Sustainable Social Spending and Stagnant Public Services: Baumol's Cost Disease Revisited

If demand for human services is inelastic or manufactured goods are necessities, labour shifts from manufacturing to services and the budget share of services rises. Higher productivity growth in the market sector pushes up the tax rate and public employment if private goods and public services are poor substitutes, labour supply is inelastic and there are few dependants. Otherwise, private affluence and public squalor result. More dependants boost public employment if the market provides poor substitutes, but public services per dependent may fall due to tax base erosion. Extensions to market and public employment being imperfect substitutes, varying utility of money and public sector productivity depends on pay.Baumol's cost disease, Wagner's law, congestion, cost of public funds, dependency ratio

Fiscal Policy and Dutch Disease

In this paper we revisit the Dutch disease paying particular attention to the role of specific factors of production and capital stock dynamics. The main insight is that if the natural resource rich windfall is substantial but not large enough for the country to become a rentier, capital goods must be produced at home and adjustment to natural resource windfall takes time. It takes time to build this home-grown capital. Specific factors are crucial to explain the dynamic responses of the real exchange rate, capital intensities and wages in response to a natural resource windfall. If a country is small and the windfall is large, it may be able to import capital and migrant labour in which case the Dutch disease can be avoided.specific factors, real exchange rate, capital stock dynamics, factor intensity, international trade, Dutch disease, permanent income, fiscal policy rules, overlapping generations

Genuine Saving and the Voracity Effect

Many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving rates, so deplete their exhaustible natural resource wealth faster than they build up wealth in other assets. This phenomenon is stronger in more fractionalized countries with poor legal systems. We explain this by a power struggle about the control of natural resources. Competing fractions in society thus have a private stock of financial assets and a common stock of natural resources. We solve a dynamic common-pool problem and obtain political economy variants of the Hotelling rule for resource depletion and the Hartwick saving rule necessary to sustain constant consumption in an economy with exhaustible natural resources. Resource depletion is faster than demanded by the Hotelling rule. As a result, the country has negative genuine saving rates and is running down its national wealth. The country saves more in financial assets than the current natural resource rents. Still, the erosion of natural wealth exceeds the accumulation of financial assets. Even though the power struggle boosts output, consumption is sub-optimally low. The highlighted political distortions are larger if the country is more fractionalized.Exhaustible natural resources, Hotelling resource rents, Hartwick rule, genuine saving, capital, sustainable consumption, rapacious rent seeking, common pool, voracity, fractionalization

The Welfare State, Redistribution and the Economy, Reciprocal Altruism, Consumer Rivalry and Second Best

Democratic countries with substantial inequality and where people believe that success depends on connections and luck induce political support for high tax rates and generous welfare states. Traditional wisdom is that such policies harm the economy, but there is not much evidence that countries with a large welfare state and substantial redistribution have worse economic performance and welfare. One important reason is that governments have been careful to invoke the principles of reciprocity and mutual obligations in the design of the welfare state. Unemployment benefits conditioned on work experience, no misconduct and search effort harm the economy less. Indeed, conditional benefits may even boost employment in an economy with efficiency wages. A second reason is that people care about relative incomes and become unhappy if others earn and consume much more than they do. This explains why people do not seem to get happier, even though societies grow richer and richer. With such consumer rivalry the government wishes to correct for the rat race, even if there is no need for redistribution, by taxing labour. A third reason is that in modern economies many distortions are present and removing one at a time may worsen economic performance. Conversely, increasing tax progression in economies with non-competitive labour markets induces wage moderation and boosts employment. A final reason is that countries with large welfare states typically introduce various progrowth policies as well.mutual obligations, altruism, relative incomes, happiness, redistributive taxation, demand management, second best, design of welfare state

Back to Keynes?

After a brief review of classical, Keynesian, New Classical and New Keynesian theories of macroeconomic policy, we assess whether New Keynesian Economics captures the quintessential features stressed by J.M. Keynes. Particular attention is paid to Keynesian features omitted in New Keynesian workhorses such as the micro-founded Keynesian multiplier and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. These theories capture wage and price sluggishness and aggregate demand externalities by departing from a competitive framework and give a key role to expectations. The main deficiencies, however, are the inability to predict a pro-cyclical real wage in the face of demand shocks, the absence of inventories, credit constraints and bankruptcies in explaining the business cycle, and no effect of the nominal as well as the real interest rate on aggregate demand. Furthermore, they fail to allow for quantity rationing and to model unemployment as a catastrophic event. The macroeconomics based on the New Keynesian Phillips curve has quite a way to go before the quintessential Keynesian features are captured.Keynesian economics, New Keynesian Phillips curve, monopolistic competition, nominal wage rigidity, welfare, pro-cyclical real wage, inventories, liquidity, bankruptcy, unemployment, monetary policy

Rapacious Resource Depletion, Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. The theory suggests that adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving.exhaustible resources, Hotelling rule, Hartwick rule, capital, sustainable consumption, fractionalization, seepage, insecure property rights, differential game, genuine saving, adjusted net saving

Sustainable Social Spending in a Greying Economy with Stagnant Public Services: Baumol’s Cost Disease Revisited

Baumol’s cost disease states that relatively high productivity growth in manufacturing induces a steady increase in the relative price of human services. If demand for these services is inelastic or manufactured goods are necessities, the budget share of these services inexorably rises over time and labour gradually shifts from manufacturing to services. If the care for children and elderly releases time for households, labour supply and the budget share of human services expand over time. This paper addresses the sustainability of human services such as care and education in a greying economy if they are financed by labour taxes. A productivity growth differential in favour of the market sector pushes up the tax rate and public sector employment if private goods and public services are poor substitutes, labour supply is relatively inelastic and there are not too many pensioners and children. Private affluence and public squalor result if labour supply is very elastic, the dependency ratio is large and the market provides good substitutes for public services. Greying of the population boosts demand for public employment if the market provides poor substitutes for public services, but the provision of public services per dependent may fall due to the erosion of the tax base. Subsequently, we discuss the situation where market and public employment are imperfect substitutes for households, the utility of money is not constant and public sector productivity depends on public sector pay.Baumol’s cost disease, Wagner’s law, time price, congestion of public services, public squalor, private affluence, tax burden, cost of public funds, differential productivity growth, greying of population, public sector pay

Prudent Monetary Policy and Cautious Prediction of the Output Gap

Using the results of risk-adjusted linear-quadratic-Gaussian optimal control with perfect and imperfect observation of the economy, we obtain prudent Taylor rules for monetary policies and also allow for imperfect information and cautious Kalman filters. A prudent central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate more aggressively to changes in the inflation gap, especially if the volatility of cost-push shocks is large. If the interest rate impacts the output gap after a lag, the interest also responds to the output gap, especially with strong persistence in aggregate demand. Prudence pushes up this reaction coefficient as well. If data are poor and appear with a lag, a prudent central bank responds less strongly to new measurements of the output gap. However, prudence attenuates this policy reaction and biases the prediction of the output gap upwards, particularly if output targeting is important. Finally, prudence requires an extra upward (downward) bias in its estimate of the output gap before it feeds into the policy rule if inflation is above (below) target. This reinforces nominal interest rate reactions. A general lesson is that prudent predictions are neither efficient nor unbiased.prudence, optimal monetary policy, Taylor rules, measurement errors, prediction

Prudent Budgetary Policy: Political Economy of Precautionary Taxation

The theory of tax smoothing and determination of public debt with uncertain future national income is extended for prudence. A prudent government deliberately underestimates future national income and the tax base, especially if the variance and persistence of shocks hitting the tax base are large and the tax rate and the unemployment benefit are large. As a precaution the tax rate is set higher and the level of public spending lower. As a result, as income and the tax base turn out to be bigger than budgeted, the minister of finance enjoys windfall revenues and is able to gradually reduce debt and debt service over time. This permits, depending on political preferences, either gradual cuts in the tax rate, gradual increases in government spending or a combination of both. It is easy to allow for government assets as well. Finally, political economy justifications are offered of why it is desirable to appoint a strong and pessimistic minister of finance. In particular, we show that prudence is able to offset the intertemporal spending, tax and debt biases resulting from the common-pool distortions. If the minister of finance and the prime minister are given as many voting rights as the spending ministers combined, the intratemporal common-pool distortions of an excessively large public sector are eliminated as well. A strong and pessimistic minister of finance can thus control the impatient profligacy of squabbling spending ministers. However, if voters care about outcomes on election eve, prudence may be abused for short-run electoral gains. Opportunistic manipulation of election results, however, also dampens the intertemporal common-pool distortions.prudence, pessimism, precautionary taxation, tax smoothing, public debt, income forecasts, public sector assets, common pool, feedback Nash, voting rights, electoral budget cycles, political economy

Aggressive Oil Extraction and Precautionary Saving: Coping with Volatility

The effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax, spending and government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences quadratic. Without prudence, optimal oil extraction is governed by the Hotelling rule and optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle. Volatile oil demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus. With prudence, the government depletes oil reserves even more aggressively and engages in additional precautionary saving financed by postponing spending and bringing taxes forward, especially if it has substantial monopoly power on the oil market, gives high priority to the public spending target, is very prudent, and future oil demand has high variance. Uncertain economic prospects induce even higher precautionary saving and, if non]oil revenue shocks and oil revenue shocks are positively correlated, even more aggressive oil extraction. In contrast, prudent governments deliberately underestimate oil reserves which induce less aggressive oil depletion and less government saving, but less so if uncertainty about reserves and oil demand are positively correlated.Hotelling rule, tax smoothing, prudence, vigorous oil extraction, precautionary saving, taxation and under-spending, oil price volatility, uncertain economic prospects and oil reserves