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    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS -OF LAW-FREEDOM OF RELIGION- VOLUNTARY RELIGIOUS CLASSES HELD IN PUBLIC SCHOOL BUILDING DURING SCHOOL HOURS

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    Appellant, a resident and taxpayer of the Champaign School District and parent of a child attending the public schools of the district, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the district to discontinue religious classes held in the public schools during regular school hours. The classes in question were sponsored by a voluntary association of Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant faiths, but other religious groups were free to establish classes upon the same basis. Instructional materials, a chosen course of study, and religious teachers were made available to the program by the association. Although employed by the association, the teachers were under the supervision of the Superintendent of Schools. Children were excused from regular classes to attend, and admission was allowed only upon written request of parents. Classes were in session not more than forty-five minutes per week. Non-participating pupils continued with regular school work, and separate rooms were utilized by the various sects represented. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Illinois denied the petition on the ground that no Illinois or federal constitutional right had been violated. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. The program violated the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment and hence was a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. People of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 461

    QUASI-CONTRACTS--DURESS--RECOVERY OF PAYMENTS MADE UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE

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    On September 1, 1939, plaintiff company, engaged in the business of refining, purchasing, transporting and selling gasoline and other petroleum products, entered into two written contracts with defendant retailer. One contract provided for purchase by defendant from plaintiff of real property by monthly installments totaling 32,000,andtheotherstipulatedforpurchasefromplaintiffofallthegasolineandpetroleumproductshandledbydefendantforaperiodoffiveyearsfromdate.Defendantdefaultedinthepaymentofmonthlyinstallmentsontherealestatecontract,andplaintiffbroughtsuittorecovertheunpaidbalanceof32,000, and the other stipulated for purchase from plaintiff of all the gasoline and petroleum products handled by defendant for a period of five years from date. Defendant defaulted in the payment of monthly installments on the real estate contract, and plaintiff brought suit to recover the unpaid balance of 15,200 and sought foreclosure of the contract. Defendant admitted the material allegations of the complaint and counterclaimed for the sum of $10,188.86; alleging that plaintiff had overcharged defendant by that amount under the supply contract and that defendant had paid the overcharge under protest rather than risk jeopardizing his position under the supply contract or incur the penalty stipulated for purchasing elsewhere. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and for the defendant on the counterclaim, finding as a matter of law that defendant was overcharged under the contract in the amount claimed and that defendant waived no known right in paying the overcharges when demanded. On appeal by plaintiff from the judgment on the counterclaim, held, reversed. (1) Defendant could not recover money paid voluntarily and without compulsion and with full knowledge of the facts and without fraud, duress or extortion. (2) Where there was no evidence of a threat to cancel the supply contract, defendant had an adequate remedy for construction of the contract under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. Pure Oil Co. v. Tucker, (C.C.A. 8th, 1947) 164 F. (2d) 945
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