Is state fiscal policy asymmetric over the business cycle?

A number of stabilizers are thought to mute the business cycle. One key stabilizer is federal fiscal policy. The federal budget surplus tends to rise during economic booms and fall in downturns, helping to stabilize consumers’ disposable income and thereby mitigate economic fluctuations. During booms, for example, the budget surplus typically rises because tax revenues rise more than expenditures.> Another stabilizer that has traditionally received less attention is state fiscal policy. Like the federal budget surplus, state government surpluses tend to rise during economic expansions and decline during downturns. Moreover, like the federal budget, state budgets represent large shares of the economy. The stabilizing influence of state fiscal policy, however, may differ across business cycle expansions and downturns – making state fiscal policy asymmetric. For example, state budgets could be more effective at mitigating economic slumps than at muting booms if taxes fall more sharply during a slump than they rise in an expansion of equal magnitude. Asymmetry in fiscal policy could be caused by a number of factors, such as balanced budget rules, which are constitutionally imposed restrictions on a state government’s ability to incur debt.> Sorensen and Yosha examine the business cycle behavior of state fiscal policy to determine whether policy is asymmetric and, if so, to identify the causes. They conclude that state revenue and expenditure display significant asymmetry over the business cycle, with nearly offsetting effects on the budget surplus. As a result, state fiscal policy tends to mute economic booms to roughly the same degree it mitigates slowdowns. The asymmetries in revenue and expenditure appear to be associated with balanced budget rules, although their fundamental causes cannot be clearly identified.Fiscal policy ; Business cycles

Is risk sharing in the United States a regional phenomenon?

Regions within the United States routinely experience economic fluctuations that differ from those of other regions. For example, in the past few years, falling wheat prices have slowed growth in the value of total output in Kansas. Such developments can pose concerns for policymakers because macroeconomic tools like monetary policy affect all regions, not just specific regions. Fortunately, several mechanisms help insulate regional income and consumption from region-specific output fluctuations. Diversification of asset ownership across regions, made possible by national capital markets, smoothes regional income and, in turn, consumption. The federal tax system also helps protect regional income and consumption from region- specific changes in output. Finally, adjustments to saving further insulate consumption from variation in output. In effect, each of these mechanisms mitigates the effect of region-specific economic fluctuations by pooling risks across regions--by providing risk sharing.> Although earlier research has documented the pattern of risk sharing for the United States as a whole, patterns may differ across broad regions of the nation. Eastern states, for example, may benefit more from income smoothing through capital markets due to their proximity to Wall Street. Moreover, geographic distance may affect whether and how risk is shared. For instance, it may be easier for Kansas residents to own property, such as a farm or hotel, in Colorado than in Massachusetts. Similarly, business owners in Kansas are more likely to obtain loans in Missouri than in New York. In this case, geography may affect the ability of risk sharing to mitigate region-specific fluctuations in output. Because geography matters, this article examines whether risk sharing occurs more in some regions than in others and whether risk sharing is greater within large regions of the United States than between regions.> Sorensen and Yosha present the conceptual framework of risk sharing and develop a method for estimating the amount of risk sharing provided by different mechanisms. They report estimates of risk sharing patterns within and across a set of large U.S. regions. These estimates reveal some important regional differences. Moreover, the estimates indicate there is more overall risk sharing within regions than between regions. The risk sharing provided by capital markets and the federal tax system is essentially the same within and across regions, implying that these are nationwide mechanisms. In contrast, risk sharing through saving adjustments is more local, occurring just within regions.Risk

Risk Sharing among OECD and EU Countries: The Role of Capital Gains, Capital Income, Transfers, and Saving

We estimate the amount of income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) between OECD countries during the period 1970{2003 with a particular focus on EU and EMU countries. Income smoothing from international factor income has increased in the EU and, in particular, the EMU but not in the non-EU OECD since the introduction of the Euro. Consumption smoothing from pro-cyclical government saving has declined in the EMU, but not in the non-EU OECD, since the signing of the Maastricht treaty. We find that when capital gains and losses on international asset positions are considered part of income, the magnitude of capital gains leads to huge amounts of income smoothing and dis-smoothing although, at the time horizons we examine, the capital gains or losses are only weakly reflected in consumption. Understanding the role of capital gains in risk sharing appears to be of first order importance.Government De¯cits, Income Insurance, International Capital Markets, International Integration, Risk Sharing, External Capital Gains

Risk sharing and portfolio allocation in EMU

This paper investigates whether risk sharing, measured as income and consumption smoothing, among countries in the EU and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has increased since the adoption of the euro. We ask: Have the recent increase in foreign equity and debt holdings been associated with more risk sharing? Do certain classes of assets (debt, equity, foreign direct investment) provide relatively more or less risk sharing? Do liabilities provide risk sharing differently from assets? Do investments in EMU countries provide more or less risk sharing per euro invested compared to investments in non-EMU countries? Has increased banking integration improved risk sharing? Due to the short span of years since the introduction of the euro, our results are tentative, but they indicate that the monetary union has facilitated risk sharing, although the level of risk sharing is still much below the level found among U.S. states.Financial integration, Risk sharing, EU, EMU, Portfolio diversification, Banking market integration, Panel data analysis, Demyanyk, Ostergaard, S�rensen

Where does Capital Flow? A Comparison of U.S. States and EU Countries 1950-2000

We find that the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was characterized by strong "catch-up growth" in the south with capital owing from rich northern states to poorer southern states - consistent with the predictions of the simple neoclassical model. After the 1970s, "catch-up growth" is mainly over in the United States and capital is owing to productive (rich) states. For Europe, we find that capital has been owing from the richer countries to the poorer countries since the 1970s with no signs yet of the "catch-up" phase having run its course, except for the country of Ireland.european capital markets, regional capital flows, institutions, regulations, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Turan

Asymmetric Shocks and Risk Sharing in a Monetary Union: Updated Evidence and Policy Implications for Europe

We find that risk sharing in the European Union (EU) has been increasing over the past decade due to increased cross-ownership of assets across countries. Industrial special- ization has also been increasing over the last decade and we conjecture that risk sharing plays an important causal effect by allowing countries to specialize without being subject to higher income risk even though the variability of output may increase. We believe that lower trade barriers may not have played a dominant causal role during this decade be- cause the effect of lower trade barriers has probably already played itself out. We further find that the asymmetry of GDP fluctuations in the EU has declined steeply over the last two decades. This may be due to economic policies becoming more similar as countries were adjusting fiscal policy in order to meet the Maastricht criteria, but a similar result was found for U.S. states so the finding may be due to a different nature of the shocks to the world economy in the 1990s. We expect to see a further rise in risk sharing between EU countries, accompanied by more specialization. However, the resulting increase in GDP asymmetry should be minor and will have small welfare costs because increased risk sharing should lower income (GNP) asymmetry.financial integration, regional specialization, international portfolio diversification, income insurance

Risk Sharing and Sectoral Specialization: Regional and International Evidence

We provide empirical evidence that risk sharing enhances specialization in production. To the best of our knowledge, this well-established and important theoretical proposition has not been tested before. Our empirical procedure is summarized as follows. First, we construct a measure of specialization in production, and calculate an index of specialization for each of the European Community (EC) and non-EC OECD countries, U.S. states, Canadian provinces, Japanese prefectures, Latin American countries, and regions of Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Then, we estimate the degree of capital market integration (a measure of risk sharing) within each of these groups of regions: the EC countries, the non-EC OECD countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom (and rely on another author's estimate for Latin America). Finally, we perform a regression of the specialization index on the degree of risk sharing, controlling for relevant economic variables. We find a positive and significant relation between the degree of specialization of individual members of a group of countries, provinces, states, or prefectures, and the amount of risk that is shared within the group. We perform regressions using variables such as shareholder rights and the size of the financial sector (relative to GDP) as instruments for the amount of inter-regional risk sharing. These regressions confirm that risk sharing---facilitated by a favorable legal environment and a developed financial system---is a direct causal determinant of industrial specialization.

Risk Sharing among OECD and EU Countries: The Role of Capital Gains, Capital Income, Transfers, and Saving

We estimate the amount of income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) between OECD countries during the period 1970{2003 with a particular focus on EU and EMU countries. Income smoothing from international factor income has increased in the EU and, in particular, the EMU but not in the non-EU OECD since the introduction of the Euro. Consumption smoothing from pro-cyclical government saving has declined in the EMU, but not in the non-EU OECD, since the signing of the Maastricht treaty. We find that when capital gains and losses on international asset positions are considered part of income, the magnitude of capital gains leads to huge amounts of income smoothing and dis-smoothing although, at the time horizons we examine, the capital gains or losses are only weakly reflected in consumption. Understanding the role of capital gains in risk sharing appears to be of first order importance

Risk Sharing among OECD and EU Countries: The Role of Capital Gains, Capital Income, Transfers, and Saving

We estimate the amount of income and consumption smoothing (risk sharing) between OECD countries during the period 1970{2003 with a particular focus on EU and EMU countries. Income smoothing from international factor income has increased in the EU and, in particular, the EMU but not in the non-EU OECD since the introduction of the Euro. Consumption smoothing from pro-cyclical government saving has declined in the EMU, but not in the non-EU OECD, since the signing of the Maastricht treaty. We find that when capital gains and losses on international asset positions are considered part of income, the magnitude of capital gains leads to huge amounts of income smoothing and dis-smoothing although, at the time horizons we examine, the capital gains or losses are only weakly reflected in consumption. Understanding the role of capital gains in risk sharing appears to be of first order importance

The Effect of Education on Equity Holdings

Abstract We study the effect of education on equity ownership in the form of stocks or mutual funds (outside of retirement accounts). We find a causal effect of education on stockholding using the number of colleges in the county where the respondent grew up as an instrument and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The effect is particularly strong for whites from non-privileged backgrounds. We explore the channels through which education affects equity holdings using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey and find that, controlling for family fixed effects, increased cognition and features associated with having a white collar job appear to be the main channels