Studies on the changes in protein fluorescence and enzymic activity of aspartate aminotransferase on binding of pyridoxal 5'-Phosphate

1. The a and ,B subforms of aspartate aminotransferase were purified from pig heart. 2. The a subform contained 2mol of pyridoxal 5'-phosphate. The apo-(a subform) could be fully reactived by combination with 2mol of cofactor. 3. The protein fluorescence of the apo- (a subform) decreased non-linearly with increase in enzyme activity and concentration of bound cofactor. 4. It is concluded that the enzyme activity/mol ofbound cofactor is largely independent of the number ofcofactors bound to the dimer. 5. The /Jsubformhad approximately half the specific enzyme activity of the a subform, and contained an average of one active pyridoxal 5'-phosphate molecule per molecule, which could be removed by glutamate, and another inactive cofactor which could only be removed with NaOH. 6. On recombination with pyridoxal 5'-phosphate the protein fluorescence of the apo-(fl subform) decreased linearly, showing that each dimeric enzyme molecule contained one active and one inactive bound cofactor. 7. The results are not consistent with a flip-flop mechanism for this enzyme

When Is a Preferential Transfer Required to Be Recorded?

In the recent case of Carey v. Donohue, 36 Sup. Ct. 386, the Supreme Court of the United States has passed on a question that has for years been vexing the Circuit Courts of Appeals, namely: When is the recording of a preferential transfer required under § 60 of the\u27Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended in 1903 and 1910. § 60a (as amended in 1903) defines a preference as a transaction by which property of an insolvent debtor is transferred, within four months before his bankruptcy, in such a way that the debt owing to one of his creditors will be paid in a greater percentage than the debts owing to other creditors, and adds: Where the preference consists in a transfer, such period of four months shall not expire until four months after the date of the recording or registering of the transfer, if by law such recording or registering is required. § 60b (as amended in 1903 and in 1910) provides that the debtor\u27s trustee in bankruptcy may recover property so transferred preferentially, if the preferred creditor had reasonable cause to believe that a preference was to be effected at the time of the transfer or of the recording or registering of the transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required, such time being within four months before bankruptcy

When is a Preferential Transfer \u27Required\u27 to Be Recorded?

The BANKRUPTCY ACT of 1898 (as amended in 1903 and 1910), after defining a preference, provides in § 60b that preferences made under certain circumstances may be recovered from the preferred creditor if the latter had reasonable cause to believe that a preference was to be effected at the time of the transfer * * * or of the recording or registering of the transfer if by law recording or registering thereof is required, such time being within four months before bankruptcy. Bankrupcty courts have for years been vexed with the question: When is a transfer required to be recorded under this provision of the Act

Insurance Policies as Assets in Bankruptcy

The Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent case of Cohen v. Samuels, 38 Sup. Ct. 36, has put an end to a method, approved by some of the lower Federal Courts, whereby a person could create a fund which would be completely under his control but which would nevertheless be protected against any claim on the part of his trustee in bankruptcy. The circumstances in the principal case were as follows: Samuels had taken out ordinary life insurance policies, with the usual provisions as to loan and surrender values, payable to certain of his relatives as beneficiaries, but \u27with a provision reserving to Samuels the right to change the beneficiary without the latter\u27s consent. At the time of Samuels\u27 bankruptcy these surrender values were about $1,200, and if before that time Samuels had wished to realize on such surrender values, all that he need have done was to name himself as beneficiary and thus become entitled to the amount. He became bankrupt, and now insists that the policies do not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy as assets because, not being payable to himself, his estate, or personal representatives, they do not fall within the language of § 70, which defines what property shall pass to the trustee. And his claim was apparently so well fortified by authority that the District Court for the Southern District of New York felt impelled to uphold it, and was supported by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, where, however, HOUGH, C. J., registered a vigorous dissent

A Surety\u27s Claim against His Bankrupt Principal under the Present Law

The peculiar three-sided relationship of principal, surety and creditor gives rise to many vexatious questions of law, and one of the most interesting of these vexatious questions is that of the relationship between surety and principal in the case of the latter\u27s bankruptcy. Under such circumstances, the creditor\u27s right is fairly simple; he may prove his debt against the principal, take such dividend as may be declared, and recover the balance of the debt from the surety, his remedy against the latter being expressly saved by Sec. 16 of the present Bankruptcy Act.1 But the position of the surety is less clear. Upon becoming a surety, he has acquired a two-sided status of liability and right; he has become liable to pay money to the creditor if the principal defaults; and if he does so pay to the creditor, he has a right to be reimbursed by the principal for the payment so made. In other words, the surety is contingently the debtor of the creditor, and the creditor of the debtor (principal). And this contingent liability and right exist in the surety from the time of making the contract of suretyship. He is, clearly enough, always liable to pay the debt to the creditor if the principal does not, and he is also always the possessor of a right against the principal, namely, the right to be reimbursed for any payment he may have to make on the principal\u27s account. It is the nature of this right that leads to the difficulty of determining the status in bankruptcy of the surety\u27s claim against his bankrupt principal. It is clear that the surety, from the time of making the contract of suretyship, has a potential claim, or contingent possibility of a right, against his principal, but it is equally clear that this claim or right does not become absolute and fixed until the surety has made a payment for his principal. Until this time he has no right of action against his principal, but merely a contingent possibility of a right. The following questions naturally arise as to this right to reimbursement: Can the holder of this claim (the surety) join in a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against the principal? Can he prove his claim against the principal\u27s estate? Is his right against the principal barred by the latter\u27s discharge in bankruptcy? Is the surety, by virtue of his inchoate claim, a creditor who may be preferred or defrauded by the bankrupt principal

The Federal Bankruptcy Act and its Effect on State Insolvency Laws

Since Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, it has been clear that State Insolvency Laws were valid (within certain well-defined limits) during the non-existence of a Federal Bankruptcy Act, and that upon the enactment of a Federal Bankruptcy Act the State laws were superseded and suspended so far as they were in conflict with the Federal legislation. The difficulty has been in determining when there was such conflict, and it has arisen in various ways. For instance, the Federal Bankruptcy Act permits any natural person to become a voluntary bankrupt, but provides that no involuntary proceedings shall be taken against a farmer or a wage earner, or a person owing less than $1000. The question has frequently been raised whether State Insolvency Laws are still effective in the cases of persons thus exempted by the Federal Act, and has been variously decided. See Littlefield v. Gay, 96 Me. 422; Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 3 (commented on in 11 MICH. L. REV. 60); Rockville Bank v. Latham, 88 Conn. 70; and Pitcher v. Standish, 90 Conn. 601,(commented on in 15 Micn. L. Rzv. 68). The Supreme Court of the United States, in the recent case of Stellwagen v. Clum, 38 Sup. Ct. 215, has now passed on another phase of the same question

Execution Sales as Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy

In the recent case of Golden Hill Distilling Co. v. Logue, 243 Fed. 342, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holds that a creditor who recovers a judgment, by consent or in invitum, and by execution sale collects his money within four months preceding bankruptcy, and with reasonable cause to believe [that a preference would thereby be effected] receives a voidable preference, which he must repay to the trustee. This question is one that has vexed the bankruptcy courts ever since the Supreme Court of the United States in Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U. S. 486, declined to answer it. It usually arises under circumstances as follows: C sues his insolvent debtor, B, obtains a judgment against him, issues and levies an execution, and sells under the levy. If the bankruptcy of B intervenes at this point, before the sheriff has turned over to C the proceeds of the execution sale, it is clear under the decision in Clarke v. Larremore that if the judgment is less than four months old it is avoided and the property affected by its lien is discharged and released from the same by the provisions of § 67f of the BANKRUPTCY ACT of 1898 which reads in part as follows: * * * all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same * * * And it is equally clear that under these circumstances it is immaterial whether the creditor has, or has not, any information or notice as to his debtor\u27s insolvency or intent to prefer

Change in the Meaning of Consortium

LAWYERS have long boasted of the flexibility of the common law, of its ability to adapt itself to the needs of changing conditions of society, of its responsiveness to sociological progress. And while eager reformers have often-and with much reason complained that the law is laggard in its response to the needs of the people, yet it is clear that sooner or later the courts generally bring themselves into accord with what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant public \u27opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare. This responsiveness to the needs of society, this adaptability to changing demands, necessarily results in a change in the meaning and content of legal words and phrases. It is clear that a word, meaning one certain definite thing in the fourteenth century, will mean much more in the twentieth century. To quote again from Mr. Justice Holmes, A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used. There are of course numerous instances of such change in the meaning of technical legal terms. It is the purpose of this paper to trace the change in the meaning and content of the term consortium ; a term which has been variously defined, but which, in general terms, includes the right of one spouse to the conjugal fellowship of the other, to the other\u27s company, cooperation and aid in the conjugal relation

Execution Sales as Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy

In the recent case of Golden Hill Distilling Co. v. Logue, 243 Fed. 342, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit holds that a creditor who recovers a judgment, by consent or in invitum, and by execution sale collects his money within four months preceding bankruptcy, and with reasonable cause to believe [that a preference would thereby be effected] receives a voidable preference, which he must repay to the trustee. This question is one that has vexed the bankruptcy courts ever since the Supreme Court of the United States in Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U. S. 486, declined to answer it. It usually arises under circumstances as follows: C sues his insolvent debtor, B, obtains a judgment against him, issues and levies an execution, and sells under the levy. If the bankruptcy of B intervenes at this point, before the sheriff has turned over to C the proceeds of the execution sale, it is clear under the decision in Clarke v. Larremore that if the judgment is less than four months old it is avoided and the property affected by its lien is discharged and released from the same by the provisions of § 67f of the BANKRUPTCY ACT of 1898 which reads in part as follows: * * * all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same * * * And it is equally clear that under these circumstances it is immaterial whether the creditor has, or has not, any information or notice as to his debtor\u27s insolvency or intent to prefer

Waters and Water Courses - No Riparian Right in Montana

Plaintiff owned lands through which a stream flowed; defendant, by virtue of an appropriation duly made, diverted all the water in the stream and used it for irrigation purposes. Plaintiff, claiming only as a riparian owner, sued to enjoin defendant\u27s diversion of the stream on the ground that it was an invasion of riparian rights. Held, that the common law doctrine of riparian rights does not prevail in Montana, and that plaintiff\u27s complaint does not state a cause of action