10 research outputs found
The intriguing relationship between uncertainty and normativity: the need for pluralistic assessment
Untersuchung zur Nachhaltigkeit der Kernenergienutzung
The report reviews the sustainability discussion, specifically for the energy sector. Definitions, rules and indicators are gone into. Publications speaking against nuclear power are analysed: Brundtland, UBA, SRU, UNCSD, HGF. The main section analyzed positive publications, i.e. Voss, Kessler, and the NEA study. 11 central argumentation strategies are identified and analyzed. They are shown to be faulty, based on selective argumentations which omit either important comparative arguments relevant to the whole energy sector, or alternative options, or additional risks caused by changes in boundary conditions. Further, aspects of human and social acceptability are left out of account as well as problems of institutionalisation. (orig.)Die Studie resuemiert (1) kurz die Nachhaltigkeitsdiskussion und ihre Spezifikation auf dem Energiesektor. Dabei werden jeweils drei Ebenen thematisiert: Definitionen, Regeln, Indikatoren. Anschliessend werden (2) skeptische bis negative Bewertungen der Kernenergie untersucht: Brundtland, UBA, SRU, UN-CSD, HGF. Der Hauptteil (3) widmet sich der positiven Bewertung der Kernenergie durch Voss, Kessler und insbesondere durch die NEA-Studie. Hierbei werden 11 zentrale Argumentationsstrategien analysiert (Handreichung 1.1 - 1.3, 2.1 - 2.8). Ihre Schlussfolgerungen und Einschaetzungen lassen sich nicht aufrechterhalten: Sie beruhen auf selektiven Argumentationen, in der a) wichtige komparative Argumente im Blick auf den gesamten Energiesektor ausgelassen werden, b) alternative Optionen unberuecksichtigt bleiben und, c) wesentliche zusaetzliche Risikopfade, moegliche Veraenderungen von Randbedingungen sowie Erwaegungen zur Human- und Sozialvertraeglichkeit ausgeblendet bleiben, sowie, d) Probleme der Institutionalisierung nicht hinreichend gewuerdigt werden. (orig.)SIGLEAvailable from TIB Hannover: RO 3190(593) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman
Principles and discourse: an approach for the theoretical justification of ethical case discussion and ethics consultation
Cooperative Guidance, Control, and Automation
The technological feasibility of more and more assistant systems and automation in vehicles leads to the necessity of a better integration and cooperation with the driver and with other traffic participants. This chapter describes an integrated cooperative guidance of vehicles including assisted, partially automated, and highly automated modes. Starting with the basic concepts and philosophy, the design space, parallel and serial aspects, the connections between abilities, authority, autonomy, control, and responsibility, vertical versus horizontal and centralized versus decentralized cooperation are discussed, before two follow-on chapters of H-Mode and Conduct-by-Wire describe instantiations of cooperative guidance and control
Working Towards Sustainable Development in the Face of Uncertainty and Incomplete Knowledge
Habermas’s moral cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge
Habermas’s Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach challenge, JAMES GORDON FINLAYSON This article levels at Habermas’s discourse ethics a challenge more usually directed to theories denying moral discourse is truth-bearing. It argues that the same challenge applies to discourse ethics, because Habermas denies that moral utterances are truth-apt, and claims that they are only analogous to truth. Part I shows that Habermas’s view that there is only an analogy between truth and rightness rests on an unjustified worry that metaethical cognitivism implies moral realism. It concludes that Habermas simply assumes moral discourse is syntactically disciplined exactly like theoretical discourse, but cannot explain why this is. Part II argues that the only tenable responses open to Habermas are either 1. to combine deflationism about truth with the acceptance that moral utterances can be true, or 2. to refrain from offering any theory of truth and to prescind entirely from the metaethical question of cognitivism versus non-cognitvism. – Correspondence to James Gordon Finlayson, Department of Philosophy, University of Sussex, Arts B Building 340, Falmer, Brighton, BN1 9Q