Efficiency of a Biofuel Subsidy Policy in the Presence of Environmental Externalities

The object of this paper is to analyze, in a general equilibrium setting with four markets, the efficiency of a biofuel subsidy policy. The analysis takes into account environmental externalities associated both with the production and the consumption of biofuels, as well as associated with the production of agricultural raw material. Our preliminary numerical results, applied to the biodiesel subsidy policy in France, first show that this policy increases the utility of the representative consumer compared to the laissez-faire solution. The same policy action leads, however, to an increased level of agricultural and GHG emissions, in comparison with the laissez-faire solution.biofuels, subsidy, environment, Environmental Economics and Policy,

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally friendly technologies ?

This paper studies the link between the design of international environmental agreements and the incentives for the private sector to invest in cleaner technologies. More specifically, it compares the performance, in the Paretoo sense, of two types of agreement : an agreement on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement on differentiated standards without transfers. To achieve this goal, we use a multi-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the expected level of abatement standards, resulting from future bilateral negotiations. Our findings indicate that whenever countries are able to partially commit, the agreement on a uniform standard may be preferable, as it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result relies on the low level of the set-up cost of this technology. If this level is sufficiently high, the announcement and implementation of the agreement on a uniform standard with transfers is not optimal, because it takes away the incentive of all firms to invest in a new abatement technology.agreements, standards, transfers, technology adoption, irreversible investment, bargaining, transboundary pollution.

The role of fixed cost in international environmental negotiations.

We investigate the relative efficiency of an agreement based on a uniform standard without transfers and one based on differentiated standards with transfers when strictly identical countries deal with transboundary pollution. We especially ask what role fixed cost plays. Two approaches are examined: the Nash bargaining solution, involving two countries, and the coalition formation framework, involving numerous countries and emphasizing self-enforcing agreements. In the former, in terms of welfare, strictly identical countries may wish to reduce their emissions in a non-uniform way under the differentiated agreement. For this result to hold, the fixed cost of investment in abatement technology must be sufficiently high. The nature of the threat point of negotiations, however, also plays a crucial role. As concerns global abatement, the two countries abate more under the uniform agreement than under the differentiated one. In terms of coalition formation when numerous countries are involved, a grand coalition could emerge under a differentiated agreement.bargaining; standards; costs; Transboundary pollution;

Estate accounting as a public policy tool and its application in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century.

Este estudio pretende informar sobre la contabilidad sucesoria en el Imperio Otomano, presentando una muestra originaria del siglo XVII. En el Imperio Otomano, la contabilidad sucesoria y la liquidación de herencias servía para mantener el orden social, asegurando la pervivencia de las deudas cuando una de las partes fallecía, así como el debido pago a terceros con derecho a bienes pertenecientes al patrimonio objeto de la herencia. The objective of this study is to give information about estate accounting in the Ottoman Empire and present a sample from the 17th century. In the Ottoman Empire estate accounting and settlement served to maintain social order by ensuring the continuation of debt-credit relationship even when one of the parties died and also by ensuring the rightful discharge of estates between those with rights to the estate.Imperio Otomano, historia de la contabilidad, siglo XVII, contabilidad sucesoria. Ottoman Empire, accounting history, 17th century, estate accounting.

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally friendly technologies?

URL des Documents de travail : http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/documents-de-travail/Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 2007.30 - ISSN : 1955-611XThis paper studies the link between the design of international environmental agreements and the incentives for the private sector to invest in cleaner technologies. More specifically, it compares the performance, in the Pareto sense, of two types of agreement: an agreement on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement on differentiated standards without transfers. To achieve this goal, we use a multi-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the expected level of abatement standards, resulting from future bilateral negotiations. Our findings indicate that whenever countries are able to partially commit, the agreement on a uniform standard may be preferable, as it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result relies on the low level of the set-up cost of this technology. If this level is sufficiently high, the announcement and implementation of the agreement on a uniform standard with transfers is not optimal, because it takes away the incentive of all firms to invest in a new abatement technology.Ce travail étudie le lien entre le design des accords environnementaux internationaux et les décisions d'investissement des entreprises dans de nouvelles technologies de traitement de la pollution. Les deux types d'accords étudiés dans ce travail sont l'accord de norme uniforme avec transferts et l'accord de normes différenciées sans transfert. La principale question posée est celle du type d'accord environnemental international qui doit être annoncé et mis en oeuvre par les pays de façon optimale au sens de Pareto. Ceci est effectué dans le cadre d'un modèle à plusieurs étapes où le secteur privé décide de réaliser un investissement irréversible, étant donné le niveau anticipé des normes de dépollution résultant des négociations bilatérales futures. Nos travaux mettent en évidence un résultat qui peut paraître contre intuitif : il est optimal, en présence de pays très hétérogènes, d'annoncer et de mettre en oeuvre un accord de norme uniforme avec transferts lorsque le coût irrécupérable de l'installation de la technologie est faible et que les bénéfices marginaux de la dépollution globale sont élevés, tandis que ce n'est plus le cas lorsque le coût irrécupérable de l'installation de la technologie est élevé. Dans ce cas, la mise en oeuvre de l'accord de norme uniforme avec transferts donne le même niveau de paiement que celui au point de menace de la négociatio