Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.Multi-Unit Auctions, Demand Reduction, Experimental Economics

BIDDING BEHAVIOR IN MULTI-UNIT AUCTIONS - AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION AND SOME THEORETICAL INSIGHTS

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.Multi–Unit Auctions, Demand Reduction, Experimental Economics.

Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights

We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with at demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed-bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units. We also provide some theoretical insights concerning the equilibria of uniform-price auctions with incomplete information.Multi-Unit Auctions; Demand Reduction; Experimental Economics

Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners. --Experimental Economics,Mechanism Design,Implementation,Linking,Bayesian Equilibrium,Efficiency

Overcoming Incentive Constraints? The (In-)effectiveness of Social Interaction

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences. Applying the linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2005) captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains. Repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only if players can choose their partners.Experimental Economics, Mechanism Design, Implementation, Linking, Bayesian Equilibrium, Efficiency

The dose can make the poison: lessons learned from adverse in vivo toxicities caused by RNAi overexpression

For the past five years, evidence has accumulated that vector-mediated robust RNA interference (RNAi) expression can trigger severe side effects in small and large animals, from cytotoxicity and accelerated tumorigenesis to organ failure and death. The recurring notions in these studies that a critical parameter is the strength of RNAi expression and that Exportin-5 and the Argonaute proteins are rate-limiting mammalian RNAi, strongly imply dose-dependent saturation of the endogenous miRNA pathway as one of the underlying mechanisms. This minireview summarizes the relevant work and data leading to this intriguing model and highlights potential avenues by which to alleviate RNAi-induced toxicities in future clinical applications

Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences

We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners

A Reference Architecture for Mobile Knowledge Management

Although mobile knowledge management (mKM) is being perceived as an emerging R&D field, its concepts and approaches are not well-settled, as opposed to the general field of Knowledge Management (KM). In this work, we try to establish a definition for mKM. Taking into account building blocks of KM in enterprises and the abstract use cases of mKM systems we introduce an reference architecture for mKM systems as a basis for verifying and comparing concepts and system architectures. Finally we address the potential of mKM to be suitable as a prototype model for mobile, situation-aware information processing in the field of Ambient Intelligence Environments

A radial analogue of Poisson's summation formula with applications to powder diffraction and pinwheel patterns

Diffraction images with continuous rotation symmetry arise from amorphous systems, but also from regular crystals when investigated by powder diffraction. On the theoretical side, pinwheel patterns and their higher dimensional generalisations display such symmetries as well, in spite of being perfectly ordered. We present first steps and results towards a general frame to investigate such systems, with emphasis on statistical properties that are helpful to understand and compare the diffraction images. An alternative substitution rule for the pinwheel tiling, with two different prototiles, permits the derivation of several combinatorial and spectral properties of this still somewhat enigmatic example. These results are compared with properties of the square lattice and its powder diffraction.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figure