A locally adapted functional outcome measurement score for total hip replacement in west Africa: introduction of the Ouaga score

Background: Functional outcome scores are often used to measure results of Total Hip Replacement (THR). Most current scoring systems were designed for use in Europe or North America and seem not optimally suited for a general West African setting. We introduce a cross-cultural adaptation of the Lequesne index as a new score.Method: A new functional hip score, adapted to the West African setting and based on the Lequesne Index was introduced. To evaluate this score, the score questionnaire was completed by a group of patients in the Paul VI Hospital in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, who were possible candidates for hip replacement. Patients with hip fractures were excluded. Double scores acquired with a minimal interval of four weeks were analysed and test-retest reliability was assessed using intra-class correlation coefficient.Results: Mean patient age was 43,3 years. All patients were able to answer all questions. Double scores were available in 21 patients. Intra-class correlation coefficient was 0.896 indicating very good correlation.Conclusion: The current study has shown that the cross-cultural adaptation of the Lequesne Index, used as Ouaga Score. It can be obtained easily and is reliable in a general West African patient population. We recommend the use of the Ouaga Score for functional evaluation and follow-up of THR in West Africa.Keywords: THR, Hip, Africa, Functional score, Hip replacement, Arthroscop

Understanding Sectoral Differences in Downward Real Wage Rigidity: Workforce Composition, Institutions, Technology and Competition

This paper examines whether differences in wage rigidity across sectors can be explained by differences in workforce composition, competition, technology and wage-bargaining institutions. We adopt the measure of downward real wage rigidity (DRWR) developed by Dickens and Goette (2006) and rely on a large administrative matched employer-employee dataset for Belgium over the period 1990-2002. Firstly, our results indicate that DRWR is significantly higher for white-collar workers and lower for older workers and for workers with higher earnings and bonuses. Secondly, beyond labour force composition effects, sectoral differences in DRWR are related to competition, firm size, technology and wage bargaining institutions. We find that wages are more rigid in more competitive sectors, in labour-intensive sectors, and in sectors with predominant centralised wage setting at the sector level as opposed to firm-level wage agreements

Institutional Features of Wage Bargaining in 23 European Countries, the US and Japan

This paper presents information on wage bargaining institutions, collected using a standardized questionnaire. Our data provide information from 1995 and 2006, for four sectors of activity and the aggregate economy, considering 23 European countries, plus the US and Japan. Main findings include a high degree of regulation in wage setting in most countries. Although union membership is low in many countries, union coverage is high and almost all countries also have some form of national minimum wage. Most countries negotiate wages on several levels, the sectoral level still being the most dominant, with an increasingly important role for bargaining at the firm level. The average length of collective bargaining agreements is found to lie between one and three years. Most agreements are strongly driven by developments in prices and eleven countries have some form of indexation mechanism which affects wages. Cluster analysis identifies three country groupings of wage-setting institutions

Downward Wage Rigidity for Different Workers and Firms: An Evaluation for Belgium Using the IWFP Procedure

This paper evaluates the extent of downward nominal and real wage rigidity for different categories of workers and firms using the methodology recently developed by the International Wage Flexibility Project (Dickens and Goette, 2006). The analysis is based on an administrative data set on individual earnings, covering one-third of employees of the private sector in Belgium over the period 1990-2002. Our results show that Belgium is characterised by strong real wage rigidity and very low nominal wage rigidity, consistent with the Belgian wage formation system of full indexation. Real rigidity is stronger for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers. Real rigidity decreases with age and wage level. Wage rigidity appears to be lower in firms experiencing downturns. Finally, smaller firms and firms with lower job quit rates appear to have more rigid wages. Our results are robust to alternative measures of rigidit

How Do Firms Adjust Their Wage Bill in Belgium ? A Decomposition Along the Intensive and Extensive Margins

This paper decomposes wage bill changes at the firm level into components due to wage changes, and components due to net flows of employment. The analysis relies on an administrative employer-employee dataset of individual annual earnings matched with firms' annual accounts for Belgium over the period 1997-2001. Results point to asymmetric behaviour depending on economic conditions. On average, wage bill contractions result essentially from employment cuts in spite of wage increases. Wage growth of job stayers is moderated but still positive; and wages of entrants compared with those of incumbents are no lower. The labour force cuts are achieved through both reduced entries and increased exits. Higher exits may be due to more layoffs, especially in smaller firms, and wider use of early retirement, especially in manufacturing. In addition, the paper points up the role of overtime hours, temporary unemployment and interim workers in adapting to short-run fluctuations

Rigid Labour Compensation and Flexible Employment ? Firm-Level Evidence with Regard to Productivity for Belgium

Using firm-level data for Belgium over the period 1997-2005, we evaluate the elasticity of firms' labour and real average labour compensation to microeconomic total factor productivity (TFP). Our results may be summarised as follows. First, we find that the elasticity of average labour compensation to firm-level TFP is very low contrary to that of labour, consistent with real wage rigidity. Second, while the elasticity of average labour compensation to idiosyncratic firm-level TFP is close to zero, the elasticity with respect to aggregate sector-level TFP is high. We argue that average labour compensation adjustment mainly occur at the sector level through sectoral collective bargaining, which leaves little room for firm-level adjustment to firm-specific shocks. Third, we report evidence of a positive relationship between hours and idiosyncratic TFP, as well as aggregate TFP within the yea