Order Submission Strategies and Information: Empirical Evidence from the NYSE

We investigate the role of asymmetric information in affecting order submission strategies. Order aggressiveness depends on the state of the order book and on the asset dynamics. We find that the most important determinants are the depth on the same side of the book and a momentum indicator. When we focus on specific situations characterized by higher probability of information-based trading, we find that orders are less aggressive, suggesting strategic behavior of informed traders. This conjecture is supported by a different response to changes in the investor's information set and by a stronger price impact of less aggressive orders.Order Aggressiveness, Informed Trading, Order Flow

A SPECIALIST'S QUOTED DEPTH AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE VARIABLE: AN APPLICATION TO SPREAD DECOMPOSITION MODELS

Although there is a sizable literature demonstrating that liquidity and transaction costs are multidimensional, researchers continue to estimate adverse-selection costs using only prices. We present a model of a profit-maximizing specialist who posts prices and depths. The model is simulated to measure changes in the adverse-selection component of the spread that result under different levels of informed trading. We find that spread decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse-selection risk when specialists choose depth. We recommend that researchers use adverse-selection measures that account for depth as well as spread to mitigate this problem. 2006 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Association.