The Necessity and Limits of Kant’s Transcendental Logic, with Reference to Nietzsche and Hegel

Engaging with Kant’s transcendental logic seems to be a question of mere scholarly historical interest today. It is most commonly regarded a mixture between logic and psychology or epistemology, and by that, not a serious form of logic. Transcendental logic seems to be of no systematical impact on the concept of logic. My paper aims to disclose a different account on the endeavour of Kant’s transcendental logic in particular and of the “Critique of Pure Reason” (CPR) in general. Kant’s fundamental question is in a revolutionary way aiming to ground the character of necessity of knowledge, which means to justify the claim that thinking in accordance with the forms and principles of formal logic does not lead to sheer tautologies or an unsolved contradiction, but to knowledge that is objectively valid. In a first part, I shall demonstrate the necessity and the significance of this new fundamental question of the CPR with respect to its genesis out of pre-Kantian metaphysics. A brief outline of Kant’s answer to this question, with special emphasis on his revolutionary new comprehension of logical form, will be given as well. A second part shall open up a perspective that lies beyond Kant’s standpoint with reference to Nietzsche and eventually to Hegel. I will answer the question: What knowledge do we achieve about being or actuality by means of formal logic? I will argue that Kant shows that formal logic is the logic of all technical-practical conduct but also, at least indirectly, the limitation of the technical-practical knowledge and its legitimate sphere of application

Gouverner la nature et libérer la nature. Deux stades d’émancipation

The paper addresses the scope of the human relationship to nature. This scope encompasses a twofold emancipation. The first emancipation is the emancipation from nature that enables the domination of nature by science and technology. The second emancipation is the emancipation from this first emancipation, stemming from the insight that we have to conceive of nature, and respect nature accordingly, as another self that displays itself. I argue that it is precisely the step towards such second emancipation that lies at the core of the revolution of our consciousness of nature that currently seems to be unfolding. Yet the urgent question arises as to how such a “liberation of nature” (Hegel) can be understood sustainably without falling behind the achievements of Kantian philosophy, into a dogmatic ontology or even naturalism. The article delineates a systematic answer to this question by addressing some crucial points in Kant and Hegel.Rad se bavi rasponom ljudskog odnosa prema prirodi. Taj raspon obuhvaća dvije emancipacije. Prva je emancipacija od prirode putem koje se omogućuje gospodarenje prirodom pomoću znanosti i tehnike. Druga emancipacija jest emancipacija od prve emancipacije, izviruća iz uvida da o prirodi trebamo misliti i odgovarajuće je poštivati kao drugo sebstvo koje se ukazuje. Argumentiram da upravo takav iskorak prema takvoj drugoj emancipaciji leži u jezgri revolucije svjesnosti o prirodi za koju se čini da se upravo odvija. No urgentno se pitanje javlja o tome kako takvo »oslobođenje od prirode« (Hegel) može biti shvaćeno kao održivo, bez zaostajanja za postignućima kantovske filozofije i pada u dogmatsku ontologiju ili čak naturalizam. Rad uspostavlja sustavni odgovor na to pitanje baveći se nekim ključnim točkama u Kanta i Hegela.Der Aufsatz handelt von der Spannweite des Naturverhältnisses des Menschen. Diese umfasst eine zweifache Emanzipation: die erste Emanzipation als die Emanzipation von der Natur, die uns die Herrschaft über diese in Gestalt der Wissenschaft und Technik ermöglicht. Die zweite Emanzipation ist die Emanzipation von dieser ersten Emanzipation. Diese entspringt der Einsicht, dass die Natur als ein anderes Selbst, das sich zeigt, zu denken und zu achten ist. Ich vertrete die These, dass es bei der gegenwärtigen Auseinandersetzung um unser Naturverhältnis im Kern um den Schritt zur zweiten Emanzipation geht. Dabei tritt aber das philosophische Problem auf, wie denn in haltbarer Weise von einer „Befreiung der Natur“ (Hegel) gesprochen werden kann, ohne hinter die Errungenschaften der Kantischen Philosophie in eine dogmatische Ontologie oder gar einen Naturalismus zurückzufallen? Der Aufsatz zeigt die Grundlinien der Antwort auf diese Frage mit Blick auf Kant und Hegel.Ce travail traite de la dimension relationnelle de l’homme envers la nature. Cette dimension comprend deux émancipations. La première concerne l’émancipation humaine de la nature par laquelle il devient possible de gouverner la nature à l’aide de la science et de la technique. La seconde émancipation est l’émancipation de la première, et découle de l’idée qu’il est né- cessaire de penser la nature et de la respecter de manière responsable tel un autre soi qui se présente à nous. J’estime précisément qu’une telle avancée se situe au cœur de la révolution de conscience de la nature, qui justement, semble se dérouler. La question urgente qui se pose est de savoir comment une telle « libération de la nature » (Hegel) peut être comprise comme viable, sans laisser derrière elle les acquis de la philosophie kantienne et sans tomber dans une ontologie dogmatique, voire dans le naturalisme. Ce travail présente une réponse systématique à la question en traitant de certains points clés chez Kant et Hegel

Pensar como operación – Acerca de los presupuestos e implicaciones de la lógica formal moderna

Actualmente se considera a la lógica formal incuestionablemente como la lógica. ¿Quién se atrevería a cuestionar esto sin perder el juicio? Queremos en lo que sigue, emprender con gusto esto. La tesis afirma que, en la lógica formal, el pensar se concibe de modo técnico-práctico, que también en ello reside – bien visto - la necesidad relativa de su punto de vista. Pero una absolutización de esta auto-interpretación de la forma lógica tiene – uno tiene que decirlo drásticamente –, en definitiva, consecuencias mortales para el entorno del mundo humano. Queremos, por eso, aproximarnos al tema lógica formal de un modo completamente no-técnico, a saber, de un modo filosófico, es decir, queremos cuestionarla en sus presupuestos e implicaciones. Pues también la lógica formal tiene sus presupuestos, que quedan a sus espaldas. En un primer paso, actualizaremos las determinaciones más fundamentales en la formulación de la lógica formal. En un segundo paso, queremos profundizar esto con vistas al concepto lógico-formal del “concepto”. Los problemas sistemáticos que trataremos con esto son precisamente aquellos cuya solución hará necesario el paso a la lógica transcendental en el sentido de Kant.

T cells armed with C-X-C chemokine receptor type 6 enhance adoptive cell therapy for pancreatic tumours

The efficacy of adoptive cell therapy for solid tumours is hampered by the poor accumulation of the transferred T cells in tumour tissue. Here, we show that the forced expression of the C-X-C chemokine receptor type 6 (CXCR6, whose ligand is highly expressed by human and murine pancreatic cancer cells and by tumour-infiltrating immune cells) in antigen-specific T cells enhanced the recognition and lysis of pancreatic cancer cells and the efficacy of adoptive cell therapy for pancreatic cancer. In mice with subcutaneous pancreatic tumours treated with T cells with either a transgenic T-cell receptor or a murine chimeric antigen receptor targeting the tumour-associated antigen epithelial cell-adhesion molecule, and in mice with orthotopic pancreatic tumours or patient-derived xenografts treated with T cells expressing a chimeric antigen receptor targeting mesothelin, the T cells exhibited enhanced intratumoral accumulation, exerted sustained antitumoral activity and prolonged animal survival only when co-expressing CXCR6. Arming tumour-specific T cells with tumour-specific chemokine receptors may represent a promising strategy for the realization of adoptive cell therapy for solid tumours