CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CHOICE, WHAT SCOPE FOR FLEXIBILITY IN TUNISIA?

Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, what scope for flexibility in Tunisia? This study evaluates within a game-theoretic framework the exchange rate regime from a welfare perspective. In a tradable-nontradable goods model framework, Tunisia’s exchange rate regime choice is cast in terms of strategic interactions between the monetary authority and domestic enterprises. The monetary authority is assumed to choose an optimal exchange rate regime according to a welfare-related criterion by minimising a loss function defined in terms of external competitiveness and domestic inflation. Simulations outcomes reveal that capital account liberalization in the Tunisian economic context is compatible with a flexible exchange rate regime.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40201/3/wp815.pd

Disclosure quality and corporate governance: Evidence from the French Stock Market

This paper examines a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in a context of ownership concentration. Agency theory presents a theoretical framework linking disclosure decision to corporate governance mechanisms. Using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), we find that firms with poor disclosure quality have higher ownership concentration, are family controlled, have a low proportion of outside directors in the board, little presence of institutional investors in the capital shares, no executive stock options plans, and present dual class shares. The MCA results also show that firms with good disclosure are not controlled by families and are characterised by a high proportion of outside directors in the board, ownership dispersion and a significant presence of institutional investors in the capital shares. As a confirmatory analysis, we use a binary LOGIT. After controlling for size, multiple listing and CAC40 membership, the results confirm a negative association between disclosure quality and family control, double voting shares grant, and ownership concentration. The results also show a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the presence of executive stock options plans, and the proportion of independent directors in the board. These findings shed the light on corporate governance features that enhance incentives for good disclosure under high ownership concentration.Pas de mots clés

Disclosure and minority expropriation: A study of French listed firms

In this paper we examine the influence of minority expropriation on disclosure level in France where shareholders are poorly protected and the main agency problem is the one between controlling and minority shareholders (type II conflict) while prior studies have been undertaken in the United States, in a context of ownership dispersion and high investor protection where the main agency conflict opposes managers to shareholders (type I conflict). Using a sample of 81 French firms on the 2001-2004 period, we find a negative relation between disclosure level and both ownership and control concentration and double voting rights shares. These results confirm that type II conflict exacerbates the disclosure problem. Controlling shareholders benefit from superior information which helps them to profit from private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders particularly when they hold voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights; therefore they are likely to reduce disclosure. Our results show also a positive relation between disclosure level and family control which is similar to Ali, Chen et Radhakrishnan (2007) findings on American firms.corporate governance, minority expropriation, ownership structure

Disclosure Quality and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the French Stock Market.

This paper examines a combined set of corporate governance features that influence disclosure quality in a context of ownership concentration. Agency theory presents a theoretical framework linking disclosure decision to corporate governance mechanisms. Using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), we find that firms with poor disclosure quality have higher ownership concentration, are family controlled, have a low proportion of outside directors in the board, little presence of institutional investors in the capital shares, no executive stock options plans, and present dual class shares. The MCA results also show that firms with good disclosure are not controlled by families and are characterised by a high proportion of outside directors in the board, ownership dispersion and a significant presence of institutional investors in the capital shares. As a confirmatory analysis, we use a binary LOGIT. After controlling for size, multiple listing and CAC40 membership, the results confirm a negative association between disclosure quality and family control, double voting shares grant, and ownership concentration. The results also show a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the presence of executive stock options plans, and the proportion of independent directors in the board. These findings shed the light on corporate governance features that enhance incentives for good disclosure under high ownership concentration.disclosure quality; corporate governance; ownership structure; agency theory; Gouvernance d'entreprise; corporate governance; Structure de propriété; Publication financière;

Maximal inequalities and Riesz transform estimates on LpL^p spaces for Schr\"odinger operators with nonnegative potentials

We show various $L^p$ estimates for Schr\"odinger operators $-\Delta+V$ on \RR^n and their square roots. We assume reverse H\"older estimates on the potential, and improve some results of Shen \cite{Sh1}. Our main tools are improved Fefferman-Phong inequalities and reverse H\"older estimates for weak solutions of $-\Delta+V$ and their gradients.Comment: Revised versio

Minimum energy wireless sensor networks

PhD programme overviewHere, on-off keying modulation is used as a means of reducing the transmit energy requirements whilst exploiting inherent channel coding, which sets the scene of this PhD study

CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIME CHOICE, WHAT SCOPE FOR FLEXIBILITY IN TUNISIA?

Capital account liberalization and exchange rate regime choice, what scope for flexibility in Tunisia? This study evaluates within a game-theoretic framework the exchange rate regime from a welfare perspective. In a tradable-nontradable goods model framework, Tunisia’s exchange rate regime choice is cast in terms of strategic interactions between the monetary authority and domestic enterprises. The monetary authority is assumed to choose an optimal exchange rate regime according to a welfare-related criterion by minimising a loss function defined in terms of external competitiveness and domestic inflation. Simulations outcomes reveal that capital account liberalization in the Tunisian economic context is compatible with a flexible exchange rate regime.Exchange rate regime, Liberalization, Convertibility, Capital Account, Welfare, Tunisia.