Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate

Models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost predict the convergence of platforms in a two-candidate election. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. In this paper, I undertake a study of candidate positioning in the United States Senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by Senators. Using over 50 years of roll call voting data, I use a simulated method of moments approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for U.S. Senators. The findings support a model in which Senators face convex costs to changing position, with the best fitting model being one with linear costs of adjustment. The model thus predicts severe punishments for “flip-flopping” Senators (those who make large changes in position). As a result of the significant costs associated with adjusting position, the empirical validity of the Median Voter Theorem (which depends upon candidates being able to change position at no cost) is called into question.spatial models, dynamic political economy, Senate, ideology

Importing Corruption Culture from Overseas: Evidence from Corporate Tax Evasion in the United States

This paper studies how cultural norms and enforcement policies influence illicit corporate activities. Using confidential IRS audit data, we show that corporations with owners from countries with higher corruption norms engage in higher amounts of tax evasion in the U.S. This effect is strong for small corporations and decreases as the size of the corporation increases. In the mid-2000s, the United States implemented several enforcement measures which significantly increased tax compliance. However, we find that these enforcement efforts were less effective in reducing tax evasion by corporations whose owners are from countries with higher corruption norms. This suggests that cultural norms can be a challenge to legal enforcement.

It's who you are and what you do: explaining the IT industry wage premium

The information technology (IT) boom dramatically boosted the rapid growth of the U.S. economy during the 1990s, contributing 1.4 percentage points of the 4.6 percent national average real gross domestic product growth from 1996 to 2000. As the IT boom went bust in 2001, however, the IT sector’s influence on the economy dwindled. ; But a lingering effect of the IT boom may still be apparent in the wages of IT workers. This article explores the extent to which variations in wages between IT-producing and non-IT industries can be accounted for by differences in wages paid to IT-related occupations. ; Using data for 1996 to 2002 from the Current Population Survey’s Earner Study, the authors study a sample of more than 845,000 U.S. workers aged eighteen to sixty-four. The sample is categorized according to individuals’ primary job and is divided into nine industry groups—three IT-related and six non-IT-related. ; The analysis shows that the average wage of IT occupations is greater than for non-IT occupations irrespective of industry. Individual worker characteristics such as years of education may account for some of this wage differential. But even after such characteristics and occupational differences are controlled for, workers in IT-producing industries still enjoy a wage premium over workers in other sectors.

Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate

Models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost predict the convergence of platforms in a two-candidate election. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. In this paper, I undertake a study of candidate positioning in the United States Senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by Senators. Using over 50 years of roll call voting data, I use a simulated method of moments approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for U.S. Senators. The findings support a model in which Senators face convex costs to changing position, with the best fitting model being one with linear costs of adjustment. The model thus predicts severe punishments for “flip-flopping” Senators (those who make large changes in position). As a result of the significant costs associated with adjusting position, the empirical validity of the Median Voter Theorem (which depends upon candidates being able to change position at no cost) is called into question

Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate

Models of electoral competition in which candidates can change position at no cost predict the convergence of platforms in a two-candidate election. Such convergence is at odds with empirical observation. In this paper, I undertake a study of candidate positioning in the United States Senate and determine the extent to which electoral costs associated with changing position explain the ideological positions taken by Senators. Using over 50 years of roll call voting data, I use a simulated method of moments approach to estimate a dynamic model of candidate positioning for U.S. Senators. The findings support a model in which Senators face convex costs to changing position, with the best fitting model being one with linear costs of adjustment. The model thus predicts severe punishments for “flip-flopping” Senators (those who make large changes in position). As a result of the significant costs associated with adjusting position, the empirical validity of the Median Voter Theorem (which depends upon candidates being able to change position at no cost) is called into question

Essays on dynamic political economy

textThe unifying theme of this dissertation is the empirical analysis of American politics. In particular, I use economic models to provide theoretically sound and empirically valid answers to political questions that are dynamic in nature. The first chapter focuses on the role of the seniority system in the pork barrel politics and the subsequent effect on the quality of Representatives in the U.S. House. The second chapter analyzes candidate positioning in a dynamic environment where there are electoral costs to changing position. The third and final chapter is a test of the role of political parties in time consistency problems when candidates cannot commit to future policies. Collectively, these chapters extend the research of empirical political economy in an important direction, one that accounts for the inherent dynamics of politics.Economic