The Optimal Concentration of Creditors

There are situations in which dispersed creditors (e.g., public creditors) have more difficulties and higher costs when collecting their claims in financial distress than concentrated creditors (e.g., banks). Under this assumption, our model predicts that measures of debt concentration relate [a] positively to creditors' chosen aggregate debt collection expenditures; [b] positively to management's chosen expenditures to avoid paying; [c] positively to total net litigation costs/waste in financial distress; and [d] positively to accomplished claim recovery by creditors (to which we present some preliminary favorable empirical evidence). Under additional assumptions, measures of debt concentration relate [e] positively to intrinsic firm quality; [f] positively to creditor monitoring and negatively to managerial waste; [g] positively to optimal continuation/discontinuation choices; [h] negatively to issuing marketing expenses. In a signaling model, when concentration alone is not a sufficient signal, firms choose the ultimately concentrated debt (i.e., a house bank) and have to pay a high interest.

The Optimal Concentration of Creditors

There are situations in which dispersed creditors (e.g., public creditors) have more difficulties and higher costs when collecting their claims in financial distress than concentrated creditors (e.g., banks). Under this assumption, our model predicts that measures of debt concentration relate [a] positively to creditors' chosen aggregate debt collection expenditures; [b] positively to management's chosen expenditures to avoid paying; [c] positively to total net litigation costs/waste in financial distress; and [d] positively to accomplished claim recovery by creditors (to which we present some preliminary favorable empirical evidence). Under additional assumptions, measures of debt concentration relate [e] positively to intrinsic firm quality; [f] positively to creditor monitoring and negatively to managerial waste; [g] positively to optimal continuation/discontinuation choices; [h] negatively to issuing marketing expenses. In a signaling model, when concentration alone is not a sufficient signal, firms choose the ultimately concentrated debt (i.e., a house bank) and have to pay a high interest.Banking, Capital Structure

Corporate Leverage and Currency Crises

This paper provides an explanation of currency crises based on an argument that bailing out financially distressed exporting firms through a currency depreciation is ex-post optimal. Exporting firms have profitable investment opportunities, but they will not invest because high leverage causes debt overhang problems. The government can make investments feasible by not defending a fixed exchange rate and letting the currency depreciate. Currency depreciation always increases the profitability of new investments when revenues are in a foreign currency and costs are at least partially in domestic. Interestingly, foreign borrowing by exporting firms doesn't change the qualitative results: if firms' debt is denominated in foreign currency, a larger depreciation is needed to restore incentives to invest. An important feature in our model is that in general exporting firms choose to finance investments with debt instead of equity. Currency depreciation is socially optimal if risky projects have a higher expected return than safe projects and if firms are forced to rely on debt financing because of underdeveloped equity markets. Although currency depreciation is always ex-post optimal, it can be harmful ex-ante. Exporting firms know that the government will let the currency depreciate, if their risky investments have failed. This leads to excessive investment in risky projects even if more valuable safe projects are available.Currency depreciation; debt overhang; emerging markets; efficient investment policy; excessive risk taking

Separated by a common currency? Evidence from the Euro changeover

We study the price convergence of goods and services in the euro area in 2001-2002. To measure the degree of convergence, we compare the prices of around 220 items in 32 European cities. The width of the border is the price di¤erence attributed to the fact that the two cities are in different countries. We find that the 2001 European borders are negative, which suggests that the markets were very integrated before the euro changeover. Moreover, we do not identify an integration effect attributable to the introduction of the euro. We then explore the determinants of the European borders. We find that different languages, wealth and population differences tend to split the markets. Historical inflation, though, tends to lead to price convergence.Euro, economic integration

Corporate Financial Policies and Performance Prior to Currency Crises

Using company level data from 17 countries that have suffered a currency crisis during the past decade, this paper documents that firms have increasing leverage and declining profitability prior to a crisis. After sorting companies into two groups based on their exchange rate beta, we show that companies that benefit from currency depreciations have higher leverage, lower earnings to revenue ratios and lower interest coverage ratios compared to firms that are harmed by currency depreciations. These results are consistent with the recent literature that puts the financial policies and performance of corporations as the central issue in currency crisis.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39770/3/wp386.pd

Corporate Financial Policies and Performance Around Currency Crises

Using data from 17 countries that have suffered a currency crisis, this paper studies firm-level leverage and performance measures before and after a crisis has occurred. We show that in the years preceding a currency crisis, companies that are expected to benefit from currency depreciations increase their leverage more than companies that are expected to be harmed by currency depreciations. The evidence regarding the profitability and financial fragility ratios is consistent with the leverage results, since companies that are expected to benefit from depreciations fare worse than other companies before a crisis. We also provide evidence that the Asian crisis is different from the previous European and Latin American ones: in Asia firms become more fragile after the crisis and their profitability declines and leverage increases further, whereas in Europe and Latin America there are clear signs of recovery after a crisis has occurred, especially for firms that are ex-ante expected to benefit from depreciations.currency crises; currency depreciation; corporate leverage; capital structure; profitability; financial fragility; exchange rates

Corporate Financial Policies and Performance Prior to Currency Crises

Using company level data from 17 countries that have suffered a currency crisis during the past decade, this paper documents that firms have increasing leverage and declining profitability prior to a crisis. After sorting companies into two groups based on their exchange rate beta, we show that companies that benefit from currency depreciations have higher leverage, lower earnings to revenue ratios and lower interest coverage ratios compared to firms that are harmed by currency depreciations. These results are consistent with the recent literature that puts the financial policies and performance of corporations as the central issue in currency crisis.currency crisis, corporate leverage, capital structure, profitability, exchange rates

The euro and corporate financing

In this paper we study how the introduction of the euro has affected corporate financing in Europe. We use firm-level data from eleven euro area countries as well as from a control group of five other European countries spanning the years 1991–2006. We show that firms from euro area countries that previously had weak currencies have increased both their equity and their debt financing compared to the control group. We also show that results are stronger for firms that hail from less financially developed euro area countries, and that large firms from industries that are dependent on external financing have increased their debt financing more. These results support the hypothesis that improved access to capital markets in the euro area has enabled increased external financing, especially debt financingeuro; external financing; supply of capital; financial development; financial dependence; financial integration

Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets around the World

We analyze cross-sectional and time series information from forty-seven equity markets around the world, to consider whether short-sales restrictions affect the efficiency of the market, and the distributional characteristics of returns to individual stocks and market indices. Using the approach developed in Morck et.al. (2000) we find significantly more cross-sectional variation in equity returns in markets where short selling is feasible and practiced, controlling for a host of other factors. This evidence is consistent with more efficient price discovery at the individual security level. A common conjecture by regulators is that short-selling restrictions can reduce the relative severity of a market panic. We test this conjecture by examining the skewness of market returns. We find that in markets where short selling is either prohibited or not practiced, returns display significantly less negative skewness, and the frequency of extreme negative returns is lower. On the other hand, the overall volatility of individual returns and market returns is higher.

The Euro is good after all: Corporate evidence

In this paper we study the changes in corporate valuation, investments, and financing choices induced by the formation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. We use corporate-level data from ten countries that adopted the euro, the three EU countries that did not join EMU, as well as Norway and Switzerland. We show that the introduction of the euro has increased valuations for large firms in EMU countries, especially in countries that had experienced currency crises. Firm values have also increased for firms that were previously exposed to currency risks irrespective of size. Investments have increased for all firms, but the effects are bigger for large firms and for firms coming from countries with experiences of currency depreciations. The increase in investments has been financed mainly via debt issues. The evidence provided here supports the view that the introduction of the euro has lowered firms' cost of capital by eliminating currency risks among the countries that have adopted the common currency, and by further increasing capital market integration in Europe