Is NATO so successful it deserves to die?

This chapter argues that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has succeeded all too well in doing what it set out to do—in the words of Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, "to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down." NATO's importance will diminish over the long run, and the Alliance is likely to devolve into a looser security arrangement at significantly lower levels of military force. Ultimately, NATO's future will depend upon whether it is able to meet the challenges of the new Europe. Various proposals have been offered to change or replace NATO and the two-bloc system with alternative security arrangements. By charting a new direction for NATO and expanding the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, new institutional pillars in Europe will recognize legitimate Western and Eastern interests in political, economic, and security matters

Peace Agreements

It has long been recognized that peace agreements sometimes contain the seeds of their own destruction. Perhaps the most famous - though by no means only - example of this self-destructive tendency in the Versailles Peace Treaties that followed World War I. The harsh punitive terms of the settlement, which severed Prussia and demilitarized the Rhineland, helped pave the way for the rise of Adolph Hitler in the 1930s. However, even less exploitative settlements can also self-destruct because they fail to adequately anticipate new problems that may arise in the future. However, there are many additional reasons why peace agreements can fail or unravel. The parties to a settlement may simply conclude after a period of time that it is no longer in their self-interest to abide by the agreements they have negotiated. Without proper monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, agreements negotiated in good faith can still self-destruct in an escalating spiral of alleged violations and counter-recrimination, or what some analysts call "the security dilemma." Ambiguities in the text of an agreement may also become major points of contention that cannot be resolved through legal or procedural means. Clearly, there are many reasons why peace agreements fail

Deconstructing multilateral cooperation

International cooperation can take many forms, some of which are highly institutionalized forms of cooperation, others of which are not. One of the most discussed – and controversial – form of institutionalized cooperation is “multilateralism.” At its heart, the concept of “multilateralism” rests on the relatively simple notion that when three or more states choose to cooperate it is with the expectation that their cooperative arrangement will yield roughly equal reciprocal benefits. For example, when three or more states agree to an alliance partnership it is with the expectation that the security guarantees they offer to each will be reciprocated – that is, an attack by a hostile force against one of the members of the alliance will rally the others to its defense. Ambrose Bierce’s definition of a Hydra – as a kind of animal that the ancients catalogued under many heads – captures some of the definitional quandaries associated with the concept. “Multilateral” literally means “many sided.” It is typically used as an adjective, not a noun or a verb. “Multilateralism,” however, is a noun – but a noun to describe what? A set of belief systems about how the world should be organized? A set of norms or principles for action that are informed by the expectation of reciprocity? A description of different kinds of world order? A description about international institutions and how they should operate? A description of international negotiation processes? A surrogate for “international regimes?

Diasporas and the Politics of Identity in International Negotiations

This chapter explores the role of diaspora communities in the politics of interethnic bargaining processes in identity conflicts. It explores both the positive and negative impacts such communities can have when a negotiation process is set in motion, not just on the parties to the conflict but also on intermediaries who are engaged in trying to secure a peace agreement. Commitment problems are commonly identified as one of the main obstacles to negotiation in interethnic disputes. Disaporas can exacerbate this problem through their engagement via remittances, arms transfers, political mobilization, and other kinds of support to warring parties. However, diasporas can also provide much needed support to a peace process when the members of a community are convinced that politics must replace armed struggle. Such turnabout or waning effects are are an important but understudied dimension of diaspora politics in identity-based conflicts

The importance of coupling: The limited test ban negotiations

Like many international negotiations, negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty have engaged a wide variety of non-state actors, including scientific experts and anti-nuclear advocacy groups, alongside those of the more traditional, state-based, or intergovernmental variety. Although the world’s nuclear powers have been at the center of these negotiations, so too have a growing number of middle-ranking powers acting as regime-builders, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden, which have championed the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty as a key step toward eventual comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Many countries in the developing world have also become engaged in this issue as the risk of nuclear proliferation in their own neighborhoods has grown (Ramaker, Mackby, Marshall, and Geil, 2003). In recent years, many scholars have come to stress the importance of “complexity” and multiple causation in contemporary international negotiation processes such that no single actor or institution has a monopoly on ideas, issues, agendas, or bargaining power (Zartman, 1994; Zartman and Crump, 2003; Hampson, 1995). In the modern world, political power and patterns of authority have become increasingly diffuse and fragmented, and the influence of actors outside the formal organizations of government has grown, leading to what some scholars have called a “crisis of governance” (Thakur, 2005). Such complexity presents a formidable barrier to understanding the real dynamics of contemporary negotiation processes, including those in pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. There is an obvious temptation among analysts to search for simplicity, either by privileging the importance of a single actor or group of actors, or highlighting the importance of a particular phase, or stage, of the negotiation process in determining bargaining outcomes. The complexity of contemporary international negotiation processes argues for a more sophisticated and nuanced theoretical understanding of the interaction of multiple variables in bargaining and decision-making, one that takes place within both an intergovernmental and a non-state advocacy context