Monetary Policy Committees: meetings and outcomes

Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke. JEL Classification: E58, D71, D78Bank of England, Federal Open Market Committee, monetary policy committee, voting

Is the yield curve a useful Information variable for the Eurosystem?

The focus of this paper is on the use of the yield curve in monetary policy making. Theoretical arguments and a multi-country empirical analysis with an explicit focus on the euro area suggest the need for caution in case the Eurosystem uses the yield curve as an information variable for monetary policy, because multiple theoretical explanations exist for an observed movement in the yield curve, suggesting that policy reactions cannot be prescribed unambiguously. In addition, the empirical analysis shows that, in contrast with earlier findings of, for example, Hardouvelis (1994) and Bernard and Gerlach (1996), the information content of the yield curve is fairly limited. For the individual European countries participating in the Eurosystem as well as for the euro area as a whole, the yield spread possesses only very limited information relating to future movements in the inflation rate and output growth, over-and-above the information contained in the history of the latter variables. JEL Classification: E43, E52

Regional Price Adjustment in a Monetary Union

Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the inflationary processes in member states of EMU cause regional price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidence of the present existence of such an adjustment mechanism, notwithstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge towards the euro area level. Overa11, inflation persistence has declined significantly over the years, but there are still marked differences between countries on this score. We conclude that the euro area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending support to the quest for further structura1 reforms in European labour and product markets

European Monetary Union, the term structure, and the Lucas Critique

In order to evaluate the empirical relevance of the Lucas Critique, weinvestigate whether the term structure (the relation of the long interest rate to theshort interest rate) showed structural change as the deadline for the euro becamecloser. Our empirical analysis of the term structures (yield curves) in 12 OECDcountries uncovers that econometrically estimated behavioural equations for mostEMU countries were stable even in the light of the creation of the euro. This findingwould seem to defy the Lucas Critique. However, fhe significant structural instabilityfound for the euro area's core country Germany suggests that the Lucas Critique isrelevant in the analysis of the impact of the creation (and future extensions) of EMU

Monetary Policy Committees: meetings and outcomes

Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke

On the Optimality of Decisions

Most monetary policy committees decide on interest rates using a simple majority voting rule. Given the inherent heterogeneity of committee members, this voting rule is suboptimal in terms of the quality of the interest rate decision, but popular for other (political) reasons. We show that a clustering of committee members into 2 subgroups, as is the case in a hub-and spokes systems of central banks such as the Fed or the ESCB, can eliminate this suboptimality whilst retaining the majority voting rule

The Effects of Learning in Interactive Monetary Policy Committees

We develop a theoretical framework for studying the effects of interaction on the quaJity of decision-making by monetary policy committees. We show that interaction, i.e. increasing one's expertise through an exchange of views, is most likely not to result in interdependent voting behaviour.Therefore, and in contrast to earlier literature, we find that interaction is beneficial for the collective outcome

Regional Price Adjustment in a Monetary Union: the case of EMU

Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the inflationary processes in member states of EMU cause regional price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidence of the present existence of such an adjustment mechanism, notwithstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge towards the euro area level. Overa11, inflation persistence has declined significantly over the years, but there are still marked differences between countries on this score. We conclude that the euro area is not an optimal currency area yet, lending support to the quest for further structura1 reforms in European labour and product markets

The Lucas Critique in Practice: An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of European Monetary Integration on the Term Structure

An empirical investigation of the term structure (the relation of the long interest rate to the short interest rate) showed structural change as the deadline for the euro became closer. Our empirical analysis of the term structures (yield curves) in 12 OECD countries uncovers that econometrically estimated behavioural equations for most EMU countries were stable even in the light of the creation of the euro. This finding would seem to defy the Lucas Critique. However, the significant structural instability found for the euro area's core country Germany suggests that the Lucas Critique is relevant in the analysis of the impact of the creation (and future extensions) of EMU