148 research outputs found
Imperfect Information and the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis
Despite a strong theoretical prediction that income skewness and redistribution should be positively linked, empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. This paper argues that it is important to distinguish between sources of changes in income skewness. Two sources of such changes are discussed: rising polarization and upward mobility, which both increase income skewness. Under imperfect information, these developments affect redistribution in different ways. While rising polarization increases redistribution, upward mobility can have the opposite effect. Reasonable degrees of informational imperfection are sufficient to generate increasing income skewness and decreasing redistribution in the presence of upward mobility.Voting; redistribution; imperfect information
Inattentive Voters and Welfare-State Persistence
Welfare-state measures often tend to persist even when they seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the economic environment. This paper proposes an information-based explanation for the persistence of the welfare state. I present a structural model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon implementations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare-state persistence arises from disincentive effects of social insurance on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private financial precautions and with it agents‘ attentiveness to changes in economic fundamentals. When welfare-state arrangements are pronounced, agents realize changes in economic fundamentals later and reforms have considerable delays.Welfare state; voting; imperfect information
Sticky Prices vs. Sticky Information – A Cross-Country Study of Inflation Dynamics
This paper empirically compares sticky-price and sticky-information Phillips curves considering inflation dynamics in six countries (US, UK, Germany, France, Canada, and Japan). We evaluate the models‘ abilities to match empirical second moments of inflation. Under baseline calibrations, the two models perform similarly in almost all countries. Under estimated parametrizations, sticky information performs better in France while sticky prices dominate in the UK and Germany. Sticky prices match unconditional moments of inflation dynamics better while sticky information is more successful in matching co-movement of inflation with demand. Both models‘ performances worsen where inflation dynamics diff er from the US benchmark.Phillips curve; sticky information; sticky prices
Assortative Mating and Female Labor Supply
This paper investigates the pattern of wives' hours disaggregated by the husband's wage decile. In the US, this pattern has changed from downward-sloping to hump-shaped. We show that this development can be explained within a standard household model of labor supply when taking into account trends in assortative mating. We develop a model in which assortative mating determines the wage ratios within individual couples and thus the efficient time allocation of spouses. The economy-wide pattern of wives’ hours by the husband's wage is downward-sloping for low degrees, hump-shaped for medium degrees, and upward-sloping for high degrees of assortative mating. A quantitative analysis of our model suggests that changes in the gender wage gap are responsible for the overall increase in hours worked by wives. By contrast, the fact that wives married to high-wage men experienced the most pronounced increase is a result of trends in assortative mating.female labor supply, assortative mating, gender wage gap
Household Labor Supply and Home Services in a General-Equilibrium Model with Heterogeneous Agents
We propose a new explanation for differences and changes in labor supply by gender and marital status, and in particular for the increase in married women’s labor supply over time.We argue that this increase as well as the relative constancy of other groups’ hours are optimal reactions to outsourcing labor in home production becoming more attractive to households over time.To investigate this hypothesis,we incorporate heterogeneous agents into a household model of labor supply and allow agents to trade home labor. This model can generate the observed patterns in US labor supply by gender and marital status as a reaction to declining frictions on the market for home services.We provide an accounting exercise to highlight the role of alternative explanations for the rise in hours in a model where home labor is tradable.Labor supply, gender, home production, heterogeneity
Household Labor Supply and Home Services in a General-Equilibrium Model with Heterogeneous Agents
We propose a new explanation for differences and changes in labor supply by gender and marital status, and in particular for the increase in married women's labor supply over time. We argue that this increase as well as the relative constancy of other groups' hours are optimal reactions to outsourcing labor in home production becoming more attractive to households over time. To investigate this hypothesis, we incorporate heterogeneous agents into a household model of labor supply and allow agents to trade home labor. This model can generate the observed patterns in US labor supply by gender and marital status as a reaction to declining frictions on the market for home services. We provide an accounting exercise to highlight the role of alternative explanations for the rise in hours in a model where home labor is tradable.labor supply, gender, home production, heterogeneity
Wage Gaps, Earnings Gaps, and the Market Power of Employers
Women are less mobile between firms than men which gives employers more market power over women and explains parts of the gender wage gap. I rationalize this observation as a consequence of different gender roles in the household. The higher a spouse's earnings, the more likely relative wage differences outweigh utility differences between jobs. About 87\% of estimated differences in inter-firm mobility are attributed to this effect and are, thus, endogenous. This implies mutually enforcing cycles between wage gaps, earnings gaps, and employers' market power and has implications for the effects of labor-market policies
Imperfect Information and the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis
Standard models of voting on redistribution generate a clear-cut prediction: redistribution increases in income skewness. (the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis) Empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Changes in income skewness are often accompanied by developments in redistribution into the opposite direction. This paper argues that it is important to distinguish between sources of changes in income skewness, polarization and upward mobility which both have the same impact on income skewness. In a model with imperfect information, these developments affect redistribution in different ways. While polarization generates a positive relation between income skewness and redistribution, upward mobility can have the opposite effect
Household specialization and the labor-supply elasticities of women and men
This paper studies gender differences in the elasticity of labor supply in a model of
household specialization. We show that household specialization implies larger Frisch
elasticities for the partner that specializes in home production. Quantitatively, empirical time-use ratios alone imply differences in the Frisch elasticity between women
and men of about 50%. Similar results are obtained for long-run elasticities. However,
limited commitment within the household reduces the gender differences in long-run
labor-supply elasticities. Our results imply that the elasticity of labor supply is not
a deep parameter but can react on, e.g., gender-biased employment subsidies, public
child care provision, and divorce laws
Inattentive voters and welfare-state persistence
Welfare-state measures often tend to persist even when they
seem to have become suboptimal due to changes in the economic
environment. This paper proposes an information-based explanation for this welfare-state persistence. I present a structural
model where rationally inattentive voters decide upon implementations and removals of social insurance. In this model, welfare-
state persistence arises from disincentive effects of social insurance on attentiveness. The welfare state crowds out private financial precautions and with it agents' attentiveness to changes in
economic fundamentals. When welfare-state arrangements are
pronounced, agents realize changes in economic fundamentals
later and reforms have considerable delays
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