Kwaliteitsinformatie en de marktaandelen van IVF-centra

Sinds 1997 zijn de prestaties van IVF-centra op internet onderling vergelijkbaar. Zorggebruikers lijken de beschikbare kwaliteitsinformatie te gebruiken. IVF-centra in de Randstad met een hoger percentage doorgaande zwangerschappen hebben een groter marktaandeel

Price competition among Dutch sickness funds

In general, competition enhances efficiency. On the market for health insurance free market competition, however, has unwanted side-effects. The existence of asymmetrical information can lead to adverse selection and cream skimming. Adequate risk-adjustment removes the incentives for cream skimming and balances the negative consequences of adverse selection. In an attempt to enhance efficiency, the Dutch government in 1992 introduced price competition between social health insurers in combination with risk-adjusted capitation payments. Our estimation results indicate that this has not resulted in altering market shares. Relatively cheap insurers did not enlarge their market share at the expense of their relatively expensive competitors. The introduction of competition among social health insurers has not been the success the Dutch government hoped for. Experiences in Belgium and Germany show that the Dutch difficulties are not exceptional. When equity considerations are high valued features of a health insurance system, it is difficult to introduce competition. To enhance efficiency, we recommend that the current capitation formula should be refined and that the insurers should be given more room for selective contracting of health care providers

Using the deductible for patient channeling: did preferred providers gain patient volume?

In market-based health care systems, channeling patients to designated preferred providers can increase payer’s bargaining clout, other things being equal. In the unique setting of the new Dutch health care system with regulated competition, this paper evaluates the impact of a 1-year natural experiment with patient channeling on providers’ market shares. In 2009 a large regional Dutch health insurer designated preferred providers for two different procedures (cataract surgery and varicose veins treatment) and gave its enrollees a positive financial incentive for choosing them. That is, patients were exempted from paying their deductible when they went to a preferred provider. Using claims data over the period 2007–2009, we apply a difference-in-difference approach to study the impact of this channeling strategy on the allocation of patients across individual providers. Our estimation results show that, in the year of the experiment, preferred providers of varicose veins treatment on average experienced a significant increase in patient volume relative to non-preferred providers. However, for cataract surgery no significant effect is found. Possible explanations for the observed difference between both procedures may be the insurer’s selection of preferred providers and the design of the channeling incentive resulting in different expected financial benefits for both patient groups

Efficientie boven water

Benchmarking heeft de efficiëntie van de drinkwatersector in de afgelopen jaren aanzienlijk verbeterd. Het introduceren van ingrijpendere vormen van marktwerking ligt niet voor de hand

Aanpassing GVS risicovol

Het kabinetsplan om de vergoedingslimieten van geneesmiddelen drastisch te verlagen, kan ernstige bijwerkingen hebben

Patient responsiveness to a differential deductible: empirical results from The Netherlands

Health insurers may use financial incentives to encourage their enrollees to choose preferred providers for medical treatment. Empirical evidence whether differences in cost-sharing rates across providers affects patient choice behavior is, especially from Europe, limited. This paper examines the effect of a differential deductible to steer patient provider choice in a Dutch regional market for varicose veins treatment. Using individual patients’ choice data and information about their out-of-pocket payments covering the year of the experiment and 1 year before, we estimate a conditional logit model that explicitly controls for pre-existing patient preferences. Our results suggest that in this natural experiment designating preferred providers and waiving the deductible for enrollees using these providers significantly influenced patient choice. The average cross-price elasticity of demand is found to be 0.02, indicating that patient responsiveness to the cost-sharing differential itself was low. Unlike fixed cost-sharing differences, the deductible exemption was conditional on the patient’s other medical expenses occurring in the policy year. The differential deductible did, therefore, not result in a financial benefit for patients with annual costs exceeding their total deductible

Concurrentie bevordert onderwijsrendement niet

Keuzevrijheid bestaat al jaren in het voortgezet onderwijs en maakt dat scholen onderling concurreren. Door de beschikbaarheid van meer informatie kunnen ouders en leerlingen steeds beter kiezen. Concurrentie tussen scholen leidt echter niet tot meer onderwijsrendement in termen van cijfers of slagingspercentages

School Choice and Competition

The literature suggests that competition among schools might increase quality. However, not much empirical evidence is present as only a few countries allow competition at a large scale. One exception is the Netherlands. Free parental choice is the leading principle of the Dutch education system since the beginning of the 20th century. Based on panel data for the Netherlands we show that there is a relation between competition and student achievement in upper secondary education, but that it is negative. In addition, private schools have higher quality levels