Social Cost of Environmental Quality Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis.

The use of cost-benefit analysis by federal regulatory agencies has expanded greatly in scope and sophistication. Unfortunately, agencies continue to employ private cost, rather than social cost, to evaluate environmental quality regulations. Furthermore, general equilibrium impacts and intertemporal effects of regulations are typically not included in the evaluation. In this paper, the authors estimate the social cost of environmental quality regulations mandated by the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. They construct an econometric general equilibrium model of the United States to demonstrate that social costs estimates diverge sharply from private costs estimates. The authors also demonstrate that general equilibrium impacts are significant and pervasive. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

The impact of firm-firm externalities on environmental standard

[[abstract]]A model of two industries (sectors) in one economy, in which a sector’s production suffers from the other sector’s pollution emission, is presented to determine the optimal regulatory emission standard and to contrast the gap between the two versions: in the presence and absence of firm-firmdamage effect. The discrepancy of the emission standard setting is surely existent in the presence of firm-firm externalities compared with in the absenceof those. The results reveal that the planned output of polluting industry ishigher in the presence of firm-firm damage effect than in the absence, butthat of nonpolluting industry depends on demand elasticity and damage function.[[notice]]補正完畢[[booktype]]紙