Bargaining and Temporary Employment

This article studies the behavior of the …rm when it is searching to …ll a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the …rm can o¤er two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. The short-term contract is like a probationary stage in which the …rm can learn the worker’s type. After this stage the …rm can propose a long-term contract to the worker, or it can decide to …nd another worker. We suppose that the …rm and the worker bargain over the wage of both types of contract, and that the worker’s bargaining power is di¤erent according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the …rms’ optimal policy choice and its welfare implications.

Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design

In a repeated interaction between and a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

Delegation and Information Revelation

This paper addresses the question of delegation in a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information. If the person who has the power to act, the principal, doesn't have the necessary information to make the best possible decision, she can address herself to someone, the agent, who has this information. Such delegation of authority has its drawbacks given that the agent may not implement the principal's ideal decision. Delegation is costly for the principal. This cost is called the loss of control. But delegation has also its benefits. We show that delegation is useful to reduce the initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. The benefits of delegation are linked to the information transmitted by the agent to the principal. To show this, we model an organization composed of one principal and one agent. The organization should take a sequence of decisions that are affected by a common environemental parameter. We assume that there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the subordinate agent: the agent knows the state of the world while the principal has only some prior about its distribution. Moreover, we assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information. In contrast, we adopt an incomplete contract framework and posit that the decision and the state of the world parameter cannot be contracted for. Therefore, the remaining contracting variable is the allocation of decision rights. With these simple contracts, we study how the agent's decision can signal his information to the principal. When the agent is in charge of a decision, his decision signals his information to the principal. The trade off between information transmitted through decisions under delegation and the associated loss of control is the heart of our analysis.

Delegation and Organizational Design

This paper concentrates on the question of organizational design under asymmetric information. The design of the organization has two parts: first, communication channels between the members should be established and second, the tasks should be allocated to the party that performs it in the most efficient way. We show that if the decisions are delegated to the agents, the agent's decisions reveal the information they have to the principal. Delegation is then a mechanism to transfer information. Given that delegation is costly, the principal should decide how many decisions she delegates. In this paper, we show that delegation is only partial. The agents do not receive power over all decisions and some agents may receive power will the other will not even if they are identical.Delagation;Hierarchy;Assymmetric information

Universal service financing in competitive postal markets : one size does not fill all

In the postal sector, the net cost of universal service depends on the content of the service, the postal market characteristics and the country’s geographical configuration. These three groups of factors affect both the direct cost of providing the service and the extent of competition on the market. In this paper, we consider countries with different geographical characteristics and we show that the choice of an appropriate mechanism to share the cost of universal service between market participants depends on the country configuration. Thus, for universal service financing, one size does not fit all.universal service obligations, compensation fund, market liberalization, cream- skimming

Delegation, externalities and organizational design

In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.Delegation, Hierarchy, Asymmetric information

Search and the firm's choice of the optimal labor contract

This article studies the behavior of a firm searching to fill a vacancy. The main assumption is that the firm can offer two different kinds of contracts to the workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one. The short-term contract acts as a probationary stage in which the firm can learn the worker's type. After this stage, the firm can propose a long- term contract to the worker or it can decide to look for another worker. We show that, if the short-term wage is fixed endogenously, for the firms can be optimal to start a working relationship with a short-term contract, but that this policy has a negative impact on unemployment and welfare. On the contrary, if this wage is fixed exogenously, this policy could be optimal also from welfare point of view

Income tax, subsidies to education, and investments in human capital in a two-sector economy

The paper studies a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in, and choose the amount of their investments. To enter the high-skill sector, workers must pay a fixed cost that we interpret as direct cost of education. The economy is characterized by two different pecuniary externalities. Given the distribution of the agents across sectors, at equilibrium, in each sector there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, due to non-contractibility of investments. A second pecuniary externality is induced by the self-selection of the agents in the two sectors. When total factor productivities are sufficiently diverse, subsidies to labor income in the low skill sector and fixed taxes on the direct costs of education increase total surplus, while subsidies to labor income in the high skill sector can actually reduce it.Human capital; Efficiency; Labour income tax

Income taxes, subsidies to education, and investments in human capital

"We study a two-sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Human and physical capital are heterogeneous. Workers and firms endogenously select the sector they are active in and choose the amount of their sector-specific investments. To enter the high-skill sector, workers must pay a fixed cost that we interpret as a direct cost of education. Given the distribution of the agents across sectors, at equilibrium, in each sector there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, due to non-contractibility of investments. A second source of inefficiency is related to the self-selection of the agents into the two sectors: typically too many workers invest in education. Under suitable restrictions on the parameters, the joint effect of the two distortions is that equilibria are characterized by too many people investing too little effort in the high skill sector. We also analyze the welfare properties of equilibria and study the effects of several tax policies on the total expected surplus. In particular, consider the equilibrium associated with a flat labor income tax. Under suitable restrictions on the parameters, a revenue neutral progressive change in the marginal tax rates is welfare improving." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))Humankapital, Einkommensteuer, Lohnsteuer, Bildungsinvestitionen, Arbeitsmarktmodell, Marktunvollkommenheit, matching, Arbeitsmarktgleichgewicht, gesellschaftliche Wohlfahrt, Unterqualifikation, Steuerpolitik, Verteilungseffekte, Bildungsertrag, Einkommenseffekte

Investments in education and welfare in a two-sector, random matching economy

"We consider a random matching model where heterogeneous agents choose optimally to invest time and real resources in education. Generically, there is a steady state equilibrium, where some agents, but not all of them, invest. Regular steady state equilibria are constrained inefficient in a strong sense. The Hosios (1990) condition is neither necessary, nor sufficient, for constrained efficiency. We also provide restrictions on the fundamentals sufficient to guarantee that equilibria are characterized by overeducation (or undereducation), present some results on their comparative statics properties, and discuss the nature of welfare improving policies." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en))Humankapital, Bildungsinvestitionen, matching, Arbeitskräfteangebot, Arbeitsmarktmodell, Arbeitsmarktgleichgewicht, Überqualifikation, Unterqualifikation