Transitions from AFDC to SSI Prior to Welfare Reform – Policy Brief

The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs serve overlapping target groups. SSI serves adults and children with disabilities from low-income families, while TANF serves low-income families with children. Consequently, policy changes in one program can affect the other. The target group for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), TANF’s predecessor, also overlapped with SSI’s target group. Many have anticipated that the replacement of AFDC with TANF in August 1996 would eventually increase SSI participation as TANF recipients with disabilities sought SSI benefits to avoid TANF work requirements and time limits

Adapting precision farming principles to organic crop production

Precision farming is a discipline that aims to increase efficiency in the management of agriculture throughout new technologies. Organic crop production systems in the future need to combine satisfactory productivity with long term sustainability. The aim of this paper is to present potentials and limits using precision farming priciples in organic crop productio

Impacts of Expanding Health Care Coverage on the Employment and Earnings of Participants in the SSI Work Incentive Program - Policy Brief

While people with disabilities often say that a loss of public health insurance is a deterrent to work, it is rare to find situations in which they might actually exhibit such a behavioral response to a change in access. Expansions in the income threshold for SSI work incentives program (Sections 1619(a) and (b)) provide an opportunity to observe such a response. Section 1619(b) allows SSI recipients to maintain Medicaid eligibility even if their income is above the level that makes them ineligible for SSI payments. If earnings increase beyond the 1619(b) threshold, however, the person loses their SSI and Medicaid eligibility. Section 1619(b) income thresholds vary significantly across states and over time. Stapleton and Tucker (2000) use the variation in Section 1619(b) income thresholds to examine the employment, earnings and program participation patterns of SSI recipients who have incomes near the threshold level for their state. They find strong evidence that many SSI recipients restrain their earnings to stay below the 1619(b) threshold. It is important to note, however, that the findings only provide evidence on the behavior of a small portion of the population with disabilities (i.e., SSI recipients who work). Nonetheless, this evidence seems to provide strong empirical support for the hypothesis that lack of access to health insurance is an important work disincentive for people with disabilities. They also find that 1619(b) participation varies significantly from month to month. Consequently, cross-sectional estimates on the share of SSI recipients participating in 1619(b) significantly understate the share of SSI recipients who ever participate. These findings are consistent with previous findings that cross-sectional estimates of employment tend to understate multi-period employment patterns for the broader population with disabilities

Review of Data Sources for School to Work Transitions by Youth with Disabilities

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Complex solutions to Painleve IV equation through supersymmetric quantum mechanics

In this work, supersymmetric quantum mechanics will be used to obtain complex solutions to Painleve IV equation with real parameters. We will also focus on the properties of the associated Hamiltonians, i.e. the algebraic structure, the eigenfunctions and the energy spectra.Comment: 5 pages, 3 figures. Talk given at the Advanced Summer School 2011, Cinvestav (Mexico City), July 201

Principal agent problems under loss aversion: an application to executive stock options

Executive stock options reward success but do not penalise failure. In contrast, the standard principalagent model implies that pay is normally monotonically increasing in performance. This paper shows that, under loss aversion, the use of carrots but not sticks is a feature of an optimal compensation contract. Low risk aversion and high loss aversion is particularly propitious to the use of options. Moreover, loss aversion on the part of executives explains the award of at the money options rather than discounted stock or bonus related pay. Other features of stock option grants are also explained, such as resetting or reloading with an exercise price equal to the current stock price

Supersymmetric quantum mechanics and Painleve equations

In these lecture notes we shall study first the supersymmetric quantum mechanics (SUSY QM), specially when applied to the harmonic and radial oscillators. In addition, we will define the polynomial Heisenberg algebras (PHA), and we will study the general systems ruled by them: for zero and first order we obtain the harmonic and radial oscillators, respectively; for second and third order PHA the potential is determined by solutions to Painleve IV (PIV) and Painleve V (PV) equations. Taking advantage of this connection, later on we will find solutions to PIV and PV equations expressed in terms of confluent hypergeometric functions. Furthermore, we will classify them into several solution hierarchies, according to the specific special functions they are connected with.Comment: 38 pages, 20 figures. Lecture presented at the XLIII Latin American School of Physics: ELAF 2013 in Mexico Cit

A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims

This article explores the legality and wisdom of the FDA’s effort to persuade courts to find most failure-to-warn claims preempted. The article first analyzes the FDA’s justifications for reversing its long-held views to the contrary and explains why the FDA’s position cannot be reconciled with its governing statute. The article then examines why the FDA’s position, if ultimately adopted by the courts, would undermine the incentives drug manufacturers have to change labeling to respond to newly-discovered risks. The background possibility of failure-to-warn litigation provides important incentives for drug companies to ensure that drug labels reflect accurate and up-to-date safety information. The article next explains why the agency’s view that it is capable of singlehandedly regulating the safety of drugs is unrealistic. The agency does not have the resources to perform the Herculean task of monitoring the performance of every drug on the market. Both the Institute of Medicine and the Government Accountability Office have explained the shortcomings in the FDA’s recent performance, and they express doubt that the FDA is in capable of facing an increasingly challenging future. The article then explains how state damages litigation helps uncover and assess risks that are not apparent to the agency during a drug’s approval process, and why this “feedback loop” enables the agency to better do its job. FDA approval of drugs is based on clinical trials that involve, at most, a few thousand patients and last a year or so. These trials cannot detect risks that are relatively rare, affect vulnerable sub-populations, or have long latency periods. For this reason, most serious adverse effects do not become evident until a drug is used in larger population groups for periods in excess of one year. Time and again, failure-to-warn litigation has brought to light information that would not otherwise be available to the FDA, to doctors, to other health care providers, and to consumers. And failure-to-warn litigation often has preceded and clearly influenced FDA decisions to modify labeling, and, at times, to withdraw drugs from the market