15 research outputs found
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Safety Basis Requirements for Nonnuclear Facilities at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site-Specific Work Smart Standard Revision 3 December 2006
This standard establishes requirements that, when coupled with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL's) Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) methods and other Work Smart Standards for assuring worker safety, assure that the impacts of nonnuclear operations authorized in LLNL facilities are well understood and controlled in a manner that protects the health of workers, the public, and the environment. All LLNL facilities shall be classified based on potential for adverse impact of operations to the health of co-located (i.e., nearby) workers and the public in accordance with this standard, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 830, Subpart B, and Department of Energy Order (DOE O) 420.2A
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Versatile laser glass inspection and damage testing facility
A test facility is described which detects small opaque inclusions in large transparent components by using a commercial laser which delivers high energy pulses to the test sample at moderate frequency in a small diameter beam. The sample is automatically scanned such that each point in the volume is irradiated with ten pulses at twice the inclusion damage threshold - an amount sufficient to cause visible damage at inclusion sites. This approach permits detection of opaque inclusions in the parts per trillion and lower concentration range. The specifics of the device design and its performance are discussed in the context of automatic inclusion inspection and mapping in large laser optics
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Estimating inventory thresholds for nuclear facilities using DOE STD-1027-92 Attachment 1 Table A.1 ``Thresholds for Radionuclides``
It has recently been reports that Table A.1 of Attachment 1 of DOE STD-1027-92 is being improperly used to determine the Category 3 inventory threshold values for non-reactor nuclear facilities. The concern of this paper is that Safety Analysts and Facility Managers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), as well as at other locations in the DOE Complex, are improperly using the entries in Table A.1. It is noted at this point that the common use of this table is to establish the lower thresholds for both Categories 2 and 3 non-reactor nuclear facilities by considering inventory quantities, as opposed to a postulated accident scenario. This paper will provide insight regarding this error and will show that the error is most likely non-conservative in nature
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Novette: a short wavelength laser-target interaction system
Novette has been designed to deliver 18.0 kJ in 1 nsec and 28 kJ in 3 nsec as maximum damage limited drive to the frequency conversion arrays. We expect maximum frequency doubled on-target energies of 13 kJ in 1 nsec and 20 kJ in 3 nsec. Propagation studies performed as Novette has been activated will be reviewed and their bearing on the Nova laser design discussed. The characteristics of the incident laser radiation in the target chamber center will be described