Does One Contribution Come at the Expense of Another? Empirical Evidence on Substitution Between Charitable Donations

In this paper I estimate and describe the extent to which an individual's charitable donation to one cause displaces his or her giving to another cause. I use the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), in conjunction with the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS). This is the first useful major source of panel data on giving to multiple causes. I control for individual-fixed effects and use "college-reunion year" as an instrument for giving to education. I find an economically and statistically significant level of substitution. I also analyze the net effect of shocks to giving to one category on giving to all other categories - testing the extremes of a fixed purse (perfect crowding-out) and zero-crowding-out. While the uninstrumented regressions can generally reject perfect crowding out, the instrumental results (with larger error bounds) do not. I also find a greater level of substitution for "large givers" than for those who make smaller donations. This points to a model with heterogenous motivations for giving: small givers may be driven by shocks and reputation concerns, while for larger givers charities are imperfect substitutes in providing "warm glow" utility.

Anonymous Rituals

Religion and ritual have been characterized as costly ways for conditional cooperators to signal their type, and thus identify and interact with one another. But an effective signal may be prohibitively expensive: if the cost of participation is too small, freeriders may send the signal and behave selfishly later. However, if the ritual reveals only the average level of signaling in a group, free-riders can behave selfishly without being detected, and even a low cost signal can separate types. While individuals cannot be screened out, members can learn the group�s profile of types. Under specified conditions, this information gain leads to greater cooperation and hence increases expected welfare. Furthermore, if crowding is unimportant relative to the conditional cooperation term, anonymous rituals will be preferred to ones which reveal individuals� behavior. Examples of anonymous institutions include church collections, voting, music, dance, and military customs.

Losing Face

When person A takes an action that can be interpreted as �making an offer� to person B and B �rejects the offer,� then A may �lose face.� This loss of face (LoF) and consequent disutility will occur only if these actions are common knowledge to A and B. While under some circumstances this LoF can be rationalized by the consequences for future reputation, we claim it also enters directly into the utility function. LoF concerns can lead to fewer offers and inefficiency in markets that involve matching, discrete transactions, and offers/proposals in both directions. This pertains to the marriage market, certain types of labor markets, admissions to colleges and universities, and certain types of joint ventures and collaborations. We offer a simple model of this, and show that under some circumstances welfare can be improved by a mechanism that only reveals offers when both parties say �yes.�

Losing Face

When person A makes an offer to person B and B rejects it, then A may "lose face". This loss of face is assumed to occur only if B knows for sure of A's offer. While under some circumstances loss of face can be rationalized by the consequences for future reputation, it may also enter directly into the utility function. Loss of face concerns can lead to fewer offers and inefficiency in markets that involve matching, discrete transactions, and offers/proposals in both directions, such as the marriage market, certain types of labor markets, admissions to colleges and universities, and joint ventures and collaborations. We offer a simple model of this, and show that under some circumstances welfare can be improved by a mechanism that only reveals offers when both parties say "yes".Matching, marriage markets, anonymity, reputation, adverse selection, Bayesian games, emotions.

Desert and Tangibility: Decomposing House Money Effects in a Charitable Giving Experiment

Several papers have documented that when subjects play with standard laboratory �endowments� they make less self-interested choices then when they use money they have either earned through a laboratory task or brought from outside the lab. In the context of a charitable giving experiment we decompose common "house money" effects into two components: the tangibility of cash in hand relative to money (or ecu's) promised on a computer screen, and the desert of earned money relative to random windfall gains. While both components are found to be significant in non-parametric tests, the former effect, which has been neglected in previous studies, has a stronger effect on total donations. These results have clear implications for experimental design, and also suggest that the availability of less tangible payment methods may increase charitable donations.

Reputation and Influence in Charitable Giving: An Experiment

Abstract Previous experimental and observational work suggests that people act more generously when they are observed and observe others in social settings. But the explanation for this is unclear. An individual may want to send a signal of her generosity in order to improve her own reputation. Alternately (or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more in order to influence others to give more. We perform the first series of laboratory experiments that can separately estimate the impact of these two social effects, and test whether realized influence is consistent with the desire to influence, and whether either of these are consistent with anticipated influence. We find that �leaders� are influential only when their identities are revealed along with their donations, and female leaders are more influential then males. Identified leader�s predictions suggest that are aware of their influence. They respond to this by giving more than either the control group or the unidentified leaders. We find mixed evidence for �reputation-seeking.�

Efficient Consumer Altruism and Fair Trade

Consumers have shown willingness to pay a premium for products labeled as "Fair Trade" and to prefer retailers that are seen as more generous to their suppliers and employees. We define a fair trade product as a bundle of a consumption good and a donation. An altruistic consumer will only choose this bundle over its separate elements if the bundle is less expensive. Thus, for fair trade to be sustainable in a competitive equilibrium, an efficiency must be generated. In general, the first-best level of investment (to reduce the retailer's cost or boosts quality) cannot be achieved when it is non-verifiable. However, the altruism of the consumer facilitates a more efficient contract: by paying the supplier more, the retailer can both extract more consumer surplus and increase the level of contracted investment, while preserving incentive compatibility. We provide empirical and anecdotal evidence for the assumptions and predictions of this model, focusing on the coffee industry.

The Economics of the Gift

This essay broadly considers gifts, giving and gift economies, modern and pre-modern, from a mainstream (and behavioural) economics perspective

The Government May Want to Encourage Price-Discrimination by Income

Governments have unique private information about individual incomes. This suggests a new policy tool: consumers can be offered an “OpportunityCard” certifying their income, and firms can be allowed to price-discriminate on this basis. This is politically appealing: it should reduce consumption inequality through the use of market mechanisms, rather than through taxes and spending. However, the efficiency consequences are theoretically ambiguous. I propose a pilot field experiment to provide empirical evidence on output, efficiency, and practical issues

Does One Contribution Come at the Expense of Another? Empirical Evidence on Substitution Between Charitable Donations

In this paper I estimate and describe the extent to which an individual's charitable donation to one cause displaces his or her giving to another cause. I use the 2001 and 2003 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), in conjunction with the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS). This is the first useful major source of panel data on giving to multiple causes. I control for individual-fixed effects and use "college-reunion year" as an instrument for giving to education. I find an economically and statistically significant level of substitution. I also analyze the net effect of shocks to giving to one category on giving to all other categories - testing the extremes of a fixed purse (perfect crowding-out) and zero-crowding-out. While the uninstrumented regressions can generally reject perfect crowding out, the instrumental results (with larger error bounds) do not. I also find a greater level of substitution for "large givers" than for those who make smaller donations. This points to a model with heterogenous motivations for giving: small givers may be driven by shocks and reputation concerns, while for larger givers charities are imperfect substitutes in providing "warm glow" utility