Towards Effective Anti-Corruption Strategies in Ukraine: Removing the Cornerstone without Toppling the Building

The work presents a theoretical framework, and offers a tentative analytical framework for building strategies for combating systemic corruption of the kind that is observed in Ukraine. It argues that, as in some other countries undergoing the process of modernization, corruption in Ukraine plays an important social role by filling gaps between formal (often impracticable) rules, and informal ones. At the same time, it creates incentives and provides the means for maintaining and widening these gaps, as in the critically important case of “capture” of the state by extorting officials endowed with abnormal administrative discretion and affiliated with crony businesses. Systemic factors of such kind make corruption so persistent and anti-corruption so necessary for development. Effective strategies should primarily address the real sources of corruption, and take into account the possible side effects. Otherwise anticorruption efforts can bring only limited success, and may even become counterproductive, as demonstrated in the examples of previous anti-corruption attempts in Ukraine. Meanwhile, prior to the Orange Revolution, systemic factors prevented the implementation of effective anticorruption strategies. In order to facilitate the creation of anti-corruption constituencies, it is proposed to classify the corrupt deals as embezzlement, collusion, overtimes, and extortion based on the interests of involved and suffering parties. Implications from this theoretical analysis are combined with some standard politicaleconomic recommendations in the tentative analytical framework for policy making and public advocacy. As examples of its application, tentative anti-corruption strategies are suggested for some forms of corruption in Ukraine, such as capture in setting up legislation and extortion in its enforcement; embezzlement in budget execution, collusion in procurement and regulation, and asset stripping in state-owned firms; collusion and extortion in public services; and extortion in the public administration.corruption, policy making, policy implementation, political economy, transition, governance, Ukraine

Business Climate in CIS Countries

The paper examines the quality of the business climate in the group of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) from the prospective of the level of development of entrepreneurship, and individual countries’ attractiveness to the foreign direct investments (FDI). The analysis suggests that the main obstacles for further improvements of the business climate in this group of countries are high level of corruption, inefficiency in the existing system of tax administration and regulation, discretionary implementation of custom and trade regulations, low level of property rights protection, and macroeconomic instability. Some explanations of the historical and institutional causes of these business impediments are provided. Although the net FDI inflow to CIS countries has been substantially increased since the time they gained independence, it’s still well bellow than in Central & Eastern Europe Countries (CEE). The number of private enterprises per capita vastly varies within the CIS countries, with some of them approaching the OECD level, but some else lagging far behind. FDI stocks also unequally distribute within the CIS group. Fuel exporting countries are better off than fuel importing countries, although the individual country’s business climate within two groups does not differ significantly. As a conclusion, paper suggests a number of concrete public policy recommendations aiming to improve business climate in the CIS region.CIS, business climate, FDI

Composite Leading Indicators for Ukraine: An Early Warning Model

The project has undertaken the following tasks: Based on an analysis of the pattern of growth of the Ukrainian economy since the end of the post-Soviet recession (the year 2000) we have formulated the hypotheses concerning the factors preceding/affecting the upturns and downturns (with a focus on the latter) of the country’s growth; We have studied international “best practice” in early warning indicators in order to design a similar system for Ukraine; We have selected the relevant indicators, consistent with our hypotheses and used a probit model in order to experiment with these indicators; The final set of indicators used in the model included the following lagged independent variables: changes in the value of export, changes in real Exchange rate of the hryvnya, producers’ price index adjusted for domestic price inflation index and the IMF’s metal price index, bank credit interest rate, changes in the industrial output of the European Union; our dependent variable (which was used as a proxy for the overall economic growth) was changes in real industrial output; The model was used to formulate a warning forecast for the Ukrainian economy for the second half of 2008 based on the data for the January 2000 – June 2008 period; all predictions for the second half of 2008 have delivered warning about a downturn of the Ukrainian economy; We ran a few additional experiments with the model, and We have recommended several further steps of analysis toward a full implementation and institutionalization of such a model in the near future.business cycle, forecasting, econometric model, Ukraine, Ukrainian economy, economic growth, GDP, early warning indicator

Composite leading indicators for Ukraine: An early warning model

Our objective has been to experiment with diverse economic indicators in order to help equip Ukrainian policymakers with a relatively simple tool, which could deliver warning signals about a possibility of upcoming economic problems and thereby assist the Government in designing policy instruments which would help prevent or soften a slowdown or recession. The project has undertaken the following tasks: Based on an analysis of the pattern of growth of the Ukrainian economy since the end of the post-Soviet recession (the year 2000) we have formulated the hypotheses concerning the factors preceding/affecting the upturns and downturns (with a focus on the latter) of the country’s growth; We have studied international “best practice” in early warning indicators in order to design a similar system for Ukraine; We have selected the relevant indicators, consistent with our hypotheses and used a probit model in order to experiment with these indicators; The final set of indicators used in the model included the following lagged independent variables: changes in the value of export, changes in real Exchange rate of the hryvnya, producers’ price index adjusted for domestic price inflation index and the IMF’s metal price index, bank credit interest rate, changes in the industrial output of the European Union; our dependent variable (which was used as a proxy for the overall economic growth) was changes in real industrial output; The model was used to formulate a warning forecast for the Ukrainian economy for the second half of 2008 based on the data for the January 2000 - June 2008 period; all predictions for the second half of 2008 have delivered warning about a downturn of the Ukrainian economy; We ran a few additional experiments with the model, and We have recommended several further steps of analysis toward a full implementation and institutionalization of such a model in the near future