Another Mere Addition Paradox? Some Reflections on Variable Population Poverty Measurement

Debates about poverty relief and foreign aid often hinge on claims about how many poor people there are in the world and what constitutes poverty. Good measures of poverty are essential for addressing the world poverty problem. Measures of poverty require a basis for determining who is poor and a method of aggregation. Historically, the methods of aggregation were quite simple. The headcount index (H), for instance, measures the number of poor people as a percentage of the total population. The poverty gap index for the whole population (I) takes the total aggregate shortfall from the poverty line divided by the number of people and the poverty line itself. Recently, however, economists have suggested several more complicated alternatives including Sen’s index, the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index, and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) index (which, under some parameterizations is equivalent to H and I). This paper critiques several of the main poverty indexes in the literature by setting out and defending its ‘axiom’ (intuition or desiderata) for any good poverty measure. It argues that if Sen’s index, the SST, and the FGT indexes do not satisfy this ‘no mere addition axiom’, they do not provide compelling measures of anything that can intuitively be considered poverty. Next, it illustrates how these poverty indexes violate this no mere addition axiom. Finally, the paper illustrates one way of modifying the indexes to satisfy the no mere addition axiom with the FGT. It notes, however, that these alternatives will not do for all policy purposes. So, it is important to consider further how poverty indexes and axioms fare in variable population contexts.poverty, measurement, indices, philosophy, population, axiomatic

How People Think About Distributing Aid

This paper examines how people think about aiding others in a way that can inform both theory and practice. It uses data gathered from Kiva, an online, non-profit organization that allows individuals to aid other individuals around the world, to isolate intuitions that people find broadly compelling. The central result of the paper is that people seem to give more priority to aiding those in greater need, at least below some threshold. That is, the data strongly suggest incorporating both a threshold and a prioritarian principle into the analysis of what principles for aid distribution people accept. This conclusion should be of broad interest to aid practitioners and policy makers. It may also provide important information for political philosophers interested in building, justifying, and criticizing theories about meeting needs using empirical evidence

Globalization and Global Justice in Review

Globalization connects everyone, from the world’s poorest slum dweller tothe richest billionaire. Globalization and Global Justice starts by giving a newargument for the conclusion that coercive international institutions —whosesubjects who are likely to face sanctions for violation of their rules— mustensure that everyone they coerce secures basic necessities like food, waterand medicines. It then suggests that it is possible for coercive institutionsto fulfill their obligations by, for instance, providing international aid andmaking free trade fair. This overview sketches the argument in the book’sfirst half, as which is the focus of the papers in the symposium

Coercion, Legitimacy, and Individual Freedom

In “World Poverty and Individual Freedom” (WPIF) I argue that the global order – because it is coercive – is obligated to do what it can to ensure that its subjects are capable of autonomously agreeing to its rule. This requires helping them meet their basic needs. In “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough” Jorn Sonderholm asserts that this argument is invalid and unsound, in part, because it is too demanding. This article explains why Sonderholm’s critique is mistaken and misses the main point of WPIF’s argument. It also explains why WPIF is important -- it can address some of those most resistant to significant obligations of global justice - libertarians, actual consent theorists, and statists

Institutional Theories and International Development

A recent trend in international development circles is ‘New Institutionalism’. In a slogan, the idea is just that good institutions matter. The slogan itself is so innocuous as to be hardly worth comment. But the push to improve institutional quality has the potential to have a much less innocuous impact on aid efforts and other aspects of international development. This paper provides a critical introduction to some of the literature on institutional quality. It looks, in particular, at an argument for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality will promote development by reducing poverty. This paper suggests that there is little theoretical or empirical evidence that this kind of conditionality is good for the poor

Empirical Evidence and the Case for Foreign Aid

This paper addresses an important methodological question for a recent debate in global justice: What types of data are necessary for settling normative debates about foreign aid? Recently, several philosophers have considered the case for foreign aid and have concluded that foreign aid is either ineffective or counter-productive. This paper considers what kinds of evidence those doing applied philosophy must use to support different claims about aid’s efficacy. Then, using some of the best available data, this paper makes a strong case for at least some foreign aid. This paper’s methodological lessons, however, are quite general. It considers what types of data are necessary for establishing the kinds of empirical claims often relied upon in the political philosophy and public policy literatur

Free Trade, Poverty, and Inequality

Anyone familiar with The Economist knows the mantra: Free trade will ameliorate poverty by increasing growth and reducing inequality. This paper suggests that problems underlying measurement of poverty, inequality, and free trade provide reason to worry about this argument. Furthermore, the paper suggests that better evidence is necessary to establish that free trade is causing inequality and poverty to fall. Experimental studies usually provide the best evidence of causation. So, the paper concludes with a call for further research into the prospects for ethically acceptable experimental testing of free trade\u27s impact on poverty and inequality. Although the paper is unabashedly methodological, its conclusions bear on many ethical debates. Ethicists sometimes argue, for instance, that there is reason to encourage free trade because they believe free trade is decreasing poverty and inequality. Clarifying the empirical facts may not settle ethical debates but it may inform them

The Anthropocentric Advantage? Environmental Ethics and Climate Change Policy

Environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. For, many liberals embrace anthropocentric theories on which only humans have non-instrumental value. Environmental ethicists argue that such liberals fail to account for many things that matter or provide an ethic sufficient for addressing climate change. These critics suggest that many parts of nature -- non-human individuals, other species, ecosystems and the biosphere have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to human freedom (or other things of value). This article suggests, however, that if environmental ethics are inclusive and also entail that concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others, they have a different problem. For, when there are many things of value, figuring out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause problems for many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive environmental ethicists need a theory taking all of the things they care about into account to provide definitive reason even to address climate change. Without this theory, anthropocentric liberals might argue that we should not accept an inclusive environmental ethic. Although there may be something wrong with this line of thought, it at least raises a puzzle for those inclined to accept these ethic

Global Justice and Charity: A Brief for a New Approach to Empirical Philosophyi

What does global justice or charity requires us to give to other people? There is a large theoretical literature on this question. There is much less experimental work in political philosophy relevant to answering it. Perhaps for this reason, this literature has yet to have any major impact on theoretical discussions of global justice or charity. There is, however, some experimental research in behavioral economics that has helped to shape the field and a few relevant studies by political philosophers. This paper reviews this research. Moreover, it argues that the little work that has been done can offer some methodological lessons to empirically engaged philosophers of many kinds. Finally, it suggests that there is reason for those interested in global ethics and charitable giving to consider doing new kinds of experimental and other empirical work in addition to traditional experimental philosophy

The Problem of Debt-for-Nature Swaps from a Human Rights Perspective

At first blush, debt-for-nature swaps seem to provide win-win solutions to the looming problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. So, one might naturally assume that they are morally permissible, if not obligatory. This article will argue, however, that debt-for-nature swaps are sometimes morally questionable, if not morally impermissible. It suggests that some criticisms of traditional (economic) conditions placed on loans to poor countries also apply to the (environmental) conditionality implicit in such swaps. The article\u27s main theoretical contribution is to suggest a general argumentative strategy for posing a challenge to the moral acceptability of many seemingly innocuous, or even apparently good, policies in the real world. Its discussion of how we should respond to seemingly tragic dilemmas (e.g. between protecting nature and respecting human rights) may also be of general interest