Achieving a "SIL 1" TCR Monitoring System

SIL 1 (Safety Integrity Level 1) refers to the quantification and measurement of the availability, reliability, maintenance and safety of the monitoring system. In the last few years the computer infrastructure used to acquire and to diffuse data to the TCR has evolved very rapidly. A number of measures in hardware, software and management have been introduced to cope with this situation. These include: the Multipurpose Monitoring Device (MMD), a standard data acquisition platform used in the renovation of old front end monitoring equipment, the Smart Equipment Controller (Dsec), a driver that reduces the layers in the data diffusion pyramid, the multiplatform monitoring software to integrate the different SCADA systems, a software configuration tool (RAZOR) for problem tracking and version control, and a complete development environment reproducing a real installation for thorough testing of any changes. To achieve SIL 1 objectives, while mastering the evolution of our systems will be the challenge for the computer team

Achieving a Highly Configurable Personnel Protection System for Experimental Areas

The personnel protection system of the secondary beam experimental areas at CERN manages the beam and access interlocking mechanism

SCADA for technical infrastructure monitoring

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used at CERN and in industrial control environments. Recently the CERN Controls Board recommended a SCADA system for use in the CERN experiments and the controls sectors. The Technical Control Room (TCR) currently monitors the complete technical infrastructure at CERN using a component-ware architecture. A migration to the recommended SCADA system has been started in order to be ready for the monitoring of the future LHC infrastructure. This gives the advantage of having an integrated tool for alarms, mimic diagrams, trending and data acquisition but requires a careful analysis of the hard- and software architecture. The configuration management, the supervision of the different elements in the control chain and the data exchange with other systems will play an important role and have to be considered from the beginning

Access Safety Systems – New Concepts from the LHC Experience

The LHC Access Safety System has introduced a number of new concepts into the domain of personnel protection at CERN. These can be grouped into several categories: organisational, architectural and concerning the end-user experience. By anchoring the project on the solid foundations of the IEC 61508/61511 methodology, the CERN team and its contractors managed to design, develop, test and commission on time a SIL3 safety system. The system uses a successful combination of the latest Siemens redundant safety programmable logic controllers with a traditional relay logic hardwired loop. The external envelope barriers used in the LHC include personnel and material access devices, which are interlocked door-booths introducing increased automation of individual access control, thus removing the strain from the operators. These devices ensure the inviolability of the controlled zones by users not holding the required credentials. To this end they are equipped with personnel presence detectors and the access control includes a state of the art biometry check. Building on the LHC experience, new projects targeting the refurbishment of the existing access safety infrastructure in the injector chain have started. This paper summarises the new concepts introduced in the LHC access control and safety systems, discusses the return of experience and outlines the main guiding principles for the renewal stage of the personnel protection systems in the LHC injector chain in a homogeneous manner

Data Management and Tools for the Access to the Radiological Areas at CERN

As part of the refurbishment of the PS accelerator complex Personnel Protection System, the Radiation Protection (RP) checkpoints and buffer zones, for the radiological controls of equipment removed from the beam areas, have been incorporated into the design of the new access points

Personnel Protection of the CERN SPS North Hall in Fixed Target Primary Ion Mode

While CERN's Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) is able to deliver both secondary proton and primary ion beams to fixed targets in the North Area, the experimental areas (North Hall) are widely accessible during beam