Indicators of unemployment and low-wage traps (Marginal effective tax rates on labour)

This paper presents results of an on-going joint European Commission / OECD project, aimed at monitoring the direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on household incomes. Indicators of financial work incentives are needed for identifying any undesired influences of taxes and social transfers on people’s work decisions. Marginal effective tax rates (METRs) are calculated in order to show what part of a change in earnings is “taxed away” by the combined operation of taxes, social security contributions (SSCs), and any withdrawal of earnings related social benefits. Three different types of METRs are calculated in order to measure so-called low-wage,unemployment and inactivity traps, that is situations where incentives to work are low. The results allow the identification of countries and family types that face little financial incentive to increase work effort or to take up a job.Unemployment trap, incentive to work, METR, tax on labour Make work pay, unemployment benefits.

Indicators of unemployment and low-wage traps (marginal effective tax rates on labour)

This paper presents results of an on-going joint European Commission / OECD project, aimed at monitoring the direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on household incomes. Indicators of financial work incentives are needed for identifying any undesired influences of taxes and social transfers on people's work decisions. At the same time, a central part of recent tax and benefit reform strategies has been to reduce reliance on welfare by “making work payâ€, that is, to make work an economically attractive option relative to welfare. It is therefore desirable to monitor the effects of such policies as well as the potential for further reform..taxation, fiscal policy, household income, marginal effective tax rates, METR, unemployment trap, inactivity trap, low-wage trap, employment, Carone, Salom�ki, Immervoll, Paturot

Indicators of Unemployment and Low-Wage Traps: Marginal Effective Tax Rates on Employment Incomes

This paper presents results from an on-going joint European Commission / OECD project, aimed at monitoring the direct influence of tax and benefit instruments on household incomes. The project uses and extends OECD tax-benefit models to compute a range of work incentive indicators such as marginal effective tax rates on earned income. This paper provides a methodological background describing these extensions. It also discusses the usefulness of a range of indicators such as net replacement rates and marginal effective tax rates and to what extent they can be used to quantify possible work disincentives. The approaches are illustrated using detailed tax-benefit calculations for 2001 and comparing relevant indicators across 15 EU and 8 non-EU countries. The results presented in this paper permit the identification of family circumstances where (1) financial incentives to increase work are either small or missing altogether; or (2) resources provided by social transfers may be ... Cette étude présente les résultats d’un projet commun Commission européenne/OCDE qui vise à faire apparaître l’impact direct des mécanismes fiscaux et de prestations sur le revenu des ménages. Le projet utilise, en les élargissant, les modèles fiscalité-prestations de l’OCDE pour calculer divers indicateurs de l’incitation à l’activité tels que le taux marginal effectif d’imposition des revenus du travail. Cette étude donne, par ailleurs, des indications méthodologiques sur la façon dont il a été procédé. On examine aussi la pertinence de différents indicateurs tels que le taux de remplacement net et le taux marginal effectif d’imposition, et on cherche à voir dans quelle mesure ils peuvent permettre de mesurer d’éventuels effets décincitatifs vis-à-vis de l’activité. A des fins d’illustration, on présente des calculs détaillés impôts-prestations pour 2001 et on procède à des comparaisons d’indicateurs pertinents dans les 15 pays de l’UE et 8 pays non membres de ...

Long term mortality after severe starvation during the siege of Leningrad: prospective cohort study

Objectives To determine whether starvation during periods of increased growth after birth have long term health consequences. Design Analysis of cardiovascular risk factors and mortality in a longitudinal follow up after the 1941-4 siege of Leningrad. Mortality measured from 1975 up to the end of 1999. Setting St Petersburg, Russia (formerly Leningrad). Participants 5000 men born 1916-35 who lived in Leningrad, randomly selected to take part in health examinations in 1975-7. Of the 3905 men who participated, a third had experienced the siege. Main outcome measures Relative risk of ischaemic heart disease and mortality from stroke by siege exposure. Odds ratios and means for several cardiovascular risk factors. Results Three to six decades after the siege, in men who experienced the siege around the age of puberty blood pressure was raised (mean difference in systolic 3.3 mm Hg, in diastolic 1.3 mm Hg) as was mortality from ischaemic heart disease (relative risk 1.39, 95% confidence interval 1.07 to 1.79) and stroke (1.67, 1.15 to 2.43), including haemorrhagic stroke (1.71, 0.90 to 3.22). The effect on mortality was partly mediated via blood pressure but not by any other measured biological, behavioural, or social factor. Conclusions Starvation, or accompanying chronic stress, particularly at the onset of or during puberty, may increase vulnerability to later cardiovascular disease