Feasible Limits For External Deficits And Debt

Rising current account deficits and foreign debt levels remain a source of concern for international financial markets and policymakers. Yet, exactly what constitutes an "excessive" external deficit or liability position for an economy at any time has not been adequately defined. This paper addresses this question by proposing measures of the maximum feasible limits of current account deficits and foreign debt levels based on international macroeconomic relationships. It proposes that investment opportunities essentially define the limit of feasibility for current account deficits, whereas the capital to output ratio sets the feasible foreign debt to GDP limit. Benchmark estimates of these limits are presented for advanced economies that have borrowed heavily since 1990.

The Welfare Cost Of Capital Immobility And Capital Controls

This paper examines the macroeconomic welfare effects of interest risk premia and controls that limit international capital mobility. Using extended loanable funds analysis, it first demonstrates how perfect capital mobility maximises national income, contrary to a prevalent view that it is inimical to economic welfare. As a corollary, the analysis then shows that capital controls, irrespective of their form, generally reduce national income and economic welfare by widening real cross-border interest differentials. Capital controls in the form of quantitative controls, such as the Chilean unremunerated reserve requirement system, and explicit taxes on foreign investment flows impose similar welfare losses. However, quantitative controls are relatively more costly than options to tax capital flows, due to revenue effects.