Stock option incentives and firm performance

This paper analyzes the performance consequences of employee stock options for a broad sample of firms during the period 1996-1999. Our tests are performed separately for the top 5 executives and all other employees. We estimate the expected level of option incentives based on each firm's economic characteristics. We examine the association between the unexpected level of option incentives and firm performance as measured by future abnormal returns, future return on assets, and current and future firm value (Tobin's Q). We find consistent evidence that firms with unexpectedly high levels of option incentives exhibit significantly higher levels of firm performance. The results hold for both Executives and Employees and are consistent across each of our three measures of firm performance.Employee stock options; financial performance; corporate governance;

Scope for Credit Risk Diversification

This paper considers a simple model of credit risk and derives the limit distribution of losses under different assumptions regarding the structure of systematic risk and the nature of exposure or firm heterogeneity. We derive fat-tailed correlated loss distributions arising from Gaussian risk factors and explore the potential for risk diversification. Where possible the results are generalised to non-Gaussian distributions. The theoretical results indicate that if the firm parameters are heterogeneous but come from a common distribution, for sufficiently large portfolios there is no scope for further risk reduction through active portfolio management. However, if the firm parameters come from different distributions, then further risk reduction is possible by changing the portfolio weights. In either case, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to underestimation of expected losses. But, once expected losses are controlled for, neglecting parameter heterogeneity can lead to overestimation of risk, whether measured by unexpected loss or value-at-risk

The effect of earnings surprises on information asymmetry

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry are stronger when the surprises are more likely to capture investors' attention. Examining the source of these changes, we show that decreased information search activities is the most important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises; for negative surprises, decreased uninformed trading plays a dominant role increasing asymmetry.Information asymmetry Earnings surprises Investor recognition hypothesis