9 research outputs found

    Effect of light, food additives and heat on the stability of sorghum 3-deoxyanthocyanins in model beverages.

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    This work aimed to evaluate the stability of sorghum 3-deoxyanthocyanins (DXA) in model beverages (pH 3.5) elaborated with crude sorghum phenolic extract, containing ascorbic acid and sulphite, under fluorescent light exposure and subjected to heat treatment. There was no significant difference in the DXA degradation during storage under light exposure (24.16%) and absence of light (20.72%). DXA degradation did not differ in the presence of ascorbic acid during storage under light exposure (23.99-25.38%) and absence of light (19.87-21.74%). The addition of sulphite caused an initial bleaching reaction, but as a reversible reaction, the anthocyanin content was higher on the last day of storage compared to the first day. There were no significant differences in total anthocyanin content of all treatments subjected to the heat treatment (80 °C for 5 and 25 min). Thus, crude DXA are very stable under light, additives and heat, and may be useful as natural food colourants

    Extreme nash equilibria

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    Abstract. We study the combinatorial structure and computational complexity of extreme Nash equilibria, ones that maximize or minimize a certain objective function, in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic. InaNash equilibrium, each user routes its traffic on links that minimize its expected latency cost. Our structural results provide substantial evidence for the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture, which states that the worst Nash equilibrium is the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, where each user chooses each link with positive probability. Specifically, we prove that the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture is valid for pure Nash equilibria and that under a certain condition, the social cost of any Nash equilibrium is within a factor of 6 + ε, of that of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium, assuming that link capacities are identical
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