Why Status Effects Need not Justify Egalitarian Income Policy

Economic research overwhelmingly shows that the utility individuals derive from their income depends on the incomes of others. Theoretical literature has proven that these status effects imply a more egalitarian income policy than in the conventional case, in which people value their income independently from the income of others. This article qualifies this conclusion in three ways. First, this policy implication holds if low income groups are sensitive to status, but not if high income groups are predominantly so. Neither do status effects provide an economic rational for egalitarian income policy if they only pertain to peer groups with similar income levels. Third, if status effects are grounded in vices like envy, jealousy, grudgingness or spite, a moral basis for egalitarian income policy is lacking, because distributive justice cannot be based on perverse preferences.relative income;positional goods;optimal taxation;egalitarian income policy;redistribution;status effects;envy

From Phillips curve to wage curve

In most traditional macro-economic models of the Netherlands the wage equation is specified by a Phillips curve, in which wage growth is negatively related to the unemployment rate. This paper shows, however, that wage formation can better be described by the so-called wage curve, in which the wage level instead of wage growth depends negatively on the unemployment rate.Phillips curve; wage curve; wage equation; wage bargaining; tax wedge; unemployment

Sourcing ethics in the textile sector: The case of C&A

During the last years competition in the textile sector has increased, putting financial returns under considerable pressure. As a result, production has shifted to low wage countries in the third world. This has raised the relevance of ethical procedures. This paper analyses how C&A as one of the largest Western apparel companies organises its sourcing ethics, notwithstanding the financial pressure in the market. Based on interviews with Asian suppliers of C&A during the second half of 2000, we review the opinions of external stakeholders about the sourcing ethics of C&A. Finally, we evaluate C&A’s sourcing ethics from a theoretical perspective.Textile sector; audit; sourcing; code of conduct; compliance; ethics; corporate social responsibility; child labour

Distribution of responsibility, ability and competition

This paper considers the distribution of responsibility for prevention of negative social or ecological effects of production and consumption. Responsibility is related to ability and ability depends on welfare. An increase in competition between Western companies depresses their profitability, but increases the welfare of Western consumers, and hence their ability, to acknowledge social values. Therefore, an increase in competition on consumer markets shifts the balance in responsibility from companies to consumers to prevent negative external effects from production and consumption patterns. An increase in competition on investor markets will shift the balance in an opposite direction.Corporate social responsibility; ability; fairness; distribution; externalities; competition; ethics

Collusion, reputation damage and interest in code of conduct: The case of a Dutch construction company

In November 2001, a TV program showed that many large Dutch construction companies participated in price fixing. We analyze how one such company, Heijmans, reacted to the reputation crises after the TV program by introducing a code of conduct. We present the outcomes of a questionnaire survey conducted among 140 managers just after the TV program with respect to the relevance of such a code and discuss the change in attitude of the CEO of Heijmans following after the negative publicity.Corporate social responsibility; code of conduct; collusion; construction sector; reputation; parliamentary investigation; regulation

Modelling the trade-off between profits and principles

Corporations discover that social responsibility pays off. However, sometimes doing what is ethical will prove costly to a company. The purpose of this article is to clarify this trade-off by developing an economic model that describes the choice between profits and principles. The model is used to analyse how external factors like a change in consumer interests and competitiveness affect the relationship between profits and principles.Corporate social responsibility; ethics; competitiveness; profit maximisation; reputation; win-win

Market operation and distributive justice: An evaluation of the ACCRA confession

In the so-called ACCRA declaration of 2004 the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC) condemns neo liberal globalisation on grounds of lack of justice. This paper outlines ten alternative criteria for distributive justice. We show that Biblical ethics support various of these criteria, including distribution in accordance to needs, the capability approach of Sen, reward of productivity and procedural justice in transactions. Next, we present an overview of empirical research to the impact of international market operation on distributive justice. We evaluate the conclusion of the WARC that market operation is opposite to Christian faith.Distributive justice; libertarianism; moral desert; egalitarianism; Christian ethics; market operation; poverty; income inequality

Calvin's Restrictions on Interest: Guidelines for the Credit Crisis

Calvin’s view on the legitimacy of interest has had a great impact on the economic development of Western society. Although Calvin took a fundamentally positive attitude to interest, he also proposed several restrictions on the charging of interest. In this article, we investigate the relevance of these restrictions to the current credit crisis. We find that each of them provides a relevant interpretation of what went wrong in the build up of the credit crisis and gives directions to improve policies of banks and governments as well.Banking sector;Bible;bonus system;Calvin;credit crisis;golden rule;reciprocity;government regulation;restriction on charging interest

Profits and Principles: An Economic Framework

Keywords: profit; business ethics; business responsibility; D45; D59; D63; L21; M14; Z13;

Reputation, corporate social responsibility and market regulation

The paper investigates the role of the government and self-regulatory reputation mechanisms to internalise externalities of market operation. If it pays off for companies to invest in a good reputation by an active policy of corporate social responsibility (CSR), external effects of the market will be (partly) internalised by the market itself. The strength of the reputation mechanism depends on the functioning of non governmental organisations (NGOs), the transparency of the company, the time horizon of the company, and on the behaviour of employees, consumers and investors. On the basis of an extensive study of the empirical literature on these topics, we conclude that in general the working of the reputation mechanism is rather weak. Especially the transparency of companies is a bottleneck. If the government would force companies to be more transparent, it could initiate a self-enforcing spiral that would improve the working of the reputation mechanism. We also argue that the working of the reputation mechanism will be weaker for smaller companies and for both highly competitive and monopolistic markets. We therefore conclude that government regulation is still necessary, especially for small companies.Corporate social responsibility; market regulation