Pure Numbers Effects, Market Power, and Tacit Collusion in Posted Offer Markets

This paper studies the effects of seller concentration and static market power on tacit collusion in extensively repeated laboratory posted-offer markets. Contrary to the implications of some earlier research, we find that tacit collusion does not become pervasive with extensive repetition. In a ‘strong no power’ design persistently competitive outcomes are observed in markets with three or four sellers. Even duopolies are frequently competitive in this design. Unilateral market power raises prices, as predicted. However, static Nash predictions fail to organize outcomes across power treatments, because tacit collusion moves inversely with concentration. Excess capacity appears to explain observed tacit collusion levels.experiments, market concentration, market power

Rebate Subsidies, Matching Subsidies and Isolation Effects

In a series of recent experiments (Davis, Millner and Reilly, 2005, Eckel and Grossman, 2003, 2005a-c, 2006), matching subsidies generate significantly higher charity receipts than do theoretically equivalent rebate subsidies. This paper reports a laboratory experiment conducted to examine whether the higher receipts are attributable to a relative preference for matching subsidies or to an ‘isolation effect’ (McCaffery and Baron, 2003, 2006). Some potential policy implications of isolation effects on charitable contributions are also considered.experiments, charitable contributions, methodology

Posted - Offer Markets In Near Continuous Time: an Experimental Investigation

This paper reports an experiment conducted to evaluate a ‘near continuous’ variant of the posted-offer trading institution, where the number of periods in a market session is increased by reducing sharply each period’s maximum length. Experimental results suggest that although decisions in time-truncated periods are not equivalent to periods of longer duration, extensive repetition improves considerably the drawing power of equilibrium predictions in some challenging environments. Nevertheless, significant deviations remain in the near continuous framework. We also observe that the extra data collected in the near continuous framework allows new insights into price convergence and price signaling.experiment, monopoly, pricing, price signaling

Nominal Price Shocks in Monopolistically Competitive Markets: An Experimental Analysis

We report a market experiment that examines the capacity of price and information frictions to explain real responses to nominal price shocks. As predicted by the standard dynamic adjustment models, we find that both price and information frictions impede the response to a nominal shock. We also find, however, that the observed adjustment delays far exceed predicted levels. Results of a pair of subsequent treatments indicate that a combination of announcing the shock privately to all sellers (rather than publicly) and a failure of many sellers to best respond to their expectations explains the observed adjustment inertia.Market Experiments, Price Rigidities, Information Rigidities, Bounded Rationality

The Antebellum U.S. Iron Industry: Domestic Production and Foreign Competition

This paper presents new annual estimates of U.S. production of pig iron and imports of pig iron products dating back to 1827. These estimates are used to assess the vulnerability of the antebellum iron industry to foreign competition and the role of the tariff in fostering the industry's early development. Domestic pig iron production is found to be highly sensitive to changes in import prices. Although import price fluctuations had a much greater impact on U.S. production than changes in import duties, our estimates suggest that the tariff permitted domestic output to be about thirty to forty percent larger than it would have been without protection.

Experimental economics: Methods, problems and promise

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the growing importance of experimentation in economic analysis. We present a variety of economic issues that have been explored with laboratory techniques. We also address some common objections to experimentation, as well as some of the principal lessons that have been learned.

Strategic Buyers, Horizontal Mergers and Synergies: An Experimental Investigation*

This paper reports an experiment designed to evaluate interrelationships between strategic buyers, market power and merger-induced synergies. The experiment consists of 40 posted-offer quadropolies. Treatments include the use of simulated or human buyers, seller consolidations and merger-induced fixed cost and unit cost synergies. In the simulated-buyer markets we observe behavior generally consistent with comparative static predictions: prices rise post-merger, and unit (but not fixed) cost synergies may exert some price-moderating effect. The addition of powerful buyers changes results markedly. Although prices are lower in the human buyer markets, outcomes are more variable and predicted comparative static effects are no longer observed.

Experimental Economics

This is the first comprehensive treatment of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate economic propositions under carefully controlled conditions. While it acknowledges that laboratory experiments are no panacea, it argues cogently for their effectiveness in selected situations. Covering methodological and procedural issues as well as theory, Experimental Economics is not only a textbook but also a useful introduction to laboratory methods for professional economists. The emphasis is on organizing and evaluating existing results. The book can be used as an anchoring device for a course at either the graduate or advanced undergraduate level. Applications include financial market experiments, oligopoly price competition, auctions, bargaining, provision of public goods, experimental games, and decision making under uncertainty. The book also contains instructions for a variety of laboratory experiments.laboratory experiments, financial markets, price competition, auctions, bargaining, games, decision making, uncertainty