Offsetting disagreement and security prices

We propose that investor beliefs frequently “cross” in the sense that an investor may like company A but dislike company B, whereas another investor may like company B but dislike company A. Such belief-crossing makes it almost impossible to construct a portfolio that is composed solely of every investor’s most favored companies. This causes the level of excitement for portfolios to be generally lower than the levels of excitement that individual companies generate among their most fervent supporters. Coupled with short-sale constraints, wherein prices are set by the most optimistic investors, this causes portfolios to trade at discounts. Utilizing several settings whereby the value of a portfolio and the values of the underlying components can be evaluated separately (e.g., closed-end funds), we present evidence supporting our proposition that, in financial markets, the “whole” is often less than the “sum of its parts.

Country-specific sentiment and security prices

I study the effect of country-specific sentiment on security prices. I provide evidence that a country's popularity among Americans affects US investors' demand for securities from that country and causes security prices to deviate from their fundamental values. Moreover, I find that country popularity is positively associated with the intensity of US cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity, suggesting that country popularity also affects firms' investment decisions.Investor sentiment Country popularity

Do analysts manage earnings forecasts to 'confirm' their own recommendations?

We propose and test a form of bias in earnings forecasts that arises from analysts' desire to be perceived as accurate. Our hypothesis suggests that an analyst with a buy (sell) recommendation has an incentive to report a downward (upward) biased earnings estimate so that the company is more (less) likely to beat the consensus forecast and experience an earnings surprise that appears “in line” with the analyst's outstanding stock recommendation. Consistent with this prediction, we find that stock recommendations prior to earnings announcements significantly and positively predict subsequent earnings forecast errors, and that this predictability is concentrated in situations where the motivation for such strategic behavior is particularly strong. Together, the results provide evidence that the desire to appear accurate does not always lead to more accurate forecasts

It pays to have friends

Currently, a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation, exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter and that, consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not.Board independence Social ties Executive compensation

Price-based return comovement

Similarly priced stocks move together. Stocks that undergo splits experience an increase in comovement with low-priced stocks and a decrease in their comovement with high-priced stocks. Price-based comovement is not explained by economic fundamentals, firm size, or changes in liquidity or information diffusion. The shift in comovement following splits is greater for large stocks, high-priced stocks, and when investor sentiment is high. In the full cross-section, price-based portfolios explain variation in stock-level returns after controlling for movements in the market and industry portfolios as well as portfolios based on size, book-to-market, transaction costs, and return momentum. The results suggest that investors categorize stocks based on price.Comovement Price

The rate of communication

We study the transmission of financial news and opinions through social interactions among retail investors in the United States. We identify a series of plausibly exogenous shocks, which cause “treated investors” to trade abnormally. We then trace the “contagion” of abnormal trading activity from the treated investors to their neighbors and their neighbors’ neighbors. Coupled with methodology drawn from epidemiology, our setting allows us to estimate the rate of communication and how it varies with the characteristics of the underlying investor population

social ties and earnings management

Abstract We detect a significant presence of social ties between the CEO and audit committee members and our results suggest that these informal ties play a material role in audit-committee oversight. In particular, we find a substantially stronger, positive relation between abnormal (i.e., discretionary) accruals and the extent of an audit committee's connection to the CEO when we consider social ties in addition to the conventional ties. Moreover, we find that an audit committee's social affiliation is associated with an increased discontinuity in the earnings distribution surrounding earnings targets. Together, our findings suggest that informal ties play a material role in facilitating creative accounting practices. JEL Classification: M4, G