Is a Growing Middle Class Good for the Poor? Social Policy in a Time of Globalization

We examine the effect of the rise and evolution of the middle class on extreme poverty, using the World Bank's international poverty line of $1.90 per person per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP)- adjusted terms. Like the definition of poverty, the definition of the middle class used here is also set in absolute terms, comprising households where per capita income or consumption lies between$11 and $110 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms—referred to as a "global," as opposed to national, definition of the middle class (Kharas, 2017). We argue that middle-class expansion initially is pro-poor given the incentives of the emerging middle class and the working poor to cooperate on matters of social policy. As citizens join the ranks of the middle class, they lobby for programs that provide them income stability and protections against shocks (social insurance). By allying with the working poor who seek social assistance (income transfers), middle-class constituents increase their bargaining power relative to elites who seek labor flexibility and lower taxes in a competitive global economy. Over time, however, as the middle class prospers and acquires greater political influence, the balance of programs shifts increasingly toward social insurance and away from social assistance. In this way, the middle class begins to capture an increasing proportion of the benefits of social spending, leaving less for welfare services targeted exclusively at the poorest. One implication of this is that the emerging middle class has never been truly progressive, because progressivity ultimately comes at its own expense

A clarification of the Goodwin model of the growth cycle

We show that there is a difficulty in the original Goodwin model which isalso found in some more recent applications. In it both the labour share and theproportion employed can exceed unity, properties which are untenable. However, weshow that the underlying dynamic structure of the model can be reformulated toensure that these variables cannot exceed unity. An illustrative example extends theoriginal model, and we argue it is both plausible and satisfies the necessary unit boxrestrictions. We show that there is a difficulty in the original Goodwin model which isalso found in some more recent applications. In it both the labour share and theproportion employed can exceed unity, properties which are untenable. However, weshow that the underlying dynamic structure of the model can be reformulated toensure that these variables cannot exceed unity. An illustrative example extends theoriginal model, and we argue it is both plausible and satisfies the necessary unit boxrestrictions

The vicious circles of control - regional governments and insiders in privatized Russian enterprises

How can one account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the veryfirms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other? The authors suggest that such asset-stripping and failure to restructure are the consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and regional governments in a particular property rights regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have little incentive to increase value. As the central institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to the regions, regional governments have imposed various distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire the control rights they need for restructuring firms and doubt they can avoid the distortions regional governments impose on the firms in which they might invest. The result: little restructuring and little new investment. And regional governments, knowing the firms'taxable cash flows will have been reduced through cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting revenues in kind. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, the authors propose a pilot for transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective: to show regional governments, for example, that a more sustainable way to protect employment is to give managers incentives to increase enterprises'value by transferring effective control to investors. The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased cash revenue (rather than in-kind or money surrogates) would enable regional governments to finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote other regional initiatives.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Municipal Financial Management,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform