Klimaverhandlungen: Welche Erwartungen können an den Klimagipfel in Paris gestellt werden?

Kurz vor dem anstehenden Klimagipfel äußert sich Angela Merkel in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Sonntagszeitung wie folgt: "Zu Recht wird von Regierungen und Politikern erwartet, daß sie nicht länger die Augen vor erdrückenden wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen verschließen, daß der Klimaschutz rasches und energisches Handeln erfordert." Frau Merkel stellt schließlich eine klare Forderung an die Ergebnisse des Klimagipfels: "Die Treibhausgasemissionen müssen nicht nur stabilisiert, sondern möglichst rasch vermindert werden." Diese Aussagen sind heute noch aktuell, wurden jedoch tatsächlich am 26. März 1995 veröffentlicht (FAS, 1995); zu der Zeit also als Frau Merkel selbst noch das Amt der Bundesumweltministerin bekleidete und kurz darauf den ersten Klimagipfel als Präsidentin eröffnete. Nach mehr als 20 Jahren der Klimadiplomatie im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen liegt die Aufmerksamkeit nun auf dem 21. Klimagipfel (COP, Conference of the Parties), der vom 30. November bis zum 11. Dezember in Paris stattfinden wird. Diesem Gipfel wird allgemeinhin zugeschrieben, die letzte Chance für eine rechtzeitige globale Einigung zur Vermeidung eines gefährlichen Klimawandels zu sein. In diesem DIW Roundup beleuchten wir die anstehende COP21 und diskutieren sowohl den aktuellen Stand als auch kontroverse Punkte der anstehenden Verhandlungen. Zudem zeigen wir Meilensteine bisheriger Klimagipfel und erläutern die ökonomische Theorie hinter internationalen Umweltabkommen

The Paris Climate Agreement: Is it sufficient to limit climate change?

"The Paris Agreement is a monumental triumph for people and our planet" (UN News Centre, 2015). Statements, like this one from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, represent the global excitement shortly after the acceptance of the Paris Agreement and describe the outcome of the COP21 in December 2015 primarily as 'historical'. Twenty years after the UN's first COP (Conference of the Parties), the international community reached "the first universal agreement in the history of climate negotiations" (French Government, 2015). Euphoria about the diplomatic success gave way to scepticism if the deal will actually have real political power to initiate ambitious climate policy worldwide that can prevent dangerous levels of climate change. It will be the next years and decades that show whether the Paris Agreement can create the so far missing global ambition to limit anthropogenic climate change and its capability to reduce risks and vulnerability to the impacts of an already changed climate. In this DIW Roundup we discuss the most important achievements of the negotiations in Paris, and show necessary steps, so that the convention will lead to the historic actions it is meant to create. Doing so, we complement a previous DIW Roundup, where we evaluated expectations prior to the Paris climate talks in December 2015

Natural gas as a barrier to sustainability transitions? A systematic mapping of the risks and challenges

Research has shown that natural gas (NG) has a significant negative impact on the climate. The role of NG in future global energy systems is highly controversial. Due to the greenhouse gas emissions associated with NG and the potential delay of low-carbon technologies, this energy source could represent a barrier rather than a solution to successful sustainability transitions. However, it appears that very little existing research covers NG-related risks for energy transitions. This paper covers a systematic mapping of the academic sustainability transitions literature, compiling existing evidence on the potential risks and adverse effects of using NG. Methane emissions in particular pose large climate risks, while the main barriers to sustainability transitions caused by NG include a crowding-out effect of low-carbon technologies, stranded assets, infrastructure lock-in, and behavioural lock-ins. The resulting political challenges include achieving climate mitigation targets, dealing with opposition to NG reduction, and addressing discursive lock-ins. The studies cited here highlight the fact that the potential of NG to reduce greenhouse gases is small, and that climate targets cannot be achieved via NG use in the long term.BMBF, 01LN1704A, Nachwuchsgruppe Globaler Wandel: CoalExit - Die Ökonomie des Kohleausstiegs - Identifikation von Bausteinen für Rahmenpläne zukünftiger regionaler StrukturwandelBMBF, 01LA1810A, Ökonomie des Klimawandels - Verbundprojekt: Die Zukunft fossiler Energieträger im Zuge von Treibhausgasneutralität (FFF) - Teilprojekt 1: Implementierung von Ausstiegspfade

Earthquakes in the Netherlands cannot shake the European natural gas market

The rising number of earthquakes in the northeastern part of the Netherlands has been attributed to the extraction of natural gas from the Groningen field. This has led tostrong opposition to natural gas production from the Dutch population, a matter that is increasingly preoccupying not only policy-makers on the local and provincial levels,but also the central government. In response, the Dutch government has decided a drastic reduction of production from the Groningen gas field, the largest natural gas field in the country. This has an impact on several Western European countries that import natural gas from the Netherlands. Model calculations by DIW Berlin based on a substantially reduced production of natural gas in the Netherlands show that due to diversified imports effects on the European natural gas market would only be small. Even if the lower Dutch production comes in addition to the disruption of the Russian supplies to Europe, it would not result in serious supply shortages or price increases in Western Europe since gas from other regions are possible. However, these supplies of natural gas would come partly from providers whose reliability might be called into question due to an unstable political situation, as for instance in North Africa

Climate protection and a new operator: The Eastern German lignite industry is changing

According to the German federal government's climate protection targets, there will be a continuous reduction of lignite-based electricity well before 2030. Simulations show that the currently authorized lignite mines in eastern Germany would not be fully depleted if the climate protection targets for 2030 were complied with. This makes planning for new mines or the expansion of existing ones superfluous. For the planning security of all the actors involved, policy makers should bindingly exclude permits for additional surface mines. In terms of the follow-up costs of lignite mining, the issue is whether or not the companies' provisions are high enough and insolvency-proof. In this context, the new ownership structures in the eastern German lignite industry, after Vattenfall's sale of its lignite division to Czech Energeticky a Prumyslovy Holding (EPH), have become a matter of importance. Simulations show that only under optimistic assumptions, the current provisions of 1.5 billion euros for the Lusatian lignite region are sufficient to cover recultivation costs. However, alternative scenarios show significant shortfalls. For this reason, policy makers should work toward independent, transparent cost estimates. Additional measures should be considered as required, such as the creation of a public sector fund to permanently protect the general public against being forced to take on the costs of recultivation. This is also animportant theme for the government's new Commission on Growth, Structural Change, and Regional Development (Kommission Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Regionalentwicklung). Individual federal states also have key roles to play in the creation of a dependable roadmap for a coal phase-out. For example, the government of Brandenburg is now in the process of revising its energy strategy for 2030 (Energiestrategie 2030)

Klimaschutz und Betreiberwechsel: Die ostdeutsche Braunkohlewirtschaft im Wandel

Den Klimaschutzzielen der Bundesregierung zufolge muss dieBraunkohleverstromung in Deutschland bereits deutlich vor demJahr 2030 kontinuierlich abnehmen. Simulationen zeigen, dass diebereits genehmigten Tagebaufelder in den ostdeutschen Revierenbei einer Einhaltung der Klimaschutzziele bis 2030 nicht vollständigausgekohlt würden. Pläne für neue bzw. zu erweiterndeTagebaufelder erübrigen sich somit. Um Planungssicherheit für alleAkteure herzustellen, sollte die Politik die Genehmigung weitererTagebaufelder daher verbindlich ausschließen.In Hinblick auf die Folgekosten des Braunkohlebergbaus stelltsich die Frage, ob die Unternehmensrückstellungen hoch genugund insolvenzfest sind. In diesem Zusammenhang sind nach demKauf der Braunkohlesparte von Vattenfall durch die tschechischeEnergeticky a Prumyslovy Holding (EPH) auch die neuen Eigentümerstrukturenin der ostdeutschen Braunkohlewirtschaft vonBedeutung. Simulationsrechnungen zufolge könnten die derzeitigenRückstellungen von 1,5 Milliarden Euro für das LausitzerRevier unter optimistischen Annahmen zur Deckung der Rekultivierungskostenausreichen, in anderen Szenarien könnte es jedoch zudeutlichen Fehlbeträgen kommen. Die Politik sollte daher auf unabhängigeund transparente Kostenschätzungen hinwirken.Bei Bedarf könnten weitere Maßnahmen erfolgen wie etwa dieSchaffung eines öffentlich-rechtlichen Fonds, um die Allgemeinheitdauerhaft vor der ungewollten Übernahme von Rekultivierungslastenzu schützen. Dies ist auch ein wichtiges Thema für die neueKommission 'Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Regionalentwicklung'der Bundesregierung. Bei der Erstellung eines verlässlichenFahrplans für den Kohleausstieg kommt zudem einzelnen Bundesländerneine wichtige Rolle zu, derzeit beispielsweise der LandesregierungBrandenburg bei der Überarbeitung ihrer Energiestrategie 2030.According to the German federal government's climate protection targets, there will be a gradual 'lights out' for lignite-based electricity well before 2030. Simulations show that the currently authorized strip mines in eastern Germany would not be depleted of coal if the climate protection targets for 2030 were complied with. This makes planning for new mines or the expansion of existing ones superfluous. For the planning security of all the actors involved, policy makers should stop granting permits for additional surface mines. In terms of the follow-up costs of lignite mining, the issue is whether or not the companies' reserves are high enough and immune to insolvency as well. Vattenfall, a major power company that also serves Germany, sold its lignite divi-sion to Czech Energeticky a Prumyslovy Holding (EPH) last fall. Given this context, the new ownership structures in the eastern German lignite industry have become a matter of importance. Based on the calculations in the simulation and optimistic assumptions, the current reserves of 1.5 billion euros for the Lusatia region are sufficient to cover recultivation costs. However, alternative scenarios show significant shortfalls. For this reason, policy makers should work toward independent, transparent cost estimates. Additional measures should be considered as required, such as the creation of a public sector fund to permanently protect the population against being forced to takeon the costs of recultivation. This is also an important theme for the government's new Commission on Growth, Structural Change, and Regional Development (Kommission Wachstum, Strukturwandel und Regionalentwicklung). Individual federal states also have key roles to play in the creation of a dependable roadmap. For example, the government of Brandenburg is now in the process of revising its energy strategy for 2030 (Energiestrategie 2030)

Nuclear power is not competitive: Climate protection in UK and France also viable without it

The nuclear power industry is faced with profound challenges- not only in Germany, but throughout Europe as well. New nuclear power plants are very expensive to build and even at high carbon prices, nuclear power is not competitive. Nevertheless, the EU reference scenario assumes that within the next three decades, new nuclear power plants will be built with a total capacity of at least 50 gigawatts (GW), and licenses will be renewed for a further 86 GW. Model calculations show that nuclear power would disappear from Europe's power generation mix by 2050 were the decision based on economic factors and cost considerations alone. In Western Europe, the UK and France are still determined to implement their plans to build new nuclear power plants. But the model calculations for these two countries indicate that complete electricity sector decarbonization by 2050 would also be possible without nuclear power

Structural change in coal regions as a process of economic and social-ecological transition : lessons learnt from structural change processes in Germany

Effective policies to mitigate climate change need to be accompanied by a socially just transition. Based on experiences of past and ongoing transition policies in coal regions in Europe and with indications to the specificity of framework conditions and challenges and to the potential effectiveness and transferability of approaches, this paper presents lessons learnt which can be inspirational for similar transitions in other coal regions and for transitions in other sectors

Shaking Dutch Grounds Won't Shatter the European Gas Market

The Netherlands have been a pivotal supplier in Western European natural gas markets in the last decades. Recent analyses show that the Netherlands would play an important role in replacing Russian supplies in Germany and France in case of Russian export disruption (Richter & Holz, 2015). However, the Netherlands have suffered from regular earthquakes in recent years that are related to the natural gas production in the major Groningen field. Natural gas production rates- that are politically mandated in the Netherlands - have consequently been substantially reduced, with an estimated annual production 30% below the 2013 level. We implement a realistically low production path for the next decades in the Global Gas Model and analyze the geopolitical impacts. We find that the diversification of the European natural gas imports allows spreading the replacement of Dutch gas over many alternative sources, with diverse pipeline and LNG supplies.There will be hardly any price or demand reduction effect. Even if Russia fails to supply Europe, the additional impact of the lower Dutch production is moderate. Again, alternative suppliers from various sources are able to replace the Dutch volumes. Hence, the European consumers need not to worry about the declining Dutch natural gas production and their security of supplies