2,359 research outputs found
Redividing the Cake
A heterogeneous resource, such as a land-estate, is already divided among
several agents in an unfair way. It should be re-divided among the agents in a
way that balances fairness with ownership rights. We present re-division
protocols that attain various trade-off points between fairness and ownership
rights, in various settings differing in the geometric constraints on the
allotments: (a) no geometric constraints; (b) connectivity --- the cake is a
one-dimensional interval and each piece must be a contiguous interval; (c)
rectangularity --- the cake is a two-dimensional rectangle or rectilinear
polygon and the pieces should be rectangles; (d) convexity --- the cake is a
two-dimensional convex polygon and the pieces should be convex.
Our re-division protocols have implications on another problem: the
price-of-fairness --- the loss of social welfare caused by fairness
requirements. Each protocol implies an upper bound on the price-of-fairness
with the respective geometric constraints.Comment: Extended IJCAI 2018 version. Previous name: "How to Re-Divide a Cake
Fairly
Strongly Dependent Ordered Abelian Groups and Henselian Fields
Strongly dependent ordered abelian groups have finite dp-rank. They are
precisely those groups with finite spines and . We apply this to show that if is a
strongly dependent field, then is strongly dependent for any henselian
valuation
The dp-rank of abelian groups
An equation to compute the dp-rank of any abelian group is given. It is also
shown that its dp-rank, or more generally that of any one-based group, agrees
with its Vapnik-Chervonenkis density. Furthermore, strong abelian groups are
characterised to be precisely those abelian groups such that there is only
finitely many primes such that the group is infinite and for every
prime , there is only finitely many natural numbers such that
is infinite. Finally, it is shown that an infinite
stable field of finite dp-rank is algebraically closed
- …