How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effect of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcome. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their cost savings from GMO adoption. Producers of non-GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields makes its GMO content above the labeling threshold. The government may impose to GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non-GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium as well as on global and interest group welfare.genetically modified organisms, coexistence, identity preservation, regulation, liability, vertical differentiation, law and economics, Marketing, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

Pest Resistance Regulation and Pest Mobility

We use a spatially-explicit analytical framework to compare mandatory refuges and a tax on the resistant variety as regulation instruments for pest resistance management. Because the extraction of the common-pool pest susceptibility resource depends on the spatial pattern of pest dispersal, we find that the usual preference for market-based environmental instruments does not necessarily apply to pest resistance management. Mandatory refuges are preferred to a tax on the resistant variety for some assumption sets on heterogeneity between farms and pest dispersal distances.Environmental Economics and Policy,

PUBLIC POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS: A COURNOT OLIGOPOLY-OLIGOPSONY MODEL

We use a partial equilibrium two-country model, with two vertically related markets, with perfect competition in the primary good sector and with a fixed number of processing firms in each country, characterized by a Cournot behavior upstream and downstream. In the first stage of the game, the government of the exporting country chooses the level of price instruments on both goods. The targeting principle is used to characterize optimal intervention in presence of a minimum revenue constraint towards primary producers. Keywords: vertically related markets, imperfectvertically related markets, imperfect competition, Industrial Organization, International Relations/Trade, F1, H2, L1, Q1,

Potential Adoption of Genetically Modified Rapeseed in France, Effects on Revenues of Farmers and Upstream Companies: an ex ante evaluation

In this paper, we conduct an empirical investigation of potential adoption of herbicide-tolerant (HT) genetically modified (GM) rapeseed in France. Our aim is to study ex ante the potential impact of their adoption in France, in terms of adoption level, economic gains, and distribution of these gains between farmers and input suppliers. We use French survey data about current plant protection practices, in order to compute pesticide costs with conventional (i.e., non GM) crops for individual farms. Then, based on results of technical studies about GM variety trials in France, we compute a predicted pesticide cost with the GM variety. Next, we study adoption rates and gains or losses of farmers (adopters and non adopters) and upstream companies (sellers of conventional herbicides, of the total herbicide to which GM rapeseed is tolerant, of GM seed), depending on the GM seed license price, the margin rate on herbicide sales and the price of conventional herbicides.genetically modified organisms, innovation, diffusion, rapeseed, Consumer/Household Economics,

How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effects of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcomes. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their production cost for GM crops. Producers of non- GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields raises its content in GMOs (genetically modified organisms) above the labeling threshold. The government may impose on GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non- GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium, on the achievement of coexistence, and on both global and interest group welfare

How do GM / non GM coexistence regulations affect markets and welfare?

This paper presents a theoretical economic model assessing the effects of the level of mandatory genetically modified (GM) / non-GM coexistence regulations on market and welfare outcomes. We assume vertical differentiation of GM and non-GM goods on the consumer side. Producers are heterogeneous in their production cost for GM crops. Producers of non- GM crops face a probability of having their harvest downgraded if gene flow from GM fields raises its content in GMOs (genetically modified organisms) above the labeling threshold. The government may impose on GMO producers mandatory ex ante isolation distances from non- GM fields in order to decrease the probability of non-GM harvest downgrading. It may also introduce an ex post compensation to non-GMO farmers for profit losses due to harvest downgrading, imposing GMO farmers’ participation to a compensation fund via a tax on GM seeds. Assuming endogenous crop choices and prices, we study the effects of ex ante regulation and ex post liability of GMO producers on market equilibrium, on the achievement of coexistence, and on both global and interest group welfare

An assessment of bioeconomic modeling of pest resistance with new insights into dynamic refuge fields

We examine the optimal time-variant refuge policy to manage pest resistance to Bt crops in afinite-horizon discrete-time model. We identify analytically the intertemporal effects of refuge fields on the pest population and its susceptibility. The shape of the optimal refuge policy and whether or not pest susceptibility should be exhausted completely at the end of the time horizon depend crucially on the values of a cost premium of Bt seeds and the fitness cost of resistance (over-mortality of resistant pests) and are addressed via numerical simulations. We demonstrate the importance of modeling the dynamics of the biological system accurately, of defining a diploid (and not haploid) biological model, and of using a discrete-time (rather than continuous-time) framework