Economic instruments and institutional constraints: possible schemes for SO2 emissions trading in the EU

The three proposals examined here were specifically conceived to address the two major constraints by which the institutional context of the EU and UNECE SO2 requirements have been interpreted: national emission ceilings and deposition constraints for geographical zones. What can be the future of such proposals, if they are to become reality? Can we imagine an evolution towards a system of tradable allowances structured by a single constraint, i.e. deposition allowances?SO2 emissions trading

On markets and the conditions of a profitable use of economic instruments for environmental policy in countries in transition to market

Economic instruments for environmental policies could reach their full potential of efficiency in economies in which all commodities are exchanged on competitive markets and agents are maximising operators, ready for catching any market opportunity and sensitive to price signals. This ideal cannot be held as a realistic picture neither of OECD countries nor economies in transition to market, even if market mechanisms have gained, to a different degree, a considerable influence on their economic life. As far as environmental issues are concerned, contexts of action are of mixed-economies type, with an important role given to public regulation and public or collective financial circuits for environmental programmes. Happily, well designed economic instruments can do quite well for improving the cost-effectiveness of such policy contexts without waiting a full development of a market economy. This gains may be derived directly (positive incentives to minimise abatement costs), or by opportunity (alleviating technological and administrative rigidities). They can also result from reforms and new institutional settings they make possible ('green tax reform', or setting up water communities) on top of their direct incentive dimension.Integrating Environmental Policy ; Sectoral Policies

The precautionary principle. Between social norms and economic constructs

Cet article confronte les interprétations proposées pour le principe de précaution qui viennent de deux horizons différents : les théories économiques du risque qui s'inscrivent dans un cadre bayésien et les repères heuristiques de la doctrine validée par les institutions européennes et françaises. Les traits communs sont mis en évidence, mais aussi d'importantes différences quant aux concepts et aux contextes d'application. Malgré ces différences, l'analyse économique propose des éclairages utiles sur plusieurs questions controversées soulevées par la mise en œuvre du principe de précaution comme norme sociale. Cela concerne par exemple la réversibilité des mesures de précaution, la question de l'application directe du principe à toute personne ou aux seules autorités publiques et le problème de l'imputation de la charge de l'instruction scientifique des hypothèses de risque.

The economic design of a potential tradable permit system for SO2 emissions in the European Union

This paper contains two main parts. The first develops the issues of the European acid policy, and sets out the general background of the related regulatory regime. It also gives an overview of the theoretical and actual features of emissions trading mechanisms. It then considers the potential attractiveness of SO2 trading in the EU. This background throws light on the more specific analyses and proposals described in the second part of the paper, which is devoted to a presentation of possible frameworks for SO2 trading in the power generation sector in the EU. In section 2.1., we look at some key design variables. In section 2.2., we present three alternative ways of designing a trading scheme. In section 2.3., we consider specific issues related to zoning and scaling.

Revisiting the precautionary principle under the light of 2002-2003 French and international events

Sur la base d'une relecture d'événements nationaux (la Charte de l'environnement en France) et internationaux (la guerre préventive des Etats-Unis en l'Irak) des années 2002-2003, ce papier rappelle la confusion entretenue entre principe de précaution et règle d'abstention. Il montre ensuite qu'il n'y a guère de fondement à postuler un antagonisme radical entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe dans la manière d'aborder la gestion des risques en pratique. Cependant, des deux côtés de l'Atlantique, on peut observer une opposition entre deux usages de ce principe, soit comme vecteur d'un progrès de la coordination internationale, soit comme justification d'initiatives unilatérales dérogeant à des règles communes précédemment acceptées.Principe de précaution;Gouvernance;guerre préventive;Souveraineté

The precautionary principle, the environment and international trade: Sovereignty and collective preferences in question

Le propos de cet article est d'envisager les effets possibles du principe de précaution sur les règles du commerce international. En prenant en compte une interrogation sur la place légitime à reconnaître aux préférences collectives dans les accords sur le commerce, l'ambiguïté des usages du principe de précaution au regard de la coordination internationale et de l'émergence d'un ordre public planétaire est soulignée. Il existe une tension entre les institutions souveraines légitimes en charge de la prévention des risques collectifs et le besoin de coopération internationale pour traiter des risques supranationaux comme le changement climatique et l'érosion de la biodiversité. Au-delà, l'interférence des enjeux du commerce et de la protection de l'environnement sous l'égide du principe de précaution devrait provoquer une différenciation des règles du commerce applicables en fonction de la fiabilité de l'information donnée et des garanties apportées sur les conditions environnementales et sociales de production tout au long des filières de production et de distribution. Ce processus dépend de l'extension effective du concept pertinent de qualité des biens aux yeux des pouvoirs publics et des consommateurs. Ce qui est en jeu est l'ensemble des garanties techniques et de l'information que les producteurs devront apporter pour susciter la confiance et soutenir les relations d'échange.Commerce international;Risques;Principe de précaution;Souveraineté;Qualité des biens

Social Decision-Making under Scientific Controversy, Expertise, and the Precautionary Principle

Integrating scientific inputs into the regulatory process is generally attributed to experts. But, environmental issues are often characterised by an all-pervasive uncertainty and scientific and social controversies which make the experts' task difficult. This paper presents the concept of social decision-making under scientific controversy and comes to an examination of the implicit but decisive roles expected from expertise in those contexts. It also gives some examples of misunderstandings about the very nature of scientific statements. Since a new principle, the Precautionary Principle, is said to bring appropriate responses to uncertainty, we examine the change in the course of relationship between science and decision-making it may have and we test its operational capability to solve decision problems on a scientific basis. Our conclusion is that in controversial contexts, the Principle has no definite content and is not able to frame a scientifically determined hierarchy of options. So, to have it reasonably translated to deal with practical matters, some effort is expected from scientific communities : they should organise a collective validation of their expertise, distinct from the organisation of expertise by public administrations. This expertise by scientists should consider with due attention the process of formulation of assumptions and building conjectural possibilities, so as to define the boundaries of relevance for action and to establish some gradual scale in the qualification of scientific products which may authorise gradual precautionary measures to be taken.regulatory decision making ; climat policy