Ouvrages reçus par le Bulletin Hispanique

Espagne Alarcón Sierra (Rafael), Una Rana viajera: Las crónicas y los libros de viaje de Julio Camba. – España, Renacimiento, 2010, 175 p. (Colección Iluminaciones, Filología, crítica y ensayo, 59) : bibliografía – ISBN 978-84-8472-563-3. Ángeles Naval (María), Cuestión de memoria. Estudios sobre Ramón J. Sender, Luis Cernuda y Francisco Ayala. – Zaragoza, Institución Fernando el Católico (CSIC), 2010, 158 p. (Colección de letras). – ISBN 84-9911-043-1. Benito Pérez Galdós en el cine mexicano..

Correlation, Partitioning and the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote under the Majority Rule

The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the probability of casting a decisive vote under the majority rule for a class of random electorate models encompassing the celebrated Impartial Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) models. The emphasis is on the impact of correlation across votes on the order of magnitude of this event. Our proof techniques use arguments from probability theory on one hand and combinatorial and algorithmic tools for counting integer points inside convex polytopes on the other hand

The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting

The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios

The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting

The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios

The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting

The purpose of this note is to compute the probability of logrolling for three different probabilistic cultures. The primary finding is that the restriction of preferences to be in accord with the condition of separable preferences creates enough additional structure among voters' preference rankings to create an increase in the likelihood that a Condorcet winner will exist with both IC and IAC-based scenarios

Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate Compact which are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner while in the other case it allocates these votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. The decisiveness and welfare analysis are conducted for a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College where the malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations

Exploring the Effects on the Electoral College of National and Regional Popular Vote Interstate Compact: An Electoral Engineering Perspective

The main purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of the formation of either a Regional Popular Vote Interstate compact or a National Popular Vote Interstate compact on the functioning of the Electoral College. The two versions of interstate Compact which are considered here differ in only one respect: in one case the interstate compact allocates its electoral votes to the regional popular winner while in the other case it allocates these votes to the national popular winner. They both differ from the ongoing National Popular Vote Interstate Compact as it is assumed that the agreement is effective as soon as the members sign it. The decisiveness and welfare analysis are conducted for a simplified symmetric theoretical version of the Electoral College where the malapportionment problems are absent. The three most popular probabilistic models are considered and the study is conducted either from the self-interest perspective of the initiators of the interstate compact or from a general interest perspective. The analysis combines analytical arguments and simulations