Trade-Offs in Fairness and Preference Judgments

At the heart of many debates about distributive justice is the widely assumed trade-off between equality and efficiency (Okun, 1975). In the present chapter, equality refers to the distribution of income within a society. Equality increases whenever income variability is reduced. Efficiency refers to the goods and services that result from a given input – production, physical capital, or human labor. Efficiency increases whenever society produces more from the same input. Trade-offs between equality and efficiency occur because increases in one often lead to decreases in the other. An egalitarian society satisfies basic needs by establishing programs that redistribute wealth. But those programs can reduce efficiency when they introduce bureaucratic waste or diminish financial incentives. A reduction in efficiency can lead to fewer investments, fewer jobs, and declining productivity

Utility Measurement: Configural-Weight Theory and the Judge\u27s Point of View

Subjects judged the values of lotteries from 3 points of view: the highest price that a buyer should pay, the lowest price that a seller should accept, and the “fair” price. The rank order of judgments changed as a function of point of view. Data also showed violations of branch independence and monotonicity (dominance). These findings pose difficulties for nonconfigural theories of decision making, such as subjective expected utility theory, but can be described by configural-weight theory. Configural weighting is similar to rank-dependent utility theory, except that the weight of the lowest outcome in a gamble depends on the viewpoint, and 0-valued outcomes receive differential weighting. Configural-weight theory predicted the effect of viewpoint, the violations of branch independence, and the violations of monotonicity, using a single scale of utility that is independent of the lottery and the point of view

Item Response Models of Probability Judgments: Application to a Geopolitical Forecasting Tournament

In this article, we develop and study methods for evaluating forecasters and forecasting questions in dynamic environments. These methods, based on item response models, are useful in situations where items vary in difficulty, and we wish to evaluate forecasters based on the difficulty of the items that they forecasted correctly. In addition, the methods are useful in situations where we need to compare forecasters who make predictions at different points in time or for different items. We first extend traditional models to handle subjective probabilities, and we then apply a specific model to geopolitical forecasts. We evaluate the model’s ability to accommodate the data, compare the model’s estimates of forecaster ability to estimates of forecaster ability based on scoring rules, and externally validate the model’s item estimates. We also highlight some shortcomings of the traditional models and discuss some further extensions. The analyses illustrate the models’ potential for widespread use in forecasting and subjective probability evaluation

The role of actively open-minded thinking in information acquisition, accuracy, and calibration

Errors in estimating and forecasting often result from the failure to collect and consider enough relevant information. We examine whether attributes associated with persistence in information acquisition can predict performance in an estimation task. We focus on actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and the tendency to maximize or satisfice when making decisions. In three studies, participants made estimates and predictions of uncertain quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount of information they could collect before estimating. Only AOT predicted performance. This relationship was mediated by information acquisition: AOT predicted the tendency to collect information, and information acquisition predicted performance. To the extent that available information is predictive of future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate forecasts

Probability Aggregation in Time-Series: Dynamic Hierarchical Modeling of Sparse Expert Beliefs

Most subjective probability aggregation procedures use a single probability judgment from each expert, even though it is common for experts studying real problems to update their probability estimates over time. This paper advances into unexplored areas of probability aggregation by considering a dynamic context in which experts can update their beliefs at random intervals. The updates occur very infrequently, resulting in a sparse data set that cannot be modeled by standard time-series procedures. In response to the lack of appropriate methodology, this paper presents a hierarchical model that takes into account the expert’s level of self-reported expertise and produces aggregate probabilities that are sharp and well calibrated both in- and outof-sample. The model is demonstrated on a real-world data set that includes over 2300 experts making multiple probability forecasts over two years on different subsets of 166 international political events

The Effects of Pictorial Realism, Delay of Visual Feedback, and Observer Interactivity on the Subjective Sense of Presence

Two experiments examined the effects of pictorial realism, observer interactivity, and delay of visual feedback on the sense of presence. Subjects were presented pairs of virtual enviornments (a simulated driving task) that differed in one or more ways from each other. After subjects had completed the second member of each pair they reported which of the two had produced the greater amount of presence and indicated the size of this difference by means of a 1-100 scale. As predicted, realism and interactivity increased presence while delay of visual feedback diminished it. According to subjects\u27 verbal responses to a postexperiment interview, pictorial realism was the least influential of the three variables examined. Further, although some subjects reported an increase in the sense of presence over the course of the experiment, most said it reamined unchanged or became weaker