The J Curve Revisited: Assessing Backsliding and Reversal Among Unstable States

Just over ten years ago, Ian Bremmer published a treatise (2006) on the stability of states built on the notion that states fall along a curve resembling a slanted “J” when plotting their stability against openness. The basic idea is that states to the right of the turnover (bottom of the curve) are increasingly open while those to the left are increasingly closed. States on either side of the turnover exhibit increased stability the further they rise along the curve, with the implicit assumption that closed states cannot reach the same level of stability as the most open states As states transition from the left side of the curve to the right, they become more open. States in the turnover process are considered unstable, and are at risk of either reversing to a closed and stable system or even collapsing. In this paper we recast Bremmer’s framework of associated conditions to a causal model. Second, we more accurately specify the causes of reversal in which crises of instability occur. To meet those objectives, we identify states according to the six types characterized by Tikuisis and Carment (2017). We then define stability as a function of two state dimensions: authority and capacity, and apply the remaining state dimension of legitimacy as a proxy for openness. In testing the model, we find that shifts to openness and reversals leading to increasing instability are not as clear cut as Bremmer argues. Transitions can reverse, oscillate, or simply stall, which are exemplified in the different types of states we categorize. For example, we find that the least stable states experience the highest volatility in shifts between stability and openness, while the most stable states exhibit the lowest volatility. Although all state types significantly improved in stability due to capacity but not authority, changes in openness were mixed over the twenty year period of study

Pragmatic, Not Mad: The Rationality of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program

The reasoning behind North Korea’s continued efforts to develop a nuclear deterrent remains puzzling to many, with the heavy costs and behavior of the regime leading to the belief that it is irrational. This paper argues that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is instead a rational strategy for the regime. The perceived threat from South Korean and American military forces, as well as its own ineffective conventional forces, make a North Korean nuclear program a viable and relatively cheap deterrent. Its limited foreign relations and near-total dependence on China largely insulate it from economic punishment. Finally, the nature of the regime allows it to disregard popular opinion while forcing it to accommodate military demands for a nuclear deterrent. The necessity of nuclear weapons for defence and the few downsides of possessing them means that Pyongyang is unlikely to give them up, thus dooming denuclearization efforts to failure

Backsliding and reversal: The J-Curve revisited

Ian Bremmer published a treatise on the stability of states built on the notion that states fall along a curve resembling a slanted "J" when plotting their stability against openness. States in the turnover process are considered unstable, and are at risk of either reversing to a closed and stable system or even collapsing. Our paper shifts the J curve's associated conditions to a model to more accurately specify the causes of reversal in which crises of instability and backsliding occur. We define stability as a function of two state dimensions: authority and capacity, and apply the remaining state dimension of legitimacy as a proxy for openness. We find that transitions can reverse, oscillate, or simply stall, which are exemplified in the different types of states we categorize. The paper concludes with implications for policy and the application of the model to conflict prediction

Failed and fragile states: The unfinished agenda

This chapter examines the continuity and change in U.S. policy towards failed and fragile states (FFS) in the developing world of Africa and Asia after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. We argue that with its sustained focus on security there has been significant continuity in FFS policy from Presidents George W. Bush to Barack Obama, and now Donald Trump. U.S. foreign policy has largely focused on those FFS that affect U.S. strategic interests. To demonstrate this point, we examine and compare policy toward Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. These three countries have been among the most fragile countries in the world and have received significant amounts of foreign aid from Washington in the last decade. Afghanistan and Pakistan are clearly stuck in a fragility trap while Ethiopia’s scope for improving over time is only slightly better. We also argue that geopolitics is playing a larger role in FFS, as Chinese and Russian economics and/or military assistance increase. The relevance of FFS for Washington will thus need to be increasingly gauged through the effects that these rivals have on core American interests in these countries

Backsliding and Reversal: The J Curve Revisited

In this article we argue that democratic transitions can reverse, oscillate, or simply stall. These transitions are exemplified in the different types of states we categorize. We construct a model of stability vs openness using three dimensions of stateness, namely authority, legitimacy, and capacity. With the additional application of a six-fold typology of states, we offer a robust analytical framework with which to identify and explain changes in state status. Our construct of stability and openness leads to a novel development of a global conflict damage index, which is built upon conflict risk, but considers a state’s capacity to deal with conflict. The paper concludes with implications for policy and the application of the model to conflict prediction when states under go transition