Carnivorous Companions and the Vegetarian’s Dilemma

This paper is concerned with a problem that arises within ethical frameworks that imply that it is wrong for humans to consume meat or other animal products when vegan alternatives are available. The specific problem relates to the ethical difficulties associated with beginning a relationship with a companion animal that may require at least some animal-based foods in order to survive. I follow some psychologists in referring to the ethical problems associated with such companionship as the Vegetarian’s Dilemma. After approaching this dilemma from the perspective the animal rights approach and welfarist consequentialism, I argue that some important insights can be gained by viewing this dilemma through a virtue ethical lens. In particular, I point out the ethical significance of the fact that the very same virtues that might lead one to adopt a vegan lifestyle may also support adoption of a carnivorous companion

Does Empirical Moral Psychology Rest on a Mistake? Understanding Theories About the Nature of Moral Judgment as Moral Propositions

The main goal of this dissertation is to develop and defend the thesis that theories about the nature of moral judgment must be understood as carrying moral commitments. This has profound consequences for the methodology of metaethics. Specifically, it implies that theories about the nature of moral judgment cannot be understood as empirical hypotheses. There have historically been many attempts to develop a philosophically satisfying theory that characterizes the nature and content of moral judgments. Many philosophers have thought that such theories are best understood as morally neutral hypotheses about human psychology. Recently, a number of philosophers have attempted to approach this question by treating theories about the nature of moral judgment as empirical hypotheses that can be confirmed or disconfirmed by psychological and neuroscientific evidence. I argue that this methodological presupposition is mistaken. In the first and second chapter, I articulate and defend a test for identifying moral propositions and use it to demonstrate that a number of prominent metaethicists have mistakenly thought that theories about the nature of moral judgment are morally neutral. The third chapter begins with an argument that moral propositions cannot be identical to or definable in terms of empirically-confirmable hypotheses. I then show that this conclusion undermines several empirically-informed theories of moral judgment put forward by Shaun Nichols, Jesse Prinz, and Richard Joyce

Moral Fictionalism and Moral Reasons

One major problem with moral discourse is that we tend treat moral utterances as if they represent propositions. But complex metaphysical problems arise when we try to describe the nature of the moral facts that correspond to these propositions. If moral facts do not exist, how can moralizers justify engagement in moral practice? One possibility is abolitionism; abandoning morality and growing out of our old habits. Another option that has been suggested is that morality be preserved as a useful fiction. Moral fictionalists propose that moralizers come to understand their moral beliefs as fictive precommitments that are instrumentally valuable. In this essay, I argue that this type of instrumentalist justification does not allow moralizers to have genuinely moral reasons for acting in accordance with their precommitments. The legislative function of morality and the concept of moral personhood cannot be supported by metaethical theories that only provide instrumental reasons for adopting moral discourse. Ironically, this implies that an instrumentalist moral society would not be able to preserve as many useful moral concepts as would a non-instrumentalist moral society. Since the fictionalists’ own criterion demands that they endorse the most instrumentally valuable metaethical theory, they cannot persuasively argue that their own metaethical alternative is viable. Fictionalists should, I argue, prefer a non-instrumentalist theory that preserves more of the functions of moral discourse, such as quasi-realism. The argumentative strategy employed by fictionalists is therefore self-undermining

WSU Faculty Association President Patrick Clipsham - Welcome 2023

Winona State University Faculty Association (WSUFA) President Patrick Clipsham and Professor of Philosophy welcomes you to the 2023 Ramaley Research Celebration (poster sessions) and the 2023 Research & Creative Achievement Day