing and nothing remains. However, the Buddhists have a much more elaborate theory about change and continuity, and this theory is a key element in the entire Buddhist system of related doctrines, viz., that of karma and rebirth, the possibility of Liberation and others. Simply put, the Buddhist emphasizes that change is there in every aspect of reality. According to a later developed form of the Buddhist teaching, change is absolutely pervasive, and even these particles are subject to change as they are nothing more than putative objects which are conceptualized to be such and such, and without the conceptualization they are ‘nothing’ at all.. Hence it seems that continuity is not possible. But in fact according to the later theory, change is not only possible, it is accepted as part and parcel of everyday life. The fact that nothing at all remains the same does not imply that continuity is not possible, since continuity does not always have to be that of an inherently existing object. A changing object can be continued also, in roughly the same sense as we say that an event, like a drama, continues even though everything in it is changing. The thread that ties the disparate elements of the event together in this case lies within our own conceptual imputation. This does not imply that everything is subjective, since the distinction between subject and object presupposes the idea of an absolutely existing individual self, which all Buddhist schools rejects. So in this later theory, absolute change is not possible because there is, ultimately speaking nothing to change, and when there is no change there is no continuation either. This is not to deny the empirical fact of changes and continuities that are present to us; things are there and they are indeed changing. What is being denied here is the belief that that there are essences to things which endure through all the changes. Since things are empty they can change, and continuity is only possible, not because there is something that exists and endures, but because there is change. A drama that does not move cannot be continued. The foregoing discussions of the Buddhist theories have many implications for the dialog between science and religion. One point is that science still seems to subscribe to the object/subject distinction. But if change and continuity are not real in the ultimate sense, then perhaps the distinction should be reconsidered. Another point concerns how to find continuity amidst all the change. But perhaps in some important sense continuity depends on us

Imagination in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"

The role and nature of imagination in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is intensively examined. In addition, the text of Kant's Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View will also be considered because it helps illustrate this issue. Imagination is the fundamental power of the mind responsible for any act of forming and putting together representations. A new interpretation of imagination in Kant is given which recognizes its necessary roles as the factor responsible for producing space and time, as an essential component in perception, as the mediator of concepts and intuitions, and as the synthesizing agent which groups together representations into categories. ;The work is divided basically into two parts. The first part looks at the imagination in the Transcendental Aesthetic. It will be shown that space and time themselves are products of imagination. As pure and a priori intuitions space and time are objects of thought and thus are conditioned by the synthetic power of imagination. Moreover, as forms of intuitions space and time are also conditioned by imagination; hence, imagination is a necessary factor in spatial and temporal perception. ;The second part of the thesis concerns the role of imagination in the Transcendental Analytic. Here the role of the imagination is more pervasive. In the Metaphysical Deduction the thesis argues that the imagination is responsible for uniting representations into twelve categories which are the conditions of thinking in general. Therefore the categories themselves owe their origins to imagination. This interpretation hinges on Kant's distinction between transcendental and general logic, which the thesis will discuss in detail. In the Transcendental Deduction the imagination is responsible for taking up representations in such a way that results in their belonging to a single framework of consciousness, thus showing that the categories apply to a posteriori representations. In the Schematism the imagination is necessary in forming the schemata, which join together concepts and intuitions so that both empirical and transcendental judgments are produced. Finally, a critique of Heidegger's idea on imagination as the "common root" of sensibility and understanding will be offere