Preface to an ethics of education as a practice in its own right

Education as a practice in its own right (or sui generis practice) invokes quite a different set of ethical considerations than does education understood as a subordinate activity – i.e. prescribed and controlled in its essentials by the current powers-that-be in a society. But the idea of education as a vehicle for the ‘values’ of a particular group or party is so commonplace, from history’s legacy as well as from ongoing waves of educational reforms, as to appear a quite natural one. So much is this case that the idea of education as a sui generis practice may seem a bit eccentric at first sight. Some preliminary work is called for then to render intelligible the claim that education is indeed a practice in its own right, and to illustrate the original starting point this gives for an exploration of educational ethics. In undertaking this preliminary work, central themes from two major sources are explored and reviewed: Richard Peters’ wellknown study Ethics and education and MacIntyre’s After virtue. The suggestive merits of both works for advancing a sui generis understanding of education and its conduct are identified. But crucial occlusions are also highlighted in the arguments of both authors, the recognition of which might have enabled their thinking on educational matters to venture onto a different plane. The kind of thinking that emerges from these investigations as most promising for educational ethics is seen to differ in its key features from what the various branches of academic philosophy have to offer by way of ethical theory

Schooling, Religious Tradition and the Default of God

To the contemporary reader the phrase 'the default of God' may suggest something shocking, such as a failure on God's part to keep a bargain or a promise. Accordingly, it may seem a curious imper tinence to make this 'default' an explicit theme in an essay on religious tradition and education. It is important therefore, at the outset, to secure the theme as far as possible against misunderstanding. Default here signifies 'to be wanting', or 'to be in want of, or 'to be deprived of. Hence, what is described as 'the default of God' is a human, historical event and, as such, it means, in Heidegger's words: 'that no god any longer gathers men and things unto himself, visibly and unequivocably, and by such gather ing disposes the world's history and man's sojourn in it.' Of course a relationship with God continues to live on in our own historical epoch, in individuals, in churches, in some homes and indeed within some schools

A Critique of Educational Research

In an article entitled 'The psychologist's contribution to educational research' Professors J. D. Nisbet & N. J. Entwistle begin by surveying briefly different definitions educational research itself with a view to drawing a distinction between "pure research the social sciences and educational research in the area of the applied sciences" Having suggested this distinction the authors clearly favour a definition which would remove educational research from the category of pure to that of applied research accordingly, their own definition states that "educational research consists in careful, systematic attempts to understand the educational process and, through understanding, improve its efficiency". Pursuing the consequences for educational enquiry of definition they themselves outline, Nisbet & Entwistle point out that this shift in emphasis from 'understanding' to 'improvement' is likely to be dis- puted by many who are active in what they claim to be wholly respectable educational research which does not aim at 'improvement'-such as historical studies and comparative education

Beyond the Habitual Paths of Reasoning

The phrase in the title comes from a passage on page 150 of Thinking Again. Employed by the authors in the course of an engagement with works of Kierkegaard and Derrida, it is also an apt phrase to give a suggestive summary of one of the chief themes in the book as a whole. The theme I have in mind here is really a twofold one: firstly, the book’s critique-largely an unsympathetic one-of those paths of reasoning associated with the modernist legacies of the Enlightenment and their educational embodiments; secondly its critique-a more sympathetic one-of postmodern moves to abandon the grand ideals and universalistic pretensions of the Enlightenment’s legacies. In this short contribution to the symposium I will concentrate on these two critiques

The Question of Ethos in Schools

Interview Board Member: Now Miss Murphy, just one final question. I suppose you are aware that there has been a lot of talk recently about the values and ethos of a school and the need for teachers employed in the school to reflect that ethos in their lifestyle. What is your own view on this whole question? Miss Murphy: Hm . . . well . . . Can I be frank? Interview Board Member: By all means, please do! Miss Murphy: / think it's an exceptionally complex question. As I see it, the school authorities have long standing rights which must be taken seriously and parents too have very important rights which are enshrined in our Constitution. But teachers and pupils also have rights which must be taken seriously and if this is the case then neither the rights of the parents nor of the school authorities are absolute. In other words, what I'm trying to say is that there is no easy answer to the question, but there is a clear need for the various parties to sit down and attempt to thrash out in open discussion some kind of code; the kind of code which might win a substantial and genuine commitment among the parties. Otherwise I think we have a recipe for smouldering dissatisfaction and recurring conflict. The real losers then are the pupils. I think they're very quick to sense the slightest tension in the atmosphere. Interview Board Member: I see! SOME PREVAILING CONCEPTIONS OF ETHOS. I shall begin by asking the reader to consider whether Miss Murphy's forthrightness and style of argument should help in securing for her the post for which she was a candidate or whether her remarks identify her as a potential troublemaker of whom a prudent school management should be wary. The reader may well reply that the information supplied is too slight to provide the basis for a valid judgement. I am quite aware of this and I should stress that there is no attempt here to force the reader prematurely to nail his or her colours publicly to the mast

A Critique of Educational Research

In an article entitled 'The psychologist's contribution to educational research' Professors J. D. Nisbet & N. J. Entwistle begin by surveying briefly different definitions educational research itself with a view to drawing a distinction between "pure research the social sciences and educational research in the area of the applied sciences" Having suggested this distinction the authors clearly favour a definition which would remove educational research from the category of pure to that of applied research accordingly, their own definition states that "educational research consists in careful, systematic attempts to understand the educational process and, through understanding, improve its efficiency". Pursuing the consequences for educational enquiry of definition they themselves outline, Nisbet & Entwistle point out that this shift in emphasis from 'understanding' to 'improvement' is likely to be dis- puted by many who are active in what they claim to be wholly respectable educational research which does not aim at 'improvement'-such as historical studies and comparative education

The ethical orientations of education as a practice in its own right

This article is the second of a two-part investigation, the first part of which was published in Ethics and Education, vol. 5, issue 2, 2010, under the title ‘Preface to an ethics of education as a practice in its own right’. Although it builds on the arguments of that ‘preface’, this second part of the investigation can be read as a stand-alone essay. It begins with a brief review of a new subordination of educational practice achieved by a neoliberal tenor in international educational reforms in recent decades in Western societies. The practical context for the essay however is that failure of many of these reforms, like the failure of neo-liberal dominance in socioeconomic policy, has given rise to emergent opportunities where inspirations for educational debate and policy-making are concerned. Arguing for the uptake of such opportunity, the ethical tenor of education as a practice in its own right is explored under four headings: (1) review and clarification of the inherent purposes of education as a practice; (2) investigation of educationally productive pathways that are characteristic of education as a practice in its own right; (3) elucidation of a recognisable family of virtues that arise from that practice itself; (4) exploration of the kinds of relationships through which these virtues, and their educational fruits, are nourished

Recovering the Lost Métier of Philosophy of Education? Reflections on Educational Thought, Policy and Practice in the UK and Farther Afield

A Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education in November 2012 explored key aspects of the relationship between philosophy of education and educational policy in the UK. The contributions were generally critical of policy developments in recent decades, highlighting important shortcomings and arguing for more philosophically coherent approaches to educational policy-making. This article begins by focusing on what the contributions to the Special Issue—particularly two of them—have to say about the relationship between philosophy of education and educational policymaking. It then goes on to argue that this relationship can best be understood through an exploration of education as a practice in its own right (as distinct from a subordinate practice). Such an exploration seeks to shed light on the proper métier of philosophy of education. In the course of the exploration the kind of thinking predominant in recent international patterns in educational policy is contrasted with a different kind of thinking which has yielded rich gains in Finland. Important distinctions are drawn between the inherent and extrinsic benefits of educational practice and between the internal and external politics of practice. These contribute to the articulation of philosophy of education as a distinctive discipline of thought and action which is necessary to the work of practitioners and policymakers alike

Beyond the Habitual Paths of Reasoning

The phrase in the title comes from a passage on page 150 of Thinking Again. Employed by the authors in the course of an engagement with works of Kierkegaard and Derrida, it is also an apt phrase to give a suggestive summary of one of the chief themes in the book as a whole. The theme I have in mind here is really a twofold one: firstly, the book’s critique-largely an unsympathetic one-of those paths of reasoning associated with the modernist legacies of the Enlightenment and their educational embodiments; secondly its critique-a more sympathetic one-of postmodern moves to abandon the grand ideals and universalistic pretensions of the Enlightenment’s legacies. In this short contribution to the symposium I will concentrate on these two critiques

School Patronage, Educational Experience and Religious Teachings

There’s an important distinction to be made between how religious teachings are introduced in a church, mosque or synagogue, and how such teachings are to be introduced in schools. Where this difference is overlooked there is a danger that the need to distinguish between educational experience and faith formation will be similarly disregarded. Both generally involve systematic learning. And religious teachings can feature in both. But properly understood, educational experience is mainly exploratory in character while faith formation is, from the start, evangelising in purpose and in practice