Human Smuggling

Despite its importance in global illegal migration, there is little, and mostly theoretical research on human smuggling. We suggest an analytical framework to understand the micro structure of the human smuggling market. Migrants interact with smuggling and financing intermediaries; these may or may not be integrated with each other, and with the migrants' employers. Policies of receiving countries (border controls, employer sanctions, deportation policies, sales of visa) affect the interactions in the smuggling market, and, hence, migration flows. We review the theoretical work, point to the scarce empirical evidence, and identify challenges for future theoretical, empirical work and policy advice.illegal migration, trafficking

Insider Privatization and Careers - A Study of a Russian Firm in Transition

We study how transition has affected human resource policies of a Russian heavy industry firm. Our data set contains personnel files of 1538 white-collar workers over 17 years: from 1984 to 2000. We find career paths before the first year of Gaidar's reforms, 1992, when Russian transition to a market economy began. After 1992, promotions are blocked, because both (i) more managers are hired from the outside, and (ii) fewer managers leave the firm. A possible reason is an extremely weak outsider property rights enforcement in Russia. Keywords: institutional environment and internal labor market, transition to a market economy.

Is it always good to let universities select their students?

ABSTRACT:We undertake a first step to investigating a reform that has beenapplied in numerous universities across Europe: the right to select students. We ask to what extent this right will increase the effciency of the university. While it seems evident that giving universities the right to select students that match best with the human capital of professors should increase efficiency measures in the productivities of students in the labor market, we point to a potentially negative effect. We argue that allowing universities to select the students they prefer can reduce the incentives of the universities to improve the human capital of their professors.

Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to assure certain efforts may have destructive effects: they can distort the way workers perceive their fellow workers and they may also lead to a reduction of effort by those workers that care most about output. Moreover, interventions may hinder the development of a cooperative organizational culture in which workers trust each other. Thus, our framework provides some first insights into the costs and benefits of interventions in teams. It identifies that team governance is driven by the importance of tasks that cannot be monitored. The more important these tasks, the more likely it is that teams are empowered.team work, incentives, informed principal, intrinsic motivation