Identification and the liquidity effect: a case study

This article reviews some of the issues economists confront in attempting to compile facts about how monetary policy actions affect the economy.Monetary policy - United States ; Liquidity (Economics) ; Monetary policy

Resolving the liquidity effect: commentary

Liquidity (Economics)

Understanding Japan's saving rate: the reconstruction hypothesis

This paper evaluates Hayashi's conjecture that Japan's postwar saving experience can be accounted for by the neoclassical model of economic growth as that country's efforts to reconstruct its capital stock that was severely damaged in World War II. I call this the reconstruction hypothesis. I take a simplified version of a standard neoclassical growth model that is in widespread use in macroeconomics and simulate its response to capital destruction. The saving rate path implied by the model differs significantly from the path taken by actual Japanese postwar saving data. I discuss several model modifications which would reconcile the reconstruction hypothesis with Japan's postwar saving experience. For the reconstruction hypothesis to be credible requires independent evidence on the empirical plausibility of the model modifications. It is left to future research to determine whether that evidence exists.Saving and investment ; Japan

Money and the U.S. economy in the 1980s: a break from the past?

Money supply ; Velocity of money

Searching For a Break in GNP

It has been suggested that existing estimates of the long-run impact of a surprise move in income may have a substantial upward bias due to the presence of a trend break in post war U.S. GNP data. This paper shows that the statistical evidence does not warrant abandoning the no trend null hypothesis. A key part of the argument is that conventionally computed significance levels overstate the likelihood of the trend break alternative hypothesis. This is because they do not take into account that, in practice, the break date is chosen based on pre-test examination of the data.

Money Growth Monitoring and the Taylor Rule

Using a series of examples, we review the various ways in which a monetary policy characterized by the Taylor rule can inject volatility into the economy. In the examples, a particular modification to the Taylor rule can reduce or even entirely eliminate the problems. Under the modified policy, the central bank monitors the money growth rate and commits to abandoning the Taylor rule in favor of a money growth rule in case money growth passes outside a particular monitoring range.

The expectations trap hypothesis

This article explores a hypothesis about the take-off in inflation in the early 1970s. According to the expectations trap hypothesis, the Fed was driven to high money growth by a fear of violating the expectations of high inflation that existed at the time. The authors argue that this hypothesis is more compelling than the Phillips curve hypothesis, according to which the Fed produced the high inflation as an unfortunate by product of a conscious decision to jump start a weak economy.Inflation (Finance) ; Phillips curve

The expectations trap hypothesis

The authors examine the inflation take-off of the early 1970s in terms of the expectations trap hypothesis, according to which fear of violating the public’s inflation expectations pushed the Fed into producing high inflation. This interpretation is compared with the Phillips curve hypothesis, according to which the Fed produced high inflation as the unfortunate byproduct of a conscious decision to jump-start a weak economy. Which hypothesis is more plausible has important implications for what should be done to prevent future inflation flare-ups.Inflation (Finance) ; Phillips curve ; Economic conditions - United States

Identification and the Liquidity Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock

Conventional wisdom holds that unanticipated expansionary monetary policy shocks cause transient but persistent decreases in real and nominal interest rates. However a number of econometric studies argue that the evidence favors the opposite view, namely that these shocks actually raise, rather than lower, short term interest rates. We show that this conclusion is not robust to the measure of monetary aggregate used or to the assumptions made to identify monetary policy disturbances. For example, when our analysis is done using non borrowed reserves, we find strong evidence in favor of the conventional view. Existing challenges to the conventional view lack credibility not just because of their fragility. They are based upon measures of policy disturbances which generate seemingly implausible implications about things other than interest rates.